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1. INrlRODUCTION
Questions about the equitable distribution of the fruits of
economic growth have come to the fore in recent years, as rapid
growth has continued. The title of the most recent partnership
agreement - Programme for Prosperity and Fairness reflects this
trend. Government policy, as expressed in the National Anti-
Poverty Strategy, contains commitments to assess proposed policy
changes with respect to their impact on poverty ("poverty-
proofing"). But there are also concerns about the impact of tax
policy changes, in terms of the balance between gains for the low-
paid, middle income earners, and high income earners. At the
same time, the continuation of rapid growth cannot be taken for
granted. One of the factors which has contributed to recent growth
is the improvement in financial work incentives associated with
changes in tax and welfare policy.
In this study we review current policy issues in the light of
recent and longer-term trends and developments. We consider
policies and packages for tax and welfare reform that can be
delivered within broadly conventional tax-welfare structures. For
studies of the effects of a more radical structural shift to a basic
income system, see Department of the Taoiseach (2001).
The project can also be seen as building on work done some
time ago for the Expert Working Group on the Integration of the
Income Tax and Social Welfare Systems. The present report
extends the range of policy options to be considered to include
the tax treatment of those on low incomes, child income support,
and the role and design of in-work benefits; it also aims to deepen
the analysis of incentive and distributional effects. It addresses the
issue of individualisation of social welfare payments, which would
do away with the concept of adult dependancy, as well as moves
towards greater independence in the tax treatment of husbands
and wives.
Much of the analysis is based on SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit
model. This model simulates the welfare entitlements and income
tax liabilities of each individual and family in a nationally
representative sample of households. In this way, the first-round
impact of changes in tax and welfare policy can be simulated. The
results can be aggregated to show the change in government’s
costs and revenues, and summarised to show the pattern of gains
and losses across the income distribution and across family types.
(For more detail on the SWITCH model see box.)
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The SWITCH model provides a firm basis for the simulation of
first-round effects of alternative packages of reforms of the tax and
benefit system. This project has involved extending that model, to
deal inter alia with the particular issues arising from
individualisation of tax and of social welfare. Analysis of this type
was undertaken for the Working Group Examining the Treatment
of Married, Cohabiting and One-parent Families under the Tax and
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Social Welfare Codes (Department of Social, Community and
Family Affairs, 1999).
Tax and welfare policy in all countries must grapple with "the
big trade-off" - equity versus efficiency. Detailed information on
the possible consequences of policy changes for income
distribution and financial work incentives is essential if policy
choices are to be well-founded. Are there areas in which equity
can be advanced without disimproving financial work incentives?
If not, which of the alternative ways of providing income support
to target groups will be least damaging to incentives? Questions of
this type are an underlying theme in the report.
The structure of the report is as follows. We first consider
(Chapter 2) how gross pay and net earnings have evolved under
the influence of recent Partnership agreements covering pay, tax
and welfare. We also review the evidence on the changing
distribution of earnings, and how that relates to the distribution of
household income. In Chapter 3, the focus is on issues relating to
the National Anti-Poverty Strategy, including the setting of poverty
targets, the recent evolution of poverty and the issues of how
welfare payments may be linked to the level and/or changes in
general living standards (benchmarking and indexation). Chapter 4
examines issues relating to low pay, and the tax and welfare
instruments which can be used to provide assistance to those on
low pay. Chapter 5 reviews the broader issues involved in shaping
the tax and welfare treatment of individuals and families, situating
Ireland’s experience in an international context. Chapter 6 focuses
on child income support - where both welfare and tax issues arise.
Some critical issues relating to the assessment of the distributional
and relative poverty impacts of budgetary policy are examined in
Chapter 7, which examines the impact of recent budgets. Chapter
8 brings together some of the ideas from earlier chapters and
explores key policy choices in a medium-term context. The main
findings and their implications for policy are drawn together in the
concluding chapter.
2. EARNINGS AND INCOMES
UNDER PAR NERSHn"
2.1
Introduction
2.2
Pay
Agreements
and Wage
Growth
Tax and welfare policies have, since 1987, been framed in a
context of social partnership negotiations. The initial partnership
agreement, Progralmne for National Recovery (PNR, Ireland, 1987),
represented a response to economic difficulties including high
unemployment and fiscal deficits. Subsequent agreements - the
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP, Ireland, 1991),
the Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW, Ireland, 1994)
and Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, Employment and
Competitiveness (P2K, Ireland, 1996) - dealt with the development
of policies to sustain and build on the economic recovery, while
also tackling issues of social inclusion. The current agreement - the
Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, Ireland, 2000) - has
the twin objectives of maintaining growth in average living
standards, and ensuring an equitable distribution of the fruits of
economic growth.
The factors involved in Ireland’s economic recovery and
expansion, including the role of partnership agreements, is dealt
with extensively elsewhere (Bradley et al., 1997, Honohan, 1999,
Hardiman, 2000). In this chapter our focus is much narrower. We
concentrate on a central element of the Partnership agreements, in
which low rates of wage growth were agreed, with further growth
in net incomes to be delivered by tax cuts. In Section 2.2 we
consider the wage increases agreed under the programme, and
how they related to actual wage outcomes. Section 2.3 considers
some issues arising from the use of tax instruments to boost
disposable income. Section 2.4 moves the focus beyond the usual
consideration of average wages, to examine developments in the
distribution of wages. The picture of wage developments across the
distribution provides a necessary backdrop for consideration of
many of the issues of tax and welfare policy discussed in later
chapters.
The pay agreements negotiated as part of the partnership process
provided for basic increases in pay which were not much greater
than expected price inflation. Cuts in income taxes were expected
to ensure some (further) growth in real incomes. There were
provisions allowing for local negotiations in the event of difficulties
in meeting payment. In the 1991 Programme for Economic and
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Social Progress, provision was made for employers and unions to
engage in local bargaining which could include a pay rise of a
further 3 per cent. We follow Sexton et al. (1999) in assuming that
on average, this raised pay by about 11k per cent.1 The Partnership
2000 agreement also had provision for local negotiations over a
possible 2 per cent pay rise. Given the strength of the labour
market in this period, we assume that almost all employees would
have seen pay rates rise by this amount. We do not attempt to take
into account the "minimum flat rate" provisions for low paid
workers, made by the National Wage Agreement (NWA) elements
of the partnership.
Table 2.1 shows the cumulative pay rises provided for under the
various agreements, and the actual rise in the hourly wage of the
average industrial worker over the period 1987 to 2000, and the
sub-periods 1987 to 1994 and 1994 to 2000.
Table 2.1: Pay Rises Provided for Under Partnership Agreements and Actual Pay
Growth, 1987-1994-2000
Sources: Programme for National Recovery (Ireland, 1987); Programme for Economic and Social Progress
(Ireland, 1990); Programme for Competitiveness and Work (Ireland, 1993); Programme 2000 (Ireland
1997); Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (Ireland, 2000); and CSO Databank QIBQ for hourly
earnings.
In the first sub-period, actual average pay rates in industry rose
by 1.2 per cent per annum faster than was provided for under the
national wage agreement (NWA) of the Partnership Agreement. In
the tighter labour market conditions of the second sub period, this
"Excess over NWA" effect (Sexton et al., 1999) rose to 1.7 per cent
per annum. While growth in average industrial earnings is not
always representative of economy-wide trends (Callan et al., 2000),
a cross-check with analysis by Sexton et al. (1999), based on Living
in Ireland Survey data for 1997 vis-a-vis the 1987 ESRI household
survey indicates similar growth over the 1987 to 1997 period. More
recently, estimates of economy-wide earnings growth in the
Quarterly Economic Commentary suggest that earnings growth
outside of industry is running ahead of the industrial sector figures
used here. This would suggest that, if anything, the figures shown
in the table somewhat underestimate the increase in "wage drift" in
the second sub-period.
1 A survey carried out by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in
late 1993 indicated that over 75 per cent of enterprises (with some 120,000
employees) had agreed to pay all o1 some of the 3 per cent increase.
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There can be a number of causes of this phenomenon,
including shifts in the skill composition of employment. But the
higher level of this "excess" effect in the later sub period, when the
labour market became considerably tighter, and the variation in the
effect across occupations (explored by Sexton et al., 1999) means
that it can have significant implications for the relative growth in
payment rates across different levels of earnings. We consider the
evidence on changes in the distribution of earnings, and their
relationship to household income distribution, in Section 2.3 below.
The wage agreements over this period were not constructed in
isolation, but in a wider context which included income tax
concessions designed to boost take-home pay. The low rates of
increase in gross pay were aimed at increasing the demand for
labour and boosting employment.2 Increased employment - and,
more recently, reductions in unemployment - were associated with
the implementation of this strategy. Our focus here is not on
quantifying the impact of this strategy as against other factors
(changes in external conditions, exchange rates etc.) examined by
others. Instead we point to two features of this wage-tax trade-off
which are of particular interest in the context of the present study.
First, tax cuts are sometimes discussed as if they were a perfect
substitute for wage increases. But it may be quite difficult to
construct a set of tax changes which will exactly compensate for a
pay increase forgone. In particular, it may be impossible to do so
for those who are outside the tax net. The current partnership
agreement (Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness) aims to remove
from the tax net those persons earning no more than the National
Minimum Wage. This would involve a substantial rise in the
number of individuals not paying any tax. As a result, the idea of
tax cuts providing a simple, straightforward way of compensating
for pay increases forgone may become still more questionable.
Second, packages involving tax cuts in return for pay restraint
have become closely associated with the partnership process. There
is widespread agreement that this strategy was an appropriate and
successful one in moving from high unemployment towards full
employment. But it is less clear whether such a bargain remains
appropriate close to full employment. In the context of the tight
labour market of recent years, there have been suggestions that a
move away from centralised bargaining towards a situation
variously characterised as a free market, free for all or localised
bargaining might be more appropriate. Alternatively, if bargaining
at central level is to remain a major feature, bargaining mechanisms
may need to be adapted to provide for greater flexibility. For a
discussion of various alternatives see McCoy et al. (March 2001), de
Buitldir and Thomhill (2001) and MacHale (2001). However, there
2
In a labour market with wages determined in a decentralised fashion, one could
also expect that tax cuts on labour income would allow for lower rates of increase
in gross wages; the centralisation of wage bargaining and co-ordination of the
wage-tax agreements could help to "telescope" the process by which such
outcomes come about.
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has been little questioning of whether income tax cuts would form
a necessary part of the package. This may reflect in part an inertia
in the process, and the build up of an expectation that such income
tax cuts will continue. In a long-run equilibrium, however, it is far
from clear that such an expectation would be justified.
2.3
Earnings
Dispersion
and the
Distribution of
Income
The earnings of employees are the single most important income
source for households in Ireland as in other industrialised countries.
We now look at the way in which the dispersion of earnings
among employees has been evolving, and relate this insofar as
possible to trends in the overall distribution of income. We rely on
the data provided by the 1987 ESRI Survey of Income Distribution,
Poverty and Usage of State Services and the 1994 and 1997 Living
in Ireland Surveys. (While data are produced regularly by the
Central Statistics Office on average earnings in specific sectors such
as industry, building and construction and the public sector, the
household surveys cover the whole economy and allow the overall
distribution of earnings at individual level to be studied.3)
The conventional approach to describing the dispersion in
earnings is to express the bottom decile, bottom ctuartile
, 
top
quartile and top decile as proportions of the median. While this
gives a picture of a number of different points in the distribution, a
single summary measure of dispersion may also be useful and the
ratio of the top to the bottom decile is often used, though different
summary measures may not always lead to the same conclusions in
terms of comparisons over time or across countries. We focus first
on the hourly earnings of all employees, and Table 2.2 shows the
distribution of gross hourly earnings in the 1987, 1994 and 1997
surveys as captured by these measures. The table shows that from
1987 to 1994 there was a marked widening in dispersion at the top of
the distribution. The ratio of the top decile to the median rose from
1.96 to 2.24, while the top quartile also moved further away from the
median. In the bottom half of the distribution, the bottom quartile fell
away from the median but the bottom decile did not. The overall
picture is thus of widening dispersion throughout the distribution
except at the very bottom, with the ratio of the top to the bottom
decile rising sharply from 4.2 to 4.8.
3
Validation against external sources has shown the employees in these samples to
be representative in terms of age, occupational group and industrial sector.
4 The median of the distribution is the earnings level above and below which half the
earners are found. Ranking all employees in terms by earnings from lowest to highest,
the bottom decile cut-off is the earnings level below which the lowest 10 per cent of
all earners fall, and the top decile the cut-off above which the highest 10 per cent are
found. Correspondingly, the bottom and top quartiles are the cut-offs below/above
which the bottom/top quarter of the distribution is found.
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2.4
Developments
in the
Distribution of
Wages
Table 2.2: Distribution of Hourly Earnings in 1987, 1994 and 1997,
All Employees
All en~lployees, hourly earnings: :
¯ Top quartile . ....,-,
: Topdecile : ,, ,,
Top decUe/bottom deCiie
It is particularly interesting to see whether this trend continued
from 1994 to 1997, as economic growth accelerated rapidly. We see
that the top decile did continue to move away from the median,
reaching 2.33 by 1997, with the top quartile also moving slightly
further from the median. In the bottom half of the distribution,
however, both the bottom decile and the bottom quartile now kept
pace with the median, if anything increasing marginally faster. As a
result, the ratio of the top to the bottom decile was essentially
unchanged.
Over the whole period from 1987 to 1997, then, there was a
substantial widening in earnings dispersion in terms of hourly
wages among all employees. This was more pronounced in the
1987-94 period than from 1994 on, so rapid economic growth did
not lead to acceleration in the trend. It was primarily driven by
relatively rapid increases for those towards the top of the
distribution, with no indication that the bottom has been falling
behind the median. In the light of the relatively rapid increase in
the top decile compared with the median it is of interest to look at
what was happening towards the very top. The 95’h percentile
(cutting off the top 5 per cent) rose even more rapidly than the
90’h. percentile, going from 2.4 times the median in 1987 to 2.8 in
1994 and 3.0 in 1997. The 99’h. percentile (cutting off the top 1 per
cent) went from 3.6 in 1987 to 3.8 in 1994 and 4.3 in 1997. So over
the whole period top earnings rose very rapidly, but it is only at
the very top that there is any suggestion that this might have
accelerated from 1994 to 1997.
It is also of interest to look at the distribution of weekly gross
earnings anlong full-time employees, since this is often used in
cross-country comparisons. Various definitions and measures of
. what constitutes "full-time" are used in different countries or with
different datasets, depending on custom and practice and the
nature of the data available. In some cases survey respondents’
own categorisation of their status as full versus part-time is taken,
in others different hours cut-offs are applied to reported hours
worked. Here we base the distinction on total hours of work
reported by respondents, .and count as full-time .those ,reporting at
least 30 hours usual work per week, the cut-off regarded as most
suitable for comparative purposes by the OECD (see Baslelaer,
Lemaitre and Marianna, 1997). About 10 per cent of Irish
employees worked less than this in 1987, but by 1994 the figure
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was up to 15 per cent and by 1997 it was 19 per cent. Table 2.3
shows the distribution of gross hourly and weekly earnings in 1987,
1994 and 1997 among full-time employees distinguished on this
basis.
Once again we see that from 1987 to 1994 there was a
consistent widening in dispersion at the top of the distribution. The
top decile as a proportion of the median rose from 1.82 to 1.97,
and the top quartile also moved further from the median. The
bottom decile was just below half the median in 1987 and 1994 and
just above it in 1997. The top half of the distribution showed little
change between 1994 and 1997. Over the decade as a whole, then,
the ratio of the top to the bottom decile increased markedly, but
this was concentrated in the period from 1987 to 1994.
Table 2.3: Distribution of Weekly Earnings in 1987, 1994 and 1997,
Full-time Employees
A comparative perspective on the Irish earnings distribution and
the way it has been changing since 1987 can be obtained by
comparing these results with measures of earnings dispersion for a
range of developed countries brought together by the OECD. This
shows first that Ireland had a relatively high level of earnings
inequality in 1987 compared with other OECD countries, only
Canada and the USA having a higher ratio of top to bottom decile.
It also reveals that the increase in earnings dispersion in Ireland
between 1987 and 1994 was also higher than most of the other
countries covered, although over the decade from 1987 the USA
saw a more substantial increase in this measure.
The increase in earnings dispersion was particularly marked
among men, with the top decile as a proportion of the (male)
median rising from 3.5 to 5.0 over the decade. This reflects the
bottom decile lagging behind the median, falling from 0.53 to 0.47,
but also the sharp increase in the top decile from 1.9 to 2.3 times
the median. Although dispersion was greater among women than
men employees in 1987 it rose by much less over the decade. With
the ratio of the top to the bottom decile increasing for women from
4.4 in 1987 to 4.6 in 1997, dispersion was by then less than for
men. The gap between average male and female earnings also
narrowed a good deal over the decade (see Callan et al., 2000). For
full-time adult men, there has been a particularly pronounced
increase in dispersion with the top decile going from 2.9 to 3.6
times the median, whereas among full-time women aged 21 or
over, by contrast, there was veW little change in dispersion over
the period.
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As far as low pay is concerned, it is customary to apply
thresholds set at either half or two-thirds of median earnings. About
11 per cent of employees were on hourly gross pay below half the
median in each of 1987, 1994 and 1997. While 20 per cent of
employees were below two-thirds of the median in 1987, this had
risen to 23 per cent by 1994 and was 22 per cent in 1997. On this
basis Ireland in the mid-1990s had one of the highest levels of low
pay of the countries covered by OECD comparative figures, similar
to the UK though lower than the USA and Canada. Part-time
employees - many of them married women - employees aged
under 25, and those in certain sectors such as retailing and personal
services were at high risk of being low paid. It is important to be
clear, however, that most low paid employees are not in poor
households, although employees in poor households are often low
paid (see Nolan, 1998; Nolan and Marx, 2000). The introduction of
a national hourly minimum wage in Ireland in April 2000 is clearly
a major policy innovation in this area. It seems unlikely to have
had a significant negative impact on employment so far, given the
strength of the economy and the tightness of the market for
unskilled labour. The key issue for the future, closely linked to the
indexation of social welfare payments as we discuss below, is how
the minimum wage changes over time: while increases over the
lifetime of the current social partnership agreement have been
flagged, at this stage a formal indexation procedure has not been
adopted.
The relationship between the distribution of earnings among
employees and that of incomes among households is a complex
one. The earnings distribution relates to individual employees,
takes no account of family size or income from other sources, and
focuses generally on gross pay. When looking at households, on
the other hand, the income concept most often employed includes
income from all sources, after deduction of income tax and social
insurance contributions. The measure used often includes an
equivalence scale adjustment to take into account the number of
people depending on that income. Since a given household may
include no, one, two or more earners, the way employees are
distributed over households is clearly a critical factor.
We can use the same ESRI surveys to compare the distribution
of disposable income among households in 1987, 1994 and 1997,
and that is done in Table 2.4. We see that the distribution was
generally rather stable over the period, though the middle did gain
at the expense of the top. Summary inequality measures such as
the Gini coefficient and the Theil index also suggest little change in
the overall level of inequality over the period.
It would be unwise to read much in welfare terms into these
distributional changes, because household incomes have not been
adjusted for differences in household size and composition. When
we carry out such an adjustment using a variety of equivalence
scales, the share of the bottom decile increases and the top falls
from 1987 to 1994, but otherwise there is something of a shift from
the rest of the bottom half to the rest of the top half, and both the
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Gini and Theil measures show a slight decline in overall inequality.
However, the share of total equivalised income going to the bottom
two deciles fell between 1994 and 1997, with the top half of the
distribution but not the top decile gaining, and the Gini and Theil
summaW indices show a marginal increase in inequality.
Table 2.4: Decile Shares in Disposable Income among Households,
1987, 1994 and 1997 ESRI Surveys
A wide range of different factors affect how the income
distribution evolves over time, and these operate through a variety
of channels of influence. The redistributive impact of income tax and
social insurance contributions, and of social welfare transfers, is
clearly an important part of the stow and the main focus of this
study. However, in dais chapter we have seen that earnings
dispersion among employees increased significantly in Ireland
between 1987 and 1997, and this raises the question as to why this
had not fed through to greater inequality in the distribution of income
among Irish households by 1997, in contrast to the UK and the USA
where increased earnings dispersion was associated with rising
income inequality. This appears to reflect the scale and nature of the
increase in labour force participation by married women in the Irish
case. Whereas in some other countries increasing labour force
participation by married women has had a disequalising effect, in the
Irish case the substantial increase in labour force participation by
married women between 1987 and 1994 has been shown to have
had if anything an equalising effect on the household income
distribution (O’Neill and Sweetman, 1998). This was because the
malxied women most likely to have entered the labour force during
that period had spouses in the lower rather than upper half of the
male earnings distribution. A related finding is that decomposition of
household income inequality by income source (using the squared
coefficient of variation) shows that earnings became less highly
correlated with total income to 1997 - whereas income from self-
employment and property became more highly correlated with
total income. An in-depth analysis of trends in the household
income distribution including such decompositions is given in
Nolan, Maitre, O’Neill and Sweetman (2000).
3. POVEgIY MEASURES,
BENCHMARKING AND
INDEXATION
3.1
¯ Introduction
3.2
The Poverty
Context
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy has important implications for
the conduct and evolution of tax and transfer policy. In this
chapter, we consider the nature of the targets set in the strategy,
and how they relate to broader measures of poverty. Trends in the
nature and extent of poverty are described in Section 3.2. Section
3.3 addresses an issue that is now coming to centre stage in that
context, namely the linking of annual increases in social welfare
rates with other incomes in society.
Poverty is generally conceived as inability to participate in the
ordinary life of society due to lack of resources, and this is the
definition set out in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS). ESRI
research has brought out the extent to which households’
deprivation levels are influenced not only by current income but
also by resources and experiences (particularly in the labour
marke0 over a long period. Income-based poverty lines can be
seen as focusing wholly on the "resources" element of the poverty
definition, but low income on its own may not always be a reliable
measure of exclusion arising from lack of resources. A more
reliable measure may be constructed by combining low income
with suitable direct indicators of deprivation - items generally
regarded as necessities which individuals or families must do
without because they cannot afford them.
Factor analysis of Irish data on non-monetary indicators for 1987
and 1994 revealed a number of distinct underlying dimensions of
deprivation. "Basic deprivation" included not being able to afford
heating; a substantial meal once a day; new rather than second-
hand clothes; a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day;
a warm overcoat; two pairs of strong shoes; a "roast" or equivalent
once a week; and not falling into arrears or debt paying everyday
household expenses. These items were perceived to be social
necessities - "things that every household should be able to have
and that nobody should have to do without" - they were possessed
by most people, reflect rather basic aspects of current material
deprivation, and cluster together.
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On this basis they were considered to be the most suitable as
indicators of underlying generalised deprivation. Those on
relatively low incomes and experiencing basic deprivation we then
identified as experiencing generalised deprivation or exclusion due
to lack of resources. When we looked at the other features that one
might expect to be associated with exclusion - such as low levels
of savings and high levels of economic strain and psychological
distress - this combined measure performed much better than
income on its own.
In 1994, about 15 per cent of households were below the 60 per
cent relative income poverty line and experiencing basic
deprivation, while 9 per cent were below half average income and
experiencing such deprivation. When the Strategy was adopted in
1997, it included a global poverty reduction target, based on this
poverty measure and using these 1994 results as the baseline. The
overall or global target was as follows:
Over the period, 1997-2007, the National Anti-Poverty
Strategy will aim at considerably reducing the
numbers of those who are "consistently poor" from 9
to 15 per cent to less than 5 to 10 per cent, as
measured by the ESRI. (Ireland, 1997.)
New data for 1997 have more recently allowed an updated
picture of trends in poverty to be presented, and the NAPS poverty
target has been revised in the light of these findings. Callan et al.
(1999) used the fourth wave to examine trends in poverty and
deprivation between 1994 and 1997. There was sizeable attrition
between Waves 1 and 4, but detailed validation suggested that it
was not associated with characteristics such as income or
deprivation levels or social welfare recipiency, and appeared not to
have a significant impact on the structure of the sample. Full
descriptions of the 1994 and 1997 surveys and these results are in
Callan et al. (1996) and Callan et al. (1999) respectively.
Looking at trends in relative income poverty between 1994 and
1997, Table 3.1 shows that the percentage of households below
relative income lines increased over the period. This is the case
consistently moving from a line set at 40 per cent of the mean up
to one set at 60 per cent. The table also shows that when one
Table 3.1: Percentage of Households and Persons Below Relative
Income Poverty Lines (Based on Income Averaged Across
Households), Living in Ireland Surveys 1994 and 1997
Notes: Equivalence scale of 1 for first adult, 0.66 for other adults, and 0.33 for
children aged under 14.
14 REFORMING TAX AND WELFARE
focuses on the percentage of persons living in these households,
the same trend is seen.
The period from 1994 to 1997 was of course one of remarkable
economic growth in Ireland, with GDP increasing by 7-8 per cent
per annum. This had a major impact on unemployment, which was
still as high as 16 per cent in 1994, but was down to 11 per cent by
1997. It also translated into a 20 per cent increase in average
household income in nominal terms between the 1994 and 1997
household surveys, when consumer prices rose by only 6 per cent.
Adjusting household incomes for differences in size and
composition, the increase in mean incomes was larger, at about 22
per cent. However social welfare support rates, while increasing
well ahead of prices, did not keep pace with the exceptionally
rapid rise in incomes from the market. Key social welfare pension
rates, for example, rose by 12 per cent in nominal terms. This,
together with failing unemployment, was crucial to the evolution of
poverty measures over the period.
It is also important to know what has been happening to real
incomes. For this purpose Callan et al. (1999) used income
standards set at 40, 50 and 60 per cent of mean equivalised income
in 1987 and adjusted upwards only in line with prices from then
on. With the 1987 60 per cent line, the poverty rate on this basis
would have fallen from about 20 per cent in 1994 to 11 per cent in
1997. Thus, in a period of rapid though uneven income growth,
relative income and real income poverty lines provide radically
different perspectives on the evolution of poverty.
Deprivation levels, as measured by the range of non-monetary
indicators available in the surveys, fell substantially over the 1994-
97 period. As a result the percentage of households below the 60
per cent line and experiencing basic deprivation fell from 15 per
cent to 10 per cent - the level the NAPS global poverty reduction
target sought for 2007. The percentage below the 50 per cent
relative income line and experiencing basic deprivation also fell,
though less sharply. Thus, combining relative income poverty lines
with a deprivation criterion held fixed from 1994 to 1997 gives a
very different picture to that shown by relative income lines alone.
The set of indicators included in the basic deprivation measure
has remained unchanged since 1987 when this data was first
avai.lable, so the issue arises as to whether this continues to
adequately capture what is regarded as generalised deprivation.
Over the whole period from 1987 to 1997, expectations followed
the general upward trend in the extent of possession of items.
Items such as central heating, a telephone, a car, a colour TV, and
presents for friends and family at least once a year came to be
perceived as necessities by a substantial majority of households.
However, not all socially perceived necessities are suitable for
incorporation into the combined income/deprivation measure, but
only those tapping the underlying generalised deprivation which
one is attempting to capture. Factor analysis shows that these five
items continue to load on the secondary deprivation dimension,
rather than cluster with the basic items (Layte et al., 2001). This
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supports the argument that the basic deprivation index should not,
at this point, be expanded to include these additional five items.
The profile of the additional households who would be counted
as poor if one broadened the poverty measure to incorporate these
five additional items was similar to that of other non-poor
households, and strikingly different from those currently identified
as poor, in terms of self-assessed economic strain, psychological
distress and fatalism (see Layte et al., 2001). The combined income
and deprivation measure as originally constituted thus continues to
identify a set of households experiencing generalised deprivation
resulting from a lack of resources, suffering a degree of economic
strain and general psychological difficulties that mark them out
from the rest of the population.
When deprivation is falling markedly, many people may not
regard an increase in numbers falling below a relative income line
as an unambiguous increase in poverty. Over a lengthy period
when living standards stabilise, however, societal expectations may
indeed catch up and adjust fully to higher average incomes. Higher
real incomes and lower deprivation levels, however welcome,
would not then mean that everyone was able to participate fully in
society: they would not represent a sustained reduction in poverty.
In the shorter term, though, the fact that real and relative income
levels are diverging so markedly cannot be simply ignored. Poverty
targets must capture these realities, but also take into account the
long-term consequences of lower incomes, and social welfare rates
in particular, lagging behind growth in average incomes.
At a minimum this means the poverty target has to be re-based
regularly, and in the light of these results the government in fact
decided to take the 1997 level of the combined income and
deprivation poverty measure as the new baseline for NAPS
purposes. The revised target is now to reduce the numbers in
"consistent poverty" to below 5 per cent by 2004.
More fundamentally, though, there is a case for broadening the
scope of poverty targets, with distinct targets along the following
lines:
1. Priority is given to ensuring that those on low
incomes see their real incomes rise, and their
deprivation levels using a fixed set of indicators
decline;
2. Next, relative incomes and deprivation levels
using a set of deprivation indicators which
changes as far as possible in line with
expectations should produce a decline in the
combined income/deprivation measure;
3. Finally, the proportion of the population falling
below relative income poverty lines should be
declining.
Each of these tiers can be regarded as encapsulating a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a sustainable reduction in poverty:
1. This target reflects the assumption that if real
incomes of the poor are falling and their
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deprivation levels rising, then even if their relative
positions were improving most people would see
poverty as increasing;
2. This target reflects the assumption that the
combined effect of changes in relative incomes
and deprivation should be to reduce the extent of
what is regarded as exclusion at a point in time;
3. This target reflects the assumption that in the long
term, people will not be able to participate in
what comes to be regarded as ordinary living
standards if their incomes fall too far below the
average: a sustained reduction in poverty can then
be achieved only by bringing them closer to
average incomes.
The adoption of a national poverty target highlights the
limitations of specific policies which, however valuable in
themselves, cannot realistically be expected to have a substantial
impact on the overall numbers in poverty. It becomes clear that
policies targeting very specific groups or areas do not in themselves
constitute a national anti-poverty strategy. It then becomes
impossible to ignore what David Piachaud in the UK context has
referred to as "the big, expensive issues" - above all what happens
to unemployment and the uprating of social welfare benefits.
Falling unemployment has been central to the impact of rapid
economic growth on poverty, as analysis of the results for 1997
bring out (Callan et al., 1999), though the risk of relative income
poverty for the much smaller numbers now unemployed remains
high. It is to the setting of welfare payment rates thus, that we now
turn our attention.
3.3
Benchmarking
and
Indexation
Recent debate on the setting and uprating of welfare payments
has centred on the ideas of "benchmarking" payments with respect
to target income levels, and "indexing" or "uprating" payments to
keep them in line with such a benchmark over time. For example,
NESC (1999) proposed that "a new benchmark for the income
adequacy of social welfare payments, other than old age pensions,
be established through the social partnership process. A time frame
over which it is to be achieved would have to be agreed as would
a mechanism to index levels of payment to improvements in the
general living standard once the benchmark has been reached".
Following this, the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (Ireland,
2000) contains .both a general commitment to the objective of
ensuring that "the real value of social welfare payments is
maintained and where possible enhanced to ensure that all share in
the fruits of economic growth" and a specific provision for a
Working Group to examine the complex issues in developing a
benchmark for adequacy of payments, and the implications of
adopting a specific approach to the ongoing up-rating or indexation
of payments.
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The issues involved are indeed complex, and decisions on some
of the central issues require social and political judgements
regarding the priority to be attached to economic efficiency and
distributional objectives. Analysis can inform such judgements, but
cannot substitute for them. In the remainder of this chapter we
focus on clarifying the conceptual, practical and technical issues
involved.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Why set a benchmark for social welfare payments? And what are
the objectives of an indexation procedure? Such fundamental
questions are considered in the report of the Social Welfare
Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group (2001), set up under
the auspices of the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. A
benchmark target would most likely emerge as the product of
negotiation and/or political judgement. In that context, its purpose
could be regarded as to provide a counterpart, for welfare
recipients, to the commitments on pay and tax provided in
partnership agreements. More generally, the purpose of benchmark
targets and/or indexation procedures could be regarded as ensuring
that ad hoc decisions taken from year to year do not result in
unwanted consequences, in terms of relationships between the
incomes of those dependent on welfare and those in employment.
The case against the use of a benchmark was also considered
by the Group. One argument was that this would reduce
government’s freedom of action and that the loss of flexibility could
have deleterious consequences. Another was that the introduction
of a benchmark was not required to protect and enhance the
incomes of welfare claimants.
It is worthwhile to distinguish between two forms of indexation
in this context. The first, which we might term baseline indexation,
involves a commitment to automatic indexation of welfare
payments in line with the chosen index in the opening position for
the annual budget. (See Chapter 7 for further discussion of this
idea). This is the form of indexation adopted by the UK with
respect to the income tax system. Tax bands and allowances are
automatically indexed to prices in the opening position for the
annual budget. This can be overridden by the budget in either
direction, but the decision must be an explicit one. The second,
and stronger form of indexation could be termed policy indexation.
Under this form, actual policy is determined precisely by the
indexed values.
There is a parallel between the arguments for and against
baseline indexation of welfare, and the arguments for and against
indexation of tax allowances and bands. If tax allowances were to
be frozen in nominal terms, this would require an explicit reduction
from the indexed level in the UK. The implicit rise in average tax
rates would be more hidden in the Irish case, where there is no
commitment in legislation to indexation. In the UK, the legislation
was introduced with the intention of making such decisions more
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explicit. In effect, therefore, it represented a decision that it was
preferable to reduce government’s freedom of action and force
government to raise revenue explicitly rather than implicitly.
Similarly in the context of welfare payments, it could be argued
that a baseline indexation procedure would require governments to
be explicit about the impact of policy choices on the relative
incomes of welfare recipients.
CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE ~ UPRATING
Some insights into the issues arising in the choice of indexation or
uprating regimes can be gained by considering cross-country
experience. A review of the different mechanisms used to uprate
social assistance benefits in OECD countries was conducted by
Eardley et al. (1995), and some of the key findings are summarised
in Table 3.2.5
Table 3.2: Mechanisms for Uprating Social Assistance Benefits in Selected OECD
Countries
Country
Australia Indexed by changes in the consumer
Austria Annual: indexation in line with
eamings.
Belgium AutomatiC link to RPI,
petrol; but special ’
narrow the gap
: Canada Annual adjustment,
Denmark Linked to level
Finland Linked to fiat-rate pensions, which are linked tO
France Can be uprated twice
Germany Social assistance is uprated in line
third of income distribution’
more than the full
Greece Ministerial or Presidential
Italy Uprated in line with
Japan Indexed to national average (
Netherlands .Linked to net minimum wage
fxice index". BUt minimum wage was
, social assistance, and again in 1993.
Sweden Standards uprated in line with pdces
UK Largely linked to prices since 1980, and. since
housing costs.
USA Year toyear uprating based
Income)
Source: Adapted from Eardley et al. (1996), social Assistance in OECD Countries: Synthesis Report, London:
HMSO.
The most common uprating formula is indexation of benefit
levels to increases in the consumer price index. Three European
countries were found to use a formula other than prices, each
linking to another benefit which had a link to wider incomes or
5 The underlying information was obtained from replies to a questionnaire sent to
official and academic informants in each country.
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living standards. Denmark linked social assistance to the level of
unemployment benefit, which grew in line with average earnings.
Finland linked social assistance to the fiat rate pension, which was
in turn related to the consumption levels of the poorest quintile. In
Austria, social assistance was usually increased in line with
pensions, which are linked to earnings.
The country experiences outlined by Eardley et al., show clearly
that the existence of a mechanism does not predetermine policy
choices in an absolute fashion or guarantee any particular result.
Consider, for example, the commonest uprating mechanism in use,
the link to consumer prices. On average, with positive economic
growth, one might expect that this would lead to a constant real
value for the benefit, but a fall in its value relative to wage earners
and the general living standard. Yet the actual experience of three
of the countries using this broad mechanism (Australia, Belgium
and the Netherlands) was quite different from this "expected"
outcome. In Australia, real wages fell, so that price indexation led
to a relative improvement in the incomes of those on social
assistance: their real incomes were protected while the real
incomes of others fell. In Belgium, there were also real income
rises for social assistance beneficiaries, because of special increases
in payment rates over and above what was required by indexation.
In the Netherlands, social assistance rates were linked indirectly to
prices via the minimum wage. But the minimum wage was frozen
between 1984 and 1990, and again in 1993. Thus there were
reductions in the real purchasing power of the social assistance
benefit.
IRISH DATA SOURCES
Turning to the Irish context, what indicators of general living
standards are then most appropriate, and how are social welfare
rates best linked to those indicators? The 1992 "Minimum Income"
Recommendation by the EU Commission, for example, refers to
fixing social security rates with reference to appropriate indicators
such as statistical data on average disposable income and
household consumption, the legal minimum wage if it exists, and
the level of prices in the Member State. Member States are also
encouraged to establish arrangements for periodic review of these
amounts, based on these indicators, "in order that needs continue
to be covered". In the Irish case, as pointed out in Callan, Nolan
and Whelan (1996), data currently available for this purpose are
rather limited. The only official data on earnings and incomes
available with sufficient frequency to be of use are the figures
produced quarterly by the CSO on average earnings in industry
(from the Quarterly Industrial Inquiry) and in certain other sectors,
and those in the annual National Accounts on aggregate incomes
from different sources and total personal disposable income. Both
have limitations in the context of monitoring trends in earnings or
incomes generally.
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The QII covers only industrial employment, where a minority of
employees work, and the published information relates to average
gross earnings but not their distribution. Information on individual
earnings does not in any case tell us what is happening to
household living standards, since the latter depends also on how
earners and those in receipt of other income sources are grouped
together, with their dependants, in households. The National
Accounts income aggregates cover the whole economy and include
income from self-employment and property as well as earnings.
However, they can serve as the basis for only the crudest estimate
of average income per head, with no means of taking into account
the way this income is distributed among households of differing
compositions. Data on household incomes are produced from the
Household Budget Survey but this has only been carried out every
seven years in the past, now moving to every five years. The Living
in Ireland Survey being carried out by the ESRI for Eurostat does
provide inter alia annual estimates of household incomes from
1994. Reductions in sample size through attrition prompted action
to "refresh" the sample with additional households in 2000, but the
shape and nature of an EU-wide statistical instrument for the
measurement of income and living standards for later years is as
yet uncertain.
Improvements in the range of indicators of trends in earnings,
household incomes and general living standard are therefore a
priority if the social welfare uprating process is to include an
explicit link. One can point, for example, to the data available in
the UK on both earnings and household incomes. The New
Earnings Survey provides a detailed picture of individual earnings
and hours worked for a very large sample of employees. This
means that not only measures such as average and median
earnings, but also the level of earnings of those at different points
in the earnings distribution, are available on an annual basis. The
annual Family Expenditure Survey and more recently the specially-
designed Family Resources Survey provide in-depth information on
household incomes, the latter for a very large sample, so that mean
and median household equivalent incomes and the distribution of
that income can be derived in a variety of ways. This provides the
basis for the annual official British report on Households Below
Average Income, setting out the evolution of the position of
households towards the bottom of the income distribution relative
to both income standards held constant in real terms and ones that
move over time in line with the average for all households.
Both individual earnings and household incomes are relevant
points of comparison, and it is important that in each case one
knows more than simply how the average is changing. Average
earnings could for example be increasing because top earnings are
rising very rapidly but earnings in the bottom half of the
distribution are actually stagnant. This would contrast sharply with
an upward shift in the entire distribution giving the same increase
in the mean. The work incentive effects of raising social security
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rates in line with the average would clearly be different in those
two cases.
WHICH EARNINGS SERIES?
Given the variability in incomes from self-employment and the
difficulties in measuring those incomes, it seems likely that incomes
from employment will be the main focus of attention. Average
earnings in industW have been the headline statistic in this area for
many years, as this series is long-established, regularly produced,
and reasonably up to date. But given the small share of industry in
total employment, it is inevitable that economy-wide trends can
sometimes differ from those in industry.
One would ideally like to have information on earnings across
the whole economy, but at present the Central Statistics Office’s
(CSO) quarterly series cover only specific sectors, with no
composite index covering all of these sectors. These are
manufacturing, building and construction, the public sector and
finance and insurance. While those covered are important there are
notable omissions, including for example earnings information for
many areas of private services. Moreover, the methodological basis
underlying the CSO earnings series also differs from household
survey-based earnings data in being obtained from enterprises. In
some instances (e.g., manufacturing and building) the series
involve compilations of hourly earnings, while for others (e.g. the
public sector and financial and insurance institutions) the
information relates only to weekly earnings. Importantly,
employees in small firms are generally not included.
These CSO series do have some notable advantages. They are
based on large numbers, they are compiled on a quarterly basis,
and they are reasonably up to date) However, the evolution of
earnings across these sectors from quarter to quarter or year to year
can vary considerably. Sexton et al., 1999, for example, recently
compared:
1. A composite index of hourly earnings in building
and construction enterprises with 10 or more
persons engaged, covering clerical workers and
both skilled and unskilled manual operatives.
2. An hourly earnings index for all "industrial
workers" (i.e. other than managerial, professional
and clerical) in manufacturing industry/ again
confined to enterprises with more than 10 persons
engaged.
3. A weekly earnings index for all public sector
workers and,
6
For example, final figures for March 2000 were published in November 2000, with
initial estimates for June planned for release in December.
7
Unless where otherwise stated, the category "manufacturing industry" includes
public utilities, i.e. electricity gas and water.
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4. A weekly earnings index for all employees in
financial and insurance institutions.
By early 1999 the average earnings of employees in building
and construction were some 43 per cent higher in real terms than
in Spring 1988. The corresponding rise for public sector workers
was just under 25 per cent. For employees in manufacturing this
increase was about 17 per cent, while it was 14 per cent for those
in financial and insurance establishments. Average earnings in
industry cannot thus be simply taken as broadly representative of
economy-wide earnings, even over a fairly long period. A true
economy-wide measure can at present only be derived from an
appropriate broadly-based survey, of enterprises or households.
SOME POTENTIAL INCOME INDICATORS
NESC (1999) discuss four possible indicators of living standards for
consideration in benchmarking and indexing welfare payments:
1. The benchmark set by the Commission on Social
Welfare in 1986.
2. The 50 per cent average income threshold or
relative income poverty line, calculated on the
basis of household disposable income per adult
equivalent.
3. Average industrial earnings before tax (gross
average industrial earnings, GME).
4. Net income after tax and PRSI of a single person
on average industrial earnings (NME).
We consider each of these in turn, and then examine the
evolution of three alternative indicators over time.
The first potential benchmark is the Commission on Social
Welfare’s (1986) assessment that a minimum adequate basic social
welfare payment would have been in the range £50 to £60 in 1986
terms. The logic of several of the approaches used to underpin this
estimate suggests that this benchmark would need to be uprated in
line with higher living standards across the community, rather than
simply indexed in line with prices. For example, three of the
approaches used by the Commission simply take proportions of the
average industrial wage, average personal disposable income from
the National Accounts, and average household income for
particular family types from a household survey. If the benchmark
decided by the Commission were to have continued relevance,
therefore, the difficult issues in deciding the precise indicator or
combination of indicators to be used, and the relevant
proportion(s) of income indicators would still have to be decided in
terms of current judgements. It is not possible to "shift the decision"
back to the 1986 Commission.
The second indicator listed above is the one most directly
related to the poverty targets discussed in the preceding section.
The household income measure, adjusted for family size and
composition using an equivalence scale, gives a broadly-based
indication of the change in living standards over time. It is a critical
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element in estimation of relative income poverty rates, and also in
the NAPS measure of consistent poverty.
The earnings related statistics (gross average industrial earnings
and net average industrial earnings for a single person) have a
somewhat different rationale. While they can also be seen as a link
between growth in the real earnings capacity of those in the labour
market and those dependent on welfare payments, they also have
another interpretation. Choice of this benchmark can be seen as
relating to financial work incentives. A welfare payment set in
relation to GAIE or NAIE can also be interpreted as approximating
the (gross or net) replacement rate for a single person at average
earnings levels. This highlights the dual nature of a replacement
rate measure: on the one hand it is a measure of adequacy of
income replacement, when employment income is lost; on the
other it can be regarded as a measure of the financial incentive or
disincentive to work. The fact that average industrial earnings
cannot be taken as necessarily representative of wider earnings
trends across the economy was illustrated in the previous section. A
further difficulty arises in trying to identify trends in net earnings, in
that trends can then depend on the family situation of the
individual concerned.
In order to understand the nature of these three alternative
income indicators for either benchmarking or indexation purposes,
it is helpful to consider broad trends in the evolution of such
indicators over a period long enough to cover different stages of
the business cycle. Issues concerning the choice of an earnings
series are dealt with in the next section. Figure 3.1 shows each of
the potential indicators (household income per adult equivalent,
hourly earnings in manufacturing, and the net wage at average
hourly earnings in manufacturing) for the years 1980, 1987, 1994
and estimates of the position in 2000.
During the 1980 to 1987 period, increases in gross average
industrial earnings were offset by tax increases leading to a fall in
net earnings. Social welfare incomes were protected against
inflation during the period and rose in relative terms, and average
household income (per adult equivalent) was roughly constant.
From 1987 to 1994, net earnings rose faster than gross earnings, in
line with the Partnership agreements on pay and tax. From 1994 to
2000, the gap between the growth of net and gross earnings
widened, with larger tax cuts; and average household income is
estimated to have risen even faster.
The reasons for the difference in the evolution of gross and net
earnings are well understood: it was an explicit goal of policy to
trade moderate wage growth for tax cuts which would support
faster growth in net earnings. The even sharper increase in the
growth of average household income is a more complex
phenomenon. It is important to understand the sources of the
additional growth in average household income in order to assess
the implications for the choice of a benchmark or indexation
indicator.
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Figure 3.1:
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Real Growth in Alternative Income Indicators for Indexation/Benchmarking:
1980, 1987, 1994 and 2000
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Notes:
Hourly earnings in manufacturing and consumer price index from the CSO Databank and Statistical
Release. Growth from 1999 to 2000 projected using forecast from Quarterly Economic Commentary,
November 2000. Net income at a standard 40 hour work week at hourly earnings calculated for single
person on PAYE and full PRSI. Disposable income per adult equivalent from analysis of CSO
Household Budget Survey 1980, Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services,
1987 and Living in Ireland Survey 1994. Estimate for disposable income per adult equivalent in the
year 2000 based on SWITCH.
Disposable income per adult equivalent is averaged over households for each of the years 1980, 1987,
1994. For 2000, the growth from 1997 is estimated using projections from the SWITCH model which
take account of estimated income growth, changes in tax and welfare policy, employment growth,
and the age composition of the population.
For any individual household, total disposable income can
include not only employment earnings, but also earnings from self-
employment, profits, rent, dividends, interest, pensions and social
welfare transfers. Thus, growth in household income can be
affected not only by growth in average industrial earnings (which,
as noted earlier, may not be representative of growth in average
employee income across all sectors) but also by growth in self-
employment incomes and the other elements mentioned above.
Over the 1987 to 2000 period, the wage share in national income
has declined as self-employment incomes and profits have risen
faster than wages. In addition, household income can be influenced
by the balance between the number of individuals within the
household who have a job and changes in average household size.
Falling unemployment and rising female labour force participation
would therefore tend to raise average household income. In
addition, average income per adult equivalent would tend to rise as
the average number of children per family declined, and could be
affected by the way earners group together into households.
There are a number of possible interpretations of such changes
in income. One is that the source of the income growth is of little
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import, from the point of view of its implications for poverty.
Failure to index welfare payments to growth in average household
income would lead to a rise in relative income poverty; growth in
mean or median income would lead to changes in living standards,
with those dependent on welfare failing sooner or later to keep up
with ordinaW or typical living patterns. At the same time, the
source and nature of the growth in average household income
could be of nlajor importance for financial work incentives - which
in turn could have further implications for employment,
unemployment and poverty.
Another view might seek to examine the contribution of
different elements to the growth in average household income.
Technically, this is a complex task, with no established
decomposition methodology. But suppose, for example, that a
certain proportion of the rise in average income could be attributed
to a fall in unemployment as individuals previously unemployed
obtained jobs. Does this mean that welfare rates should be indexed
to an indicator which excludes this portion of the growth in
income? It would seem more natural, in the context of the broad
objectives of the NAPS, to think in terms of a policy blend which
took advantage of increased employment rates to pay higher
unemployment compensation, while the conditionality of payments
might be more closely monitored in the context of a tight labour
market.
Similarly, there may be different interpretations of the role of
increased female participation in the labour force. The increase in
the number of two-earner couples is a contributow factor to the
rise in general living standards. But cash incomes are of course an
imperfect indicator of household welfare or living standards. Non-
cash elements affecting household welfare include the time
available for childcare, eldercare, leisure and "home production",
which is reduced by labour market participation.
At a broader level there is an argument for including non-cash
income as a contributoW element to overall economic welfare.
Other non-cash elements affecting household welfare include
imputed rent from owner occupation of accommodation; non-cash
benefits from employment; and non-cash benefits from the state,
whether provided universally (such as free education) or in a more
selective manner (such as medical cards giving access to free GP
services). One of the difficulties here is that including only a subset
of non-cash incomes may prove even more distortionaw in terms
of characterising the income distribution than restricting the focus
to cash income.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIVE INCOME POVERTY OF RECENT
TRENDS IN WELFARE RATES
The importance of the way in which future social welfare support
rates are related to the growth in other incomes in society can be
illustrated by considering recent trends and the implications of their
continuation. Table 3.3 shows how real growth in a range of social
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welfare rates compares with projected growth in gross and net
earnings, and in average income per adult equivalent (projected
using SWITCH).
Table 3.3: Social Welfare Rates Compared to Alternative Indicators
IndeX (1994=100)
Household,Income per Adult Eq
Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing
Net Earnings at Houdy Earnings in
person)
O d Age Contributory Pension
Widow’s Contributory Pension
Unemployment or Disability Benefit
Long-term Unemployment Assistance:
Supplementary WelfareAilowance
Lone Parent /
Over the period, most welfare rates rose by about 12 per cent
more than prices. This was somewhat below the growth in gross
earnings (16 per cent) and well below the growth in net earnings
(32 per cent). Special increases for pensions led to higher growth
than gross earnings but lower than net earnings. Growth in average
income per adult equivalent at household level is projected to have
been substantially above even the growth in net earnings.
What would be the implications if social welfare rates continue
to be increased ahead of consumer prices but lag behind average
income from employment? These issues are treated in depth in
Chapter 8. But earlier analysis (Callan et al., 1999) showed that the
allocation of resources as between tax cuts and welfare increases
could have a significant impact on relative income poverty rates.
These simulation results, together with those set out in Chapter 7,
serve to bring out in a direct way the crucial role, as far as relative
income poverty rates are concerned, of the evolution of social
welfare rates relative to other incomes in society.
IMPLICATIONS OF FORECAST ERRORS IN INDEXING PAYMENTS
The data available for any linking procedure or mechanism will be
provisional, and it will be some time after the event before the final
figures become available. In any case, it would be desirable to
avoid sharp variation from year to year in social welfare increases,
to provide some stability for expectations. It would therefore seem
advisable to have an "error correction mechanism" built into any
linking procedure. This could mean that social welfare rates were
related to a moving average of earnings trends, rather than simply
to the latest annual increase. Many of the same considerations, both
in terms of data and methods, apply to the question of how the
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3.4
Conclusions
National Minimum Wage introduced in April 2000 is to be uprated
over time. It will clearly be necessary to carefully consider the
relationship between the uprating of the minimum wage and social
welfare payments, and their interactions, before setting in place any
mechanism applying to social welfare.
Rates of welfare payment are a key factor in reaching, and
maintaining, the broad objectives of the National Anti-Poverty
Strategy. The setting of welfare payment rates involves difficult
social choices, in the context of trade-offs between objectives of
adequacy of welfare payments, taxation levels and financial
incentives to work which can affect employment levels. Experience
from other countries where different rate-setting mechanisms,
linked to prices or wage growth, have been used, shows that the
choice of a mechanism does not predetermine later social choices
in a simple fashion. There are advantages, however, in having year-
to-year changes made within an explicit framework, which takes
account of medium term considerations.
Differences between some of the main forms of income
indicator which could be used for the benchmarking and
indexation of welfare payments were considered. From a poverty
perspective, the role of average household income (adjusted for
family size and composition) in influencing living standards and
ordinary living patterns is a critical factor. If welfare payments lag
behind growth in this indicator, then welfare recipients may find it
increasingly difficult to participate fully in ordinary living patterns.
If, on the other hand, welfare payment rates rise much more
rapidly than growth in net earnings, then the financial incentive to
work may be reduced - with potential consequences for
employment and unemployment which could make poverty targets
harder to reach.
A simple mechanistic approach may be unlikely to resolve the
knotty economic, political and social issues which lie at the heart of
this debate. There are also technical issues relating to the
availability, timeliness and statistical reliability of the various
indicators. Some of these are inherent in the nature of the data
collection process; others are related to the extent of resources
invested in the data collection. But broadly speaking, information
on prices is the most up-to-date and readily available, while lags
are greater for information on wages.
One possible strategy for dealing with the indexation issue,
taking account of the ongoing tension between the objectives of
adequacy and financial work incentives, and the flow of data on
which decisions can be based is outlined below. The broad aim
would be to allow welfare recipients to share in the fruits of
growth, but without the ups and downs associated with cyclical
changes. The strategy could be seen as having four elements:
(a) A "real income guarantee" that welfare payments
would be indexed in line with expected price
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inflation, to insure that their real value was
protected even in times of recession.
(b) Indexation of welfare payments in line with
expected growth in net wages (moderated over
the cycle to take account of any years in which
welfare rates had increased faster than wages).
(c) Annual correction with respect to forecast errors
in the previous year.
(d) Periodic review, perhaps every 3 to 5 years, in the
light of household-based information on the wage
and income distributions, relative income poverty
thresholds and indicators of deprivation. This
review would also be an opportune time to
consider issues such as the sustainability of the
path over the cycle; and regularly revisit issues
relating to benchmarking, rather than assuming
that they can be dealt with on a "one-off" basis.
In current economic circumstances, the real income guarantee
element of the strategy may seem redundant or overly cautious, but
it is well to have a system which can cope with a variety of
economic circumstances, including recessions of the type which
occurred in the 1980s. The second part of this strategy would
ensure that welfare recipients had a share in the fruits of growth,
while guarding against adverse effects in terms of financial work
incentives. The third part of the strategy would take explicit
account of the uncertainties about price and wage changes: if
wages or prices grew by more or less than anticipated then this
would be explicitly accounted for in determining welfare payment
rates in the following year. Finally, and centrally, the evolution of
welfare payment rates would be monitored in the context of
household-based information on wages and incomes, where the
fuller consequences of year-to-year changes could be teased out,
and issues relating to the benchmarking of payments could be
regularly revisited.
4. Low PAY, Tax AND
IN-WORK BENnieS
4.1
Introduction
The strength of the labour market in recent years has led to vew
substantial growth in employment and real income gains at all
levels of the wage distribution. Rising employment and real wage
levels have helped to lift many families out of poverty. However,
there are still concerns about the levels of income achieved by
some families depending on employment income (the "working
poor") and about the wages and labour market prospects of those
at the lower end of the wage distribution (the "low pay" problem).
The overlap between low pay and poverty is quite limited. For
example, in 1998, only 7 per cent of households falling below the
60 per cent relative income poverty line were headed by an
employee (Layte et al., 2001). Even with the highest poverty line
and highest low pay threshold, Nolan (1993) found that four out of
five low-paid employees did not live in poor households. This
corresponds with the pattern found in other countries. Most low
paid employees are in households in the middle and upper parts of
the equivalent income distribution. On the other hand, low-paid
employees are more likely to have experienced unemployment,
more likely to be younger workers, less likely to be entitled to a
pension from their employer on retirement and as such face
pervasive labour market disadvantage (Nolan, 1993).
The returns to low wage employment are a vital concern in
considering policies to maintain financial incentives for
unemployed persons to take up such employment. This concern
motivated the introduction of the Family Income Supplement (FIS)
scheme in 1984, at a time when the financial incentive to take up
employment was at a low ebb. There has also been much
discussion of low wage employment in the lead-up to the
introduction and implementation of the statutory National Minimum
Wage in April 2000. The effectiveness of the minimum wage has
depended on the interaction with the tax/benefit system. The
significant increase in income, which the minimum wage has
represented for many low paid workers, has contributed to the
objectives pursued by ongoing tax reductions and in-work benefits.
Combining work and welfare raises important policy issues: are
in-work benefits ensuring that working families remain out of
poverty? How can the right incentives be provided for unemployed
people to take work, and for low-paid people to move up to
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4.2
International
Context
better-paid jobs? We begin our search for answers to such questions
by considering international experience in this area.
This section looks at some international evidence on tax and
welfare systems in order to put the Irish system in a comparative
context. Comparisons at aggregate or average level are used, as
well as others focused more particularly on how the different
systems deal with issues of low pay and poverty.
4.2.1 IMPLICIT TAX RATE COMPARISON
One method for analysing trends in the structure of taxation is to
calculate and compare implicit tax rates (tax revenues divided by
the tax base). Using this method for measuring the tax burden on
labour employed across Member states, EUROSTAT (2000) find that
between 1980 and 1997, the European average implicit tax rate on
employed labour increased steadily from 35 per cent to 42 per cent
(p. 218).8 This contrasts with the Irish implicit tax rate on employed
labour; from 1970 onwards it had steadily increased to peak at 34
per cent in 1988. It declined between 1988 and 1989 and then
remained constant for almost five years. In 1995 it decreased by
more than one and a half percentage points and since then has
stayed below 30 per cent (EUROSTAT, 2000).
4.2.2 TAX WEDGE COMPARISON
Table 4.1 shows the tax wedge between gross income and net
income across selected OECD countries, according to family type
and the gross income position vis-d~-vis average gross income
prevailing in each country in 1998. Tax rates in Ireland in 1998
were below the average tax rate across each of the eight household
types shown. The highest tax rate was faced by single people
without children, earning above average wages. One indicator for
low pay is the income level of two-thirds the wage of the average
production worker (APW).9 Using this measure, Ireland
8
The same rate for other factors of production (capital, self-employed labour,
energy and natural resources) decreased from 44 per cent to 35 per cent in the
1970 to 1997 period.
9 This provides one perspective on tax rates on lower incomes. Two-thirds of APW
represents different points in the wage distribution of different OECD countries -
t~vo-thirds of the APW may be close to the legal minimum wage. An alternative
would be to take a fixed point on the earnings distribution e.g. the first decile.
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Table 4.1
demonstrates a very significant difference from other OECD
countries for the family type of lone parent. Ireland has the lowest
tax burden across all countries shown. The negative figure for this
group indicates that cash benefits exceed taxes by 15 per cent. The
addition of two children at the same income level means that a
lone parent is 31 points better off than a single person with no
dependants. This is because of the universal child benefit received
and eligibility to benefit from the Family Income Supplement.
Comparative Average Tax Rates: Income Tax plus Employee Social Insurance
Contributions less Cash Benefits as Percentage of Gross Wage 1998
Source: OECD, 2000.
A number of developments since 1998 have seen the tax and
social insurance contributions, and levies reduced for those below
average earnings. By the 2001 tax year, a significant number of
taxpayers were removed from the higher tax bracket. All taxpayers
and particularly single workers on moderate incomes benefited
from the increase in the PAYE allowance to £2,000 in 2001. At the
same time, the value of the personal, widowed and lone parent tax
allowances increased by 56 per cent in real terms. In the 2001 tax
year a single person pays no tax on the first £144 of income per
week. The intervening change in the structure of the standard rate
band has meant that all PAYE taxpayers up to and at the average
industrial wage pay tax only at the standard rate, which fell from 24
per cent in 1998 to 20 per cent in 2001. Given the size and nature
of the cuts in taxes in recent years, it seems likely that the situation
of average and low paid workers has improved relative to their
counterparts in most other developed countries.
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4.2.3 IN-WORK BENEFIT SYSTEMS
In-work benefits shift the balance between incomes in and out of
work and encourage labour force participation. These benefits to
"make work pay" are usually in either of two forms. The first is
implemented through employment-conditional benefits paid
directly to the low wage worker and the second operates as a
system of tax credits or through payroll tax rebates given to
employers. In recent years many countries have introduced in-work
benefits or wage-subsidy schemes as measures to help make work
pay for those at the lower margin of the earnings distribution. This
section will review programmes that have been introduced in the
UK and the US, paying particular attention to the main objectives of
the schemes, their effectiveness and their interaction with tax and
social welfare policy.
Box 4.1 describes the in-work benefit scheme, which operates
as a tax credit in the US. Taxpayers have the option of claiming the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as a lump sum at the end of the
tax year. Research has shown that the EITC is making a significant
difference in encouraging lone parent income support recipients
into work. The impact on couples with children is less positive and
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) conclude that the EITC may be subsidising
married mothers to stay at home (p. 31) as workforce participation
by some second earners in a family was negatively related, in their
econometric model, to the level of EITC. Liebman (1998) found that
the EITC transferred most dollars to tax-paying households above
the poverty line but concluded that the EITC was an effective way
to target low-wage workers as EITC recipients received few other
transfers and usually benefited individuals who work a large
number of hours at low wages.
Box 4.1: In-work benefit scheme of the United States -
"The Earned-Income Tax Credit Scheme"
(EITC)
iln existence since:1975,
~1990si The eligibilitY
!earned and "the number
11999,
income was less
1 childand $10
and:the income
two-child Couple is $3,"
’.$12,260: More limited
~with lone parents.
on lower incomes and
,partict
care for children; these
~EITC :but. 0nly the. adult with ~the
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In addition to the federal EITC scheme, state level welfare
reforms have played an important role since 1996. States have
flexibility in designing and implementing their welfare systems
since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation (PRWORA) Act of 1996. Some key state-level reforms
include three major types of policy: mandating work, making work
pay and helping families with childcare. Mandating work has been
implemented through providing once-off financial assistance,
requiring mandatory job search as a condition of eligibility and/or
linking applicants to other services or resources in lieu of cash
assistance (known as diversion activities). However, the probability
of being sanctioned also varies across states but tends to involve
termination of cash assistance and more frequent visits from
programme inspectors.
Box 4.2 outlines the in-work benefit system in the UK. The
Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) is targeted at 1.5 million
recipients compared with a total workforce of close to 30 million.
The WFTC is estimated to cost £50 billion per year. Entitlement to
WFTC is concentrated amongst families at the bottom of the
earnings distribution: over 35 per cent of families with children in
the second and third income deciles are eligible for WFFC.
Box 4.2: UK In-work Benefit Scheme - Working Families
Tax Credit (WFTC)
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iby the
i withOut children ."
Both the WFTC and the EITC affect the financial incentive to
form a "couple", because they provide the same level of support to
families with the same (combined) income whether there are one
or two adults present.11 Figure 4.1 shows that despite the
expansions of the EITC, the UK WFTC system is more generous in
terms of the average in-work benefit paid, particularly since the
WFTC is paid on a net-income basis. There is also a qualitative
difference between the US and the UK due to the structure and
operation of the EITC and WKFC, respectively. In the absence of
the EITC, paid as a US tax credit, low income families have a lower
benefit withdrawal rate while still facing a positive financial gain to
work. The WFTC with the complete withdrawal of out-of-work
benefits under 16 hours a week means that there would be
negative financial gain to part-time work without an in-work
payment: more than the full-time minimum wage would be needed
to see any financial gain to work over welfare.
Brewer (2000) found that work incentives in the UK and the US
would be worse without their respective in-work benefits.12 The
evidence suggests that WFTC provides good financial incentives to
do some minimum wage work, but poor financial incentives to
increase earnings beyond that point because of relatively higher
marginal withdrawal rates. If benefits are withdrawn soon after an
individual takes up employment, the disincentive to taking up work
is very significant. A more gradual tapering off of benefit as
earnings rise adds less to financial disincentives - but costs more.
Individuals may also find themselves facing two or more tapers on
different benefits at any one time. Combined, the rate at which
benefits are withdrawn and taxes increase as earnings rise is known
as the marginal effective tax rate (METR). People facing very high
METRs have little or no financial reward for increased work hours
and effort and lose very little if they work less (OECD, 1998).
10
House of Commons Hansard, 25 May 2000.
11
Programmes which provide the same level of support whether there is one or
two adults is tile extreme case; joint assessment can also be combined with higher
support for two adults.
12
Bingley and Walker (1997) take a sample of lone mothers to look at the effect of
changes to in-work benefits (such as the UK’s Family Credit scheme) on movement
in and out of work. This study found that doubling the maximum amount of family
credit eligibility increases participation by 10 percentage points (from a base of 34
per cent working). The maximum amount drawn is dependent on family size but
averaged around £75stg (in 1992 prices).
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Figure 4.1: Annual WFTC and EITC Payments, Calculated at
Exchange Rate of UK£1=$1.50
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Note.. Assumes hourly wage of £3.60. WFTC eligibility occurs after 16 hours per
week is worked. The EITC rates apply to a family of 2 or more children, the
subsidy rate is 40 per cent and the taper rate is 21.06 per cent. Taper rate of 55 per
cent for WFTC.
How strong are the effects of high marginal effective tax rates?
This depends in part on the context in which they operate. A high
METR may apply over a narrow range, so that very few individuals
actually face it - but others may have chosen to avoid it by
working fewer hours, or dropping out of the labour market. High
METRs may have a significant effect if they affect disadvantaged
groups e.g. lone parents. These groups tend to be eligible for a
wider range of benefits and are encouraged to stay on long-term
benefit for this reason. Further, the incentive for one family
member to work can be affected by the benefit entitlement of
another. This can be a feature where extensive means testing is
employed to determine eligibility for benefits, particularly in family
situations where a spouse is considering taking up employment.’~
Marsh and McKay (1993) found that recipients of the Family Credit
scheme were often not the unemployed finding low-paid jobs, but
spouses in two-earner couples when one partner lost their job.
13
This result has led Australia to address this problem to some extent by giving
each partner in a household whether neither partner has a high level of earnings an
individual benefit entitlement and reducing the METR below 100 per cent.
Individualising benefits means that income support for family members would be
independent of the support received by other family members.
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4.2.4 REPLACEMENT RATE COMPARISON- INTERNATIONAL
EVIDENCE
The disincentive to move from welfare to work is often measured
by the rate of income out of work that can be replaced with
income in the form of social welfare entitlements with the
complexity associated with multiple entitlements. High marginal
effective tax rates (METR) have created strong disincentives to
move from welfare to work among those on low incomes (the
welfare trap). These disincentives to work can be captured with a
replacement rate measure. Replacement rates are defined as the
ratio of income net of taxes and benefits when out of work to net
income in work (Gregg et al., 1999).
Table 4.2 shows a selection of net replacement rates from the
OECD database for three different earnings levels:
i. the earnings of an average production worker;
ii. two-thirds of the average production worker (APW) rate
and
iii. the first decile of the earnings distribution.
Table 4.2: Net Replacement Rates at Different Earnings LevelsI 1996-1997
Initial Unemployment L0ng-term unemployment =
Rank Country Average" Average
earnings eamings
74     ~:
60
69
77
84
74
74
62
54
56
85
73
74
84
84
2/3 1= decile 2/3 1= decile
average eamings average eamings
earnings earnings
86 ’ 86 74 86 86
76 77 63 90 91
69 80 77 77 77
96 96 96 96 96
94 94 97 97 97
86 85 50 60 60
74 73 52 61 61
73 75 62 73
52 52 18 22
64 , 69 65 95 95
90 90 79 94 94
74 74 55 73 69
78 81 43 61 71
90 90 100 100 100
84 84 90 93 91
(12) Australia
(10) Belgium
(9) Canada
(15) Denmark
(16) Finland
(5) France
(3) Germany
(7) Ireland
(1) Ita)y
(8) Japan ,
(14) Nethedands
(6) Norway
(4) Spain
(17) Sweden
(13) Switzedand
(11)    UK              64           83         87          74          89          89
(2) US      61 51       51     ..48       61       61
l These figures are given for a hypothetical family where the worker is 40 years old, has a dependent spouse
and 2 children and started to work at 18. The figures represent replacement rates for newly and long-
term unemployed persons. Housing costs are assumed to be 20 per cent of gross average earnings.
2 Replacement rates for the long-term unemployed relate to persons in the 60d’ month of their unemployment
spell.
Source: OF.CD database on taxation and benefit entitlements - Table 6 OECD Economic Studies No. 30, 2000/1.
These data show that net replacement rates in excess of 80 per cent
are quite common in many OECD countries once social assistance
and benefits, housing benefits and the effect of the tax system is
taken into account. Italy has the lowest replacement rates across all
categories while Finland and Sweden have the highest replacement
rates across the countries shown. When countries are ranked
according to a simple average over the six categories, Ireland has
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the 7th lowest average replacement rate, similar to those of Spain,
France and Norway. Ireland’s replacement rates are consistently
below the 80 per cent level.
4.2.5 TAKE-UP- PROGRAMME ENTRY EFFECTS
Low-income families do not always apply for or receive the in-
work benefits to which they are entitled. There may be a
programme entry effect that determines the take-up rate of the in-
work benefit, which is related to problems of intrusiveness and
transactions costs. When administrative procedures are time-
consuming and the rules themselves discourage reapplication e.g.
imposition of a waiting period, the perceived risks of accepting a
job may offset any potential gain in income, according to Saunders
(1995). Graham (1984) shows that take-up is influenced by the rate
of payment received and previous experience in claiming benefit.
Employees, who would not otherwise have contact with social
welfare services, may now be eligible for in-work benefit.
According to the OECD (1998), misperceptions of eventual net
incomes both in and out of work may mislead people and result in
apparently irrational labour supply decisions. Respondents tend to
be more aware of out-of-work benefits than of in-work benefits,
leading them to ove>estimate their replacement rate, with
potentially negative effects on the labour market. A side-effect of
this is that if families entitled to small amounts of in-work benefit
do not bother claiming, then the degree to which high marginal
deduction rates are extended up the income distribution is reduced
(Brewer, 2000).
Many countries have had to engage in intensive publicity
campaigns (e.g. the Family Credit scheme in the UK) to reach a
point where take-up is high percentage of those eligible. An
alternative approach followed by the US and to which the new UK
WFTC adheres, is to pay the supplement as a refundable tax
credit.14 Using a tax credit system has its own disadvantages: the tax
unit has to be similar to the income-sharing unit used for targeting
the in-work benefit. In the advent of tax individualisation, targeting
support on family income is less straightfolward. Second, the
period of assessment for the benefit must match the period used for
assessing tax returns. Tax liabilities tend to be calculated on an
annual basis, while in-work benefits tend to be made on the basis
of a short period of earned income. Third, a criticism of any tax
credit scheme intending to disproportionately benefit the low-paid
is that families with low pay tend not to be in the tax net and may
not benefit from a tax credit if they do not pay tax greater than or
equal to the value of the credit. On the other hand, experience
shows that the aggregate administration cost of applying payroll tax
reductions for those with low earnings tends to be lower than that
14
In the US, EITC participation rates appear to be higher than comparable rates for
other programmes serving low-income populations, such as food stamp benefits.
38 REFORMING TAX AND WELFARE
arising from a separate benefit system. There would be some
commonality between the costs of applying other payroll
deductions and credits including tax credits, employment-
conditional benefits and payroll deductions generally)5
4.3
Irish
Experience of
Policies for
the Low-Paid
4.3.1 EVOLUTION OF FIS
Family lncome Supplement (FIS), the Irish in-work benefit scheme
administered through the social welfare system, was introduced in
1984 at a time when the out of work compensation payments were
¯ . . 16 .high relative to potential earnings (Callan et a1.,1995). This was
seen as damaging the incentive to take up employment and official
statements emphasised the need to combat labour market rigidities
by improving the income position of working, low-income families
supported by an employee¯ "The main objective of the scheme is to
maintain the incentive to work by providing cash supports to
workers with families who are on low incomes and as a result, are
only marginally better off than if they were claiming Social Welfare
benefits" (Comprehensive Public Expenditure Programmes, 1984).
The structure of FIS is as follows¯ To qualify for a payment, an
individual or couple must be employed in full-time employment for
at least 19 hours every week, have at least one qualified dependent
child, and have an average weekly income below a limit
depending on family size. Employment must be likely to last for at
least 3 months.17 FIS payments were originally calculated as a
percentage of the shortfall between the family’s gross income (from
any source, though some items such as child benefit and
investment income are excluded) and fixed income limits according
to family size. Until 1991, there was a further provision that
payments could not exceed a specified maximum amount for each
family size¯ The percentage rate applied to the shortfall has a dual
role. On the one hand, it acts as a multiplier providing income
support to the low paid by closing a portion of the gap between
income and target income (the income limit). On the other hand, it
also acts as a withdrawal rate that serves to gradually withdraw the
benefit, as income gets closer to the income limit. The marginal
benefit withdrawal rate (MBWR) is in effect a taper that operates
15
However, the incidence of the administrative cost may be shifted onto employers
if the scheme involves additional complexity for them.
16
An extreme form of this phenomenon is often labelled an "unemployment trap" -
a situation in which a person is financially better off unemployed and receiving
social welfare benefits rather than working¯ This would be measured with a high
replacement rate where incomes when unemployed form a high proportion of
potential net income in employment.
17
Casual work such as, seasonal work of less than 3 months and Government
Schemes do not count as full-time employment. However, Back to Work Allowance
(Employees), Job Initiative, Jobstart and Part-time Job Incentive do count as full-
time employment. An applicant will not qualify for a FIS payment for any week
where an unemployment payment (excluding the Back to Work Allowance
(Employees)) is claimed.
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like a tax since, for every additional £1 of earned income, a portion
of benefit (specifically the increase in income, in this case £1,
multiplied by the withdrawal rate) is withdrawn.
FIS has changed quite substantially since its introduction. One of
the most substantive changes has been the change from a gross
income basis to a net income definition of family income calculated
as an individual’s assessable earnings (Gross Pay minus income tax,
employee PRSI and levies). Spouse/partner’s assessable earnings
and extra income from employment (such as payments for
overtime, bonuses, allowances or commission) are also counted.
Items such as income from occupational pensions and payments
from a limited number of social welfare schemes also count as
family income and will reduce a family’s eligibility for FIS.is The
amount of the FIS payment started originally as 33 per cent of the
gap between actual income and the relevant income limit but has
been maintained at 60 per cent since 1989. The minimum number
of hours fell from 30 in 1986 to 19 at present. Until 1989 a claimant
had to work this minimum number of hours himself/herself but
since then, it has been possible to combine hours worked by
spouses/partners.
The income limits have been raised by 116 per cent between
1986 and 2001, as against wage growth of the order of 90 per cent.
This has had the effect of extending the scope of the scheme
higher up the wage distribution. This coupled with the relaxation of
the minimum hours requirement, has tended to increase the
numbers eligible for FIS payments.
4.3.2 FIS INTERACTION WITH TAX AND PRSI STRUCTURES
The first step in resolving the issue of how tax-benefit schemes
affect financial work incentives is to map how the level of FIS
payment varies with gross earnings. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In 2001, a one-earner 4-child family with earnings of £250 per
week would receive close to £45 per week in Family Income
Supplement.
18
Where an employee is paid weekly or fortnightly, weekly income is based on the
weekly average of assessable earnings in the 4-week period before a claim is made.
If paid monthly, average weekly income is worked out using average assessable
earnings on a per week basis in the 2-month period before the claim is made. If an
employee’s spouse/partner is self-employed, his/her income over the 12-month
period before the claim is made (divided by 52), is used to work out his/her
average weekly income.
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Figure 4.2: FIS Entitlement at Varying Hours of Work, Paid at Minimum Wage, 2001. (One-
Earner Family with 2 Children)
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There is better co-ordination between FIS and the income tax
system than previously. The raising of the tax threshold means that
fewer FIS recipients will also be paying tax. This means that the
high tax-cum-benefit withdrawal rate arising from the interaction of
the FIS withdrawal rate and income taxes, affects only about one-
fifth of those entitled to FIS in 2001. The move from a gross to a
net income basis for the calculation of FIS entitlement means that
even those FIS recipients who are in the tax net will gain at least
20 pence in the pound from an increase in pay.
In order to explore this empirically, we examined marginal
effective tax rates (METRs) at 2001.19 The results show that about
four out of five families eligible for FIS are most likely to have an
METR of between 60 and 70 per cent. This is not surprising since
FIS is withdrawn at a rate of 60 per cent on marginal disposable
incomef° The remainder have tax rates of close to 80 per cent,
which arise from the combination of the 60 per cent withdrawal
rate and the standard tax rate.
There is a trade-off between policies that reduce replacement
rates and the marginal effective tax rate for those in low-wage
employment. In-work benefits aimed at making work pay for the
low-income employed have to be withdrawn as earnings increase
19
Marginal effective tax rates measure the amount of an extra pound of income
which is deducted in tax or deducted as a reduction in benefits from the welfare
system. If a £1 increase in income leads to a 40 pence rise in disposable income,
the METR is 60 per cent.
20 In operation, there are timing factors that "soften" the higher METR associated
with FIS i.e. if a recipient gets a pay increase, FIS will not be reduced/withdrawn
until the next assessment, which could be up to 12 months later.
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to ensure that the costs of the in-work benefit scheme are
sustainable. The higher the in-work payment, the greater the boost
to financial work incentives, particularly at low income. A high in-
work benefit can be withdrawn at a high rate (i.e. 60 per cent for
FIS in Ireland) or a lower rate of payment can be withdrawn at a
lower rate along the lines of the EITC in the US which is withdrawn
at a rate of 29 per cent on every additional dollar earned. As a
result marginal effective tax rates are less than 50 per cent, for EITC
recipients in the US; but higher METRs are typical for those on in-
work benefits in Ireland and the UK.
4.3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF TI-IE MINIMUM WAGE
While labour market aims may be the main motivation for a
minimum wage, the existence and level of a minimum wage are
also relevant to concerns about the financial incentive to take up
employment, and levels of in-work income for low waged workers.
The national minimum wage was introduced in April 2001, at £4.40
per hour. Since July 2001, the statutory minimum wage is £4.70 per
hour (£188 gross per 40-hour week). SWITCH analysis reported in
Figure 4.3 shows that the first income decile (controlling for family
composition by applying an equivalence scale to disposable
income) would be considerably worse off without a minimum-
wage floor. This minimum wage scenario is contrasted with a
scenario in which there is no minimum wage. Families in the first
decile, on average, stand to gain by about 7 percentage points in
disposable income terms, while the richest half of the population
see an increase of less than 1 per cent in their disposable income
with the imposition of the 2001 minimum wage.
Figure 4.3: First-round Impact of National Minimum Wage (£4.70) on Families’ Disposable
Income, against Benchmark of No Minimum Wage
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4.3.4 OTHER POLICIES
Schemes which supplement participants’ earned incomes are
characterised by Greenwood and Voyer (2000) as a particular kind
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of supply-side labour market intervention. The job-search and job-
acceptance behaviours of individuals are promoted by raising the
.financial returns from working. On the other hand, there may be
demand side subsidies with the general aim of overcoming
employer reluctance to take on less skilled labour.21 Demand side
measures affect the labour market by mobilising labour supply,
which lead to improved skills and competencies and has
strengthened the job search process. The instalments of labour
market activation include training programmes (which can be seen
as having both demand and supply side elements) and temporary
employment schemes - subsidies to employment in the private
sector and direct employment or job creation schemes.
F~,S, the national training and employment authority provide
general and specific skills training and have participants in either
Specific Skills Training or on the Job Training Scheme. The
National Rehabilitation Board administers schemes for people with
disabilities. Bridging training programmes were introduced in 1998
to support the progression of long-term unemployed persons onto
F/~S mainline training programmes and into work. Other courses in
this category are run by CERT, the state tourism training agency.
The need for policy to focus on training and up-skilling, rather than
continuing to pay "passive" benefits for low pay is stressed by
Evans (2001) in his review of UK and international welfare-to-work
experience. In the long term, education and training, which will
boost the wage that can be commanded, can play a major role in
dealing with the low pay problem.
The Department of Enterprise and Employment support
schemes to provide employment subsidies to Irish employers,
employees and to the self-employed workers in the private sector.
Subsidies to employers comprise direct payments to employers=
and a social insurance exemption scheme. Subsidies to employees
are administered by the Department of Social, Community and
Family Affairs and are targeted at the long-term unemployed. The
largest of these is the Back to Work Allowance (Employment)
Scheme which allows employees to retain 75 per cent of their
social welfare for the first year, 50 per cent for the second year and
25 per cent of their social welfare entitlement for the third year. On
the part-time job incentive scheme, recipients receive a weekly
supplement. Subsidised employment is mainly provided for the
long-term unemployed (mostly in the form of Community
Employment Schemes) (Sexton and O’Connell, 1996).
In tight labour market conditions, such as those obtaining at the
time of writing, the role of demand-side labour subsidies will
necessarily be somewhat circumscribed. Even in conditions with
21
These subsidies have been most widely used in Continental European countries
(Salverda, 2000).
22
After 1994 the number of direct payment employment subsidies to employers
were reduced leaving the Social Insurance Exemption Scheme as the main form of
employer subsidy at present.
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more substantial unemployment, there is no guarantee that the jobs
go to people from lowqncome households: much depends on the
design of the measures. Measures focusing narrowly on specific
target groups (that is the long-term unemployed, the low-skilled or
disadvantaged social groups) may have little effect on overall
employment, whilst a broad application of subsidies may lead to
dead weight losses: the subsidies might be paying for hires into
low-paid jobs which would have occurred anyway.
4.4
Future
Options
4.4.1 INTEGRATING THE TAX AND SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEMS
Some ideas in the literature involve quite radical alternatives to
fully integrate income taxation and social welfare systems. The
attractions of such schemes are readily apparent, in terms of
simplicity, universality of coverage, and avoidance of the very high
marginal tax rates and replacement rates which arise from the
combination of benefit withdrawal and payment of income tax. In
the Irish context, there have been particularly thorough
investigations of schemes of this type, most recently by the
Working Group on Basic Income, led by the Department of the
Taoiseach.23
Some results from that study (Callan et al., 2000) show that few
Irish employees faced replacement rates close to 100 per cent. This
effect would be eliminated by a basic income system. However,
more employees would see their replacement rate rise than fall.
The estimated tax rate to finance a basic income system lay
between 51 and 53 per cent. Under the conventional system, 57
per cent of taxpayers pay taxes at a rate below 30 per cent, but
their marginal tax rates would rise to about 50 per cent under the
basic income system. The move to a basic income system would
also reduce the tax-cum-benefit withdrawal rate facing the small
proportion of cases affected by FIS withdrawal under the
conventional system. Callan et al., concluded that the net effect of a
move to a basic income system on growth was more likely to be
negative than positive.24
4.4.2 TARGETING TAX CUTS TO LOW PAID
Four options for further targeting tax cuts to the low paid are
outlined in this section. First, we look at the aggregate cost and
distributional consequences of raising the personal allowance/tax
credit to a level sufficient to take all those earning the minimum
23
In its pure fonn, a basic income would replace all social security transfers and
personal tax allowances with a single basic income payment paid unconditionally
to everyone.
24
While growth, in itself, is not the only criterion for evaluation of such a policy
change, a negative impact on growth would imply that the tax rate required to
finance the scheme would probably be higher than that obtained from static
estimates.
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wage out of the tax net. Second, the experience of granting relief
on health insurance premia and (planned) mortgage interest at
source in ’the form of refundable tax credits is examined,
specifically focusing on those in the poorer deciles of the income
distribution. We examine the policy option of extending the system
of refundable tax credits and look at the distributive effect of such a
change. Fourth, following the UK example, a 10 per cent starting
tax rate is examined in the Irish context.
Making Those on the Minimum Wage Exempt from Income Tax
In order to ensure that all on the minimum wage (£4.70 per hour in
2001), are taken out of the income tax net, the combined personal
and PAYE allowances would need to be increased to £9,800 per
year equating to a revised tax credit of £1,960 per annum. Using
SWITCH, we find that the exchequer cost of increasing the personal
allowance to £7,800 holding the PAYE allowance at its current level
of £2,000) is about £780 million.
Figure 4.4: The Overall Distributive Effect of Increasing the
Personal Allowance to Ensure that those at or Below the
2001 Minimum Wage are not Subject to Income Tax
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Figure 4.4 shows that there would be little change in the income
of those in the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution from
this policy. Gains of 3 to 31/2 per cent are found in the middle of
the distribution, with somewhat smaller gains towards the top.
Only about 16 per cent of the total tax forgone benefits those in
the bottom half of the distribution, while 84 per cent goes to the
top half. Thus, while some of the benefit goes to the target group,
nmch of the benefit "spills over" to higher income earners. Why
does this occur? In part the pattern reflects the lack of overlap
between low pay and poverty (see Nolan, 1993). Those who are on
low pay may be married to a spouse with earnings which bring the
tax unit to the middle or upper reaches of the income distribution.
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But in large measure, the spillover results from the simple fact that
the full value of an increased allowance accrues only to those who
remain in the tax net, and not to those who are taken out of the tax
net by the increase. The average value to those who remain in the
tax net is about £650 per year, almost twice the benefit obtained by
tax units who are brought out of the tax net. The tax system does
allow for various methods to "claw back" some or all of this
benefit, though each has its own drawbacks. But the negative
aspects of such policies have also motivated a search for other
means to focus relief on low income units.
Refundable Tax Credits- Experience to Date
A significant development in Budget 2001 also was the introduction
of relief at source for health insurance premia. It was also
announced that mortgage providers would give mortgage interest
relief at source from January 2002. Because the value of this relief
is equally available to all those with a mortgage or health insurance
regardless of whether or not they are subject to income tax, these
credits in effect operate as refundable tax credits. This intensifies
the benefit of this relief for the lower deciles of disposable income
per adult equivalent. SWITCH estimates the full-year exchequer cost
of these changes to total £25 million. The gains are concentrated on
the bottom half of the distribution, with deciles 1 to 4 seeing a rise
of between a quarter and a half of one per cent in disposable
income. (Figure 4.5)
Figure 4.5: Income Effects Per Decile of Disposable Income of
Refundable Tax Credits (on Health Insurance and
Mortgage Interest) Announced in Budget 2001
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Extending the Range of Refundable Tax Credits
Budget 2001 saw the completion of a move from a system of tax
free allowances, to a system based on tax credits. This followed a
transition process where all tax allowances were standard rated.
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The idea of refundable tax credits is under discussion in a
Partnership Working Group. To make all tax units benefit from tax
credits regardless of whether or not they pay tax, a radical move
would be to make all tax credits refundable. Making all current tax
credits refundable would cost in excess of £850 million, with the
first 4 deciles obtaining about 97 per cent of the benefits.2s The gain
for those in the bottom 3 deciles would be from 15 to 33 per cent.
Essentially, this would involve the payment of the standard-rated
value of tax free allowances to all, irrespective of their income
level or income source. Thus, welfare recipients would gain close
to £30 per week from a refundable tax credit.
While this is not the same as the "basic income" idea, there are
elements in common. Atkinson and Sutherland (1990) consider the
effects of "cashing out" the value of tax free allowances, and
treating the resultant payment as a partial basic income. If
refundable tax credits were operationalised in this way, the £30 per
week would be deducted from welfare payment rates, but would
be seen by recipients as a payment which did not depend on their
welfare status. Thus, job offers could be evaluated on the basis of
gross amounts payable, less tax at the standard rate. The true in-
work and out-of-work incomes could be calculated somewhat more
easily - though assessing the likely amount of FIS payable, if any,
would remain quite complex. But of itself, this change would do
little to alter the real financial incentives, as distinct from
perceptions about them.
Figure 4.6: Net Effect of Fully Refundable Tax Credits Across
Deciles of Disposable Income Per Adult Equivalent
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25 This estimation is produced by SWITCH and excludes the Age Allowance and the
Home Carer’s Allowance.
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A Low Starting Rate of Income Tax
Another option would be to complement the minimum wage with
a lower starting rate of income tax, as implemented after the UK
July 1997 Budget. A similar scenario for Ireland, with a 10 per cent
tax rate on the first £2,000 of taxable income before reverting to the
standard rate of 20 per cent on the remaining £18,000 of the
current standard rate band would cost almost £260 million
according to SWITCH.26
Figure 4.7: Initial 10 Per Cent Tax Rate on First £2,000 of Taxable
Income Compared with Current 2001 Policy
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Figure 4.7 shows that there is little benefit for those in the
bottom 3 deciles. This evidence concurs with that from the UK,
which shows that this measure achieves relatively little for low-
income earners on top of the results already achieved by the
minimum wage (IFS, 1999). A 10p tax rate does virtually nothing
more to reduce household poverty and it is unlikely to improve the
work incentives of those who are currently unwaged due to the
fact that replacement rates barely changed. The impact on effective
marginal tax rates for those on low incomes would be nil, as low
wage earners tend not to pay tax anyway. Those on high incomes
would gain as much as anyone. There would also be additional
administrative complexities if an additional tax rate were imposed.
The more bands there are, the more retrospective adjustments have
to be carried out. Increasing tax allowances (and credits) produces
26
This simulation involved keeping standard-rated allowances at the standard rate
of 20 per cent.
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similar, though slightly more progressive distributional results and
avoids any administration problems.
4.4.3 EXPANSION OF FIS
Several options are considered for the expansion of FIS. First, the
possibility of extending FIS to become a universal earnings top-up
without reference to family status is discussed. Second, the
aggregate cost and distributional consequences of increasing the
2001 FIS income limits by 10 per cent are analysed using SWITCH.
Third, a more comprehensive analysis coupling increased income
limits with a reduction in the benefit withdrawal taper is outlined.
Finally, the relative impacts of extending FIS parameters or
implementing a 10 per cent increase in the current minimum wage
is explored.
One option - already being piloted in the UK - is to extend in-
work benefits to workers without dependent children. However,
the case for this "earnings top-up" seems to be rather weak. Many
of those with the lowest earnings levels are young childless people
who would already be helped by the minimum wage. The extra
expenditure on the earnings top-up has only a limited additional
effect on household poverty, although it does further improve the
return to part-time work, in particular for currently unwaged men
without children. Earnings top-ups also extend in-work benefits to
all groups of workers, which may have a depressing effect on
wages.
A second option is to increase the FIS income limits by 10 per
cent, holding the FIS multiplier/benefit withdrawal rate constant at
its current rate of 60 per cent. An increase in the income limit
would be consistent with a continuation of the type of changes
made to the FIS scheme in recent budgets. This change would cost
about £19 million and the distributional impact is shown below in
Figure 4.8. The distribution of gains is shown because no family
would lose out directly as a result of this FIS policy change. For
families in the third decile, a 10 per cent increase in the current
income limits for FIS would represent an additional £20 per week
in disposable income terms. However, more tax units in the fourth
decile stand to benefit than any other decile (15,600) and
consequently most resources would flow to those families who
have a weekly equivalised disposable income between £114 and
£155 in 2001.
Third, these distributional effects would be compounded if the
FIS taper rate was reduced in tandem by 10 percentage points to
0.5. The aggregate cost of the combined income limit and taper
changes would be about £12 million. A taper cut would have the
effect of giving lower payments to existing recipients, while paying
money to new recipients who have higher incomes. Cutting the
taper rate by 10 per cent also represents a lower rate of benefit
withdrawal. This would lower the METR faced by the family but
this METR would affect more people.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of Gains Across Income Deciles of 10 Per
Cent Increase in FIS Income Limits
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In-work benefits represent a supply-side support to employed
parents, which in conjunction with the tax system can affect labour
supply incentives in the process of raising the disposable income
accruing to the family. A wage-subsidy type increase in the
minimum wage facing the low paid would be an alternative albeit
less targeted form of income support. Comparing the alternative of
a 10 per cent increase in FIS income limits coupled with a 50 per
cent taper rate with a 10 per cent increase in the 2001 minimum
wage (an increase of 47 pence per hour), we compare these policy
scenarios across three family types in Table 4.3.27
By design, all FIS gains are targeted on parents, so the shares of
policy gain in the right hand column add to 100 per cent.
Employed parents would stand to gain 21 per cent of the total cost
of a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage (£11.5 million).
This assumes a FIS take-up rate of 66 per cent. Lone parents and
dual-earner parents would have a higher observed and percentage
increase in their disposable income under the FIS policy change
outlined above. However, more families in total would gain in net
income terms from the minimum wage policy change.
27
Increasing the current minimum wage by 10 per cent would save the exchequer
£12.2 million in social welfare with no change in the current tax take.
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Table 4.3: Outcome of Low-Pay Policy Scenarios for Employed Lone Parents, Single
Earner Married Parents and Dual Earner Married Parents - Baseline -- 2001
Situation
Family Type .................... " ..........
! Earning Lone Parent:
Average net gain per week
i Percentage increase in disposable income
Percentage of this family type gaining min 50p p,w.
Percentage of total policy gain accruing to family type :
Single earner married couple with children:
Average net gain per week
Percentage increase in disposable income
Percentage of this family type gaining rain 50p p.w.
Percentage of total policy gain ’accruing to family type : ’" 4.0
Dual earner married couple with children:
Averagegain per week
Percentage increase indisposableinc0me ¯ -~ 1:7
i Percentage of this family type gaining rain 50p p.w. ¯ : ~ . 17.8
Percentage of total policy gain accruing to family
~ Aggregate:ost : .........................
Soume: SWITCH
4.4.4 DELIVERY THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM: FROM FIS TO A
REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT
Experience elsewhere (UK and US) has shown that there may be
some advantages to operating an "in-work" benefit through the tax
system as a tax credit. Workers would avoid the stigma and the
transactions cost associated with the welfare system and they
would see an immediate reward in their take-home pay. Shifting
administrative responsibilities from the expenditure system to the
tax system would make it easier to impose separate taper rates for
different family types. Such a system may be administratively
cheaper to operate as the FIS application form at present targets
families that would not otherwise have any connection with the
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs.28 However,
the difficulties associated with administering a refundable tax credit
include the possibility of erroneous payments if family
circumstances or income unexpectedly changed during the year
and there was no reconciliation process at the end of the year. On
the other hand, it is vital that families receive assistance when they
are most in need and that they connect the reward with work
effort. Further, paying the credit through the recipient’s pay cheque
would reinforce the distinction between the rewards of work and
remaining on welfare.
On the other hand, paying the benefit through the employer
could raise privacy concerns, impose administrative costs on
employers and make it more likely that firms rather than workers
28
However, the total volume of information collected would not reduce.
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4.5
Conclusions
would capture the subsidy. The UK has addressed the first two
concerns by adopting procedures that minimise the involvement of
firms in adnlinistering the X,VFTC.29 It is likely that the institution of
a minimum wage would offset the effect of employers capturing
the benefit of the subsidy by reducing the wage rate by an
equivalent amount. However, firms are likely to be constrained to
pay all people who do the same job equally. If the credit recipients
are likely to be only a small share of a firm’s workforce, the firm
will not be able to capture the subsidies.
The PAYE system uses a cumulative withholding system in
which tax payments change as income and liabilities change during
the year. However, in light of the degree of individualisation
between spouses in the Irish tax system, this tracking can only
follow an individual’s income not the couple’s income. Family
income is more difficult to track in a timely fashion. It is not
surprising that the UK WFTC retains a largely retrospective
eligibility determination that existed for the welfare Family Credit
scheme. 30
Paying FIS through the tax system has an additional attraction
from an administrative point of view. When paid through the
welfare system, FIS counts as an expenditure. When paid through
the tax system, it is more likely to be viewed as a tax reduction.
This may have implications for how the resources are accounted
for in terms of the government’s own spending limits, or limits
agreed at EU level.
The context for looking at the net income situation of the low-
paid in h’eland has changed with the advent of full-employment
levels. The strength in the labour market has led to substantial
growth in employment with real income gains at all levels of the
wage distribution. However, this success has not lessened the
pressure on those families still relying on low incomes from
employment. Despite the fact that few employed families are
defined as poor, the extent to which they benefit from tax, welfare
and minimum wage changes affecting the working poor and the
low paid remain an important policy issue.
29
Although firms will include the credit in pay cheques, workers apply for the
credit like all other discretionary credits directly to Inland Revenue. Only the
amount of the credit is reported to the employer. To minimise moral hazard, there
must be an opportunity to verify eligibility before payments are made. To provide
the credit in a timely fashion, eligibility determination must be either ongoing or
prospective. The EITC advance payment option and the WFTC each meets one of
these goals, but neither achieves both.
30
An end-year reconciliation process could create problems if it meant that
overpayments were discovered - particularly if due to changes in incomes and not
the "fault" of the claimant. Currently FIS is retained until the next assessment date,
even if income increases. This is perceived to be a positive feature of the current
system in terms of softening the disincentive to work while eligible for FIS.
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This chapter looked at Irish marginal effective tax rates and the
tax wedge between gross and net incomes compared with those of
other European and OECD countries. These comparisons indicated
that the low paid faced relatively low average tax rates in Ireland.
Looking at the international context for in-work benefit schemes,
Ireland’s Family Income Supplement (FIS) and the UK’s Family
Credit/Working Families Tax Credit schemes tackle the trade-off
between payment generosity and the effective tax-cum-benefit
withdrawal in a similar fashion. The Earned Income Tax Credit in
the US involves rather lower levels of payment, permitting a lower
rate of benefit withdrawal.
Increasing the basic personal allowance or tax credit to remove
those on the minimum wage from the tax net would cost
something approaching £800m. About five-sixths of the benefit
would accrue to the top half of the income distribution. Similarly,
introduction of a starting rate of tax at 10 per cent would have
relatively little benefit for those in the lower half of the income
distribution.
The option of paying in-work benefit as a tax credit, rather than
a welfare payment along the lines of the UK Working Families Tax
Credit or the Earning Income Tax Credit operating in the US,
depends on it being a refundable tax credit as most families eligible
for FIS do not pay tax at present. A refundable tax credit would
benefit all families regardless of whether they are net taxpayers and
can effectively target the poorer deciles of equivalised disposable
income. It can be envisaged that potential claimants could apply for
their in-work tax credit as per other voluntary tax credits, for
example age allowance/tax credit. The aim would be that payment
should improve take-up of entitlements.
5. TAX AND WELFARE
TREATMENT OF INDIVn)UALS
AND FAMII IFS
5.1
Introduction
5.2
Competing
Objectives
Recent changes in the tax treatment of couples gave rise to a
particularly heated controversy. In this chapter we attempt to shed
more light on the nature of the change, and identify key factors of
importance in the policy debate. We start (Section 5.2) by
summarising some possible objectives for the tax and welfare
system, and how they relate to one another. Then Section 5.3
examines some international evidence on the structure of other
tax/transfer systems. Section 5.4 reviews the Irish experience, up to
and including Budget 2001. Section 5.5 turns to the related issues of
the welfare treatment of individuals and couples. The main findings
are drawn together in Section 5.6.
As we shall see, different countries have made different choices
regarding the tax treatment of couples, levels of child benefit or
child tax credit and other policy parameters with a critical bearing
on the relative economic welfare of different family types in
society. Over time, some countries have altered their choices in
quite a dramatic fashion. But before we become embroiled in the
"on the ground" complexity of these issues, it is useful to step back
and ask what would be desirable features of a tax and transfer
system.
One feature which most would find acceptable is that taxation
should be related to ability to pay. "People with equal ability
should pay the same (the concept of horizontal equity), while those
with higher abilities should pay more (the concept of vertical
equity)" (Musgrave, 1996) While this can be difficult to define
precisely, one implication is often taken to be that the average tax
rate should rise with income, i.e., that taxes should be progressive.
A second feature that could be regarded as desirable is
"marriage neutrality’#’: the total tax burden for a couple with the
same total income should not change upon marriage. Thus, two
single persons, whatever their earnings, would find that their total
31 Systems which favour or penalise marriage are considered later.
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tax liability did not change on marriage. This would role out both
"marriage subsidies" and "marriage penalties" - both of which can
be found in the US tax code.
Box 5.1: Income Tax Treatment of Families
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A third feature that could be argued for on grounds of
"horizontal equity" is that all families with an equal monetary
income be treated equally. As with many arguments based on
horizontal equity, there are issues here as to whether the situations
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of the two comparators are indeed equal. In this instance, one
might ask whether families with equal monetary income are "in the
same situation", when one family earns its income through one
individual (working a standard workweek) and the other requires
two family members to earn that income (each working a standard
workweek). But for the moment let us assume that this is a
desirable feature of the income tax code.
The difficulty now is that these three objectives are incompatible
(as show by Rosen, 1977, among others). A progressive system in
which a family’s taxes depend on total family income cannot be
marriage neutral: depending on more specific features of the
system, it may involve either a tax on or a subsidy to marriage. A
progressive system which is marriage neutral will not have the
feature that families with the same total income pay the same tax.
Since at least one of these three principles must be breached,
which is it to be? Progressivity seems to be the most firmly
entrenched principle across OECD countries, so we concentrate on
the other two. One argument could be that "it is not at all clear that
the tax system should treat marriage neutrally" (Eissa and Hoynes,
2000). Married couples benefit from economies of scale in a
household context. (This is recognised in the social welfare system
by providing a payment rate for couples, including cohabiting
couples, which is soon to rise to 1.7 times the rate for a single adult
- though old age pensioners, and recipients of contributory benefits
can obtain two full adult payments). Similarly, it could be argued
that in the tax system marriage should be taxed because it raises
ability to pay. If this view were to be taken to its logical
conclusion, however, the household or housing circumstances of all
taxpayers - adult children living with parents, group-home
residents etc. - would need to be reported and used to determine
taxes. On the other hand, it could be argued that marriage provides
social benefits through positive effects on child well-being. An
argument for government intervention would require
(a) that there is a causal relationship between marriage and
child well-being;
(b) that individual decisions about marriage do not take full
account of these social benefits.
If these conditions are met, then a tax subsidy to marriage could be
justified.
Many European countries, however, have given precedence to
marriage neutrality and progressivity over the "equal tax for equal
family income" principle. With an individually based tax, and a
progressive rate structure, this means that the tax paid by a couple
may depend on the distribution of earnings between them. At one
extreme, all the earnings are attributable to one partner, while the
other is not engaged in the paid labour market. This family may
then be compared with a two-earner family on the same total cash
income. One argument here is that while the families have the
same cash income, they do not have the same total resources. The
one-earner family has the cash earnings, plus the time of the other
partner for other valuable activities such as caring for children,
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other caring work, or homemaking activities. The two-earner family
has the same cash income, but does not have the resource of
having one partner available to work in the home. On this basis,
the one-earner family could be regarded as having a greater ability
to pay, which would imply a higher tax level. Such a system could
also be seen as providing labour market neutrality, whereby the
incentive to participate in the paid labour market should not be
influenced by marriage.
We have seen that the goals of progressivity, marriage
neutrality, and equal taxes for equal family income are not
compatible. Actual tax systems have resolved this dilemma in
different ways, and it is to a consideration of these actual tax
systems that we turn in the next section. But it is important to note
that, at a theoretical as well as at a practical level, the evaluation of
the tax system must depend not only on the effects of the tax
system, but also on those of the transfer system that it finances.
"After all, what matters is how the budget operation affects the state
of distribution; it is unimportant in the end whether the impact
comes from the expenditure side or the tax side of the budget. It
may thus well be argued that equity should be viewed in terms of
net benefit or burden". (Musgrave, 1996, p. 354).
5.3
International
Context
As far back as 1977, a review of the tax/transfer treatment of
family units (OECD, 1977) concluded that there was a trend
towards treating the individual as the tax unit, rather than the
married couple or the family. At the same time, there was a trend
towards the provision of help for families with children with direct
cash payments, or, less frequently through tax credits, rather than
allowances against taxable income. During the 1970s six countries
(Denmark, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Belgium)
moved from joint/family taxation to individual taxation. As a result,
by 1977, individual taxation was the basis on which liabilities were
calculated in about half of all OECD countries. The UK also moved
in this direction, completing the move in the 1980s.
As the review pointed out, the choice of the basis of taxation
left much scope for "ringing the changes" in terms of how gross
family income was transformed by the combination of taxes and
transfers into disposable income. "In the income tax system alone,
by ringing the changes on the choice of tax unit (individual,
married couple or family), the type and amount of family
allowance for marriage or children (quotient system, separate
schedules, tax allowances and tax credits) and ,also the range and
steepness of the rate schedule, similar results in terms of after-tax
income can be achieved under systems which, at first sight, appear
to be based on different principles" (OECD, 1977, p. 9).
A more recent study found that ten out of fifteen EU countries
had income tax systems which were based around independent or
individual taxation of husbands and wives (See Table 5.1 for
details).
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Table 5.1: Types of Joint Taxation in EU Countries, 1998
Source: O’Donoghue and 8utherland (1999)
Focusing on the tax system (and neglecting benefits) they
attempt a loose categorisation based on whether tax is independent
or joint; the number of family tax instruments, if taxation is joint,
whether this is mandatory or compulsory. They find four countries
at one end of this spectrum, with independent taxation and few
family tax instalments: Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
Four more have joint taxation, but have many family tax
instruments (Austria, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands). On the
joint taxation side there are three countries where joint taxation is
mandatory (France, Luxembourg and Portugal) and four where joint
taxation optional (Belgium, Germany, Spain and Ireland). As the
authors recognise, the classification is a loose one and subject to
debate. In our view, the fact that the Irish system offered
alternatives to joint taxation, including independent taxation
("single assessment") was of little practical import. Given the
parameters of the system, it was almost inevitable that taxpayers
would opt for joint assessment (the default option) if they wished
to minimise their liabilities. The "option" of single assessment had
almost no financial value. As a result, we would see little difference
between Ireland and countries with mandatory joint taxation.
O’Donoghue and Sutherland (1999) emphasise that there are
many other aspects of tax and welfare systems which influence
their relative generosity to single persons and couples, with and
without children. "The impact of income tax systems [on families]
should be judged in combination with the other parts of the tax-
benefit system, as well as in isolation. Indeed, highly redistributive
systems can include "large" income tax systems with few family
concessions financing an extensive system of family benefits and
services" (O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999, p. 593).
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Box 5.2: The US Tax Systetm Penalising and Subsidising
Marriage
Aim ,and
income taxes
~marriage, and 1
:taxation
~did not change much
~marriagemeutral". Income s
i1948, giving rise
~schedule was
:more
~many .(though ’not aiD
earnings. "Changes in. flae income
!the magnitude of
~marriage subsidy
{of marriage have been and
i(Alm and
~decisions.:
over the 1984 t
subsidised in the US
:this period. This rise in
tO
5.4
Individual-
isation and the
Tax System
The Irish tax system initially treated couples as a unit for income
tax purposes, with the wife’s income being aggregated along with
that of her husband. While there was a "married man’s allowance"
tax was assessed on the basis of the same band width as for single
persons. Compared to two cohabiting single persons, a married
couple received a marriage subsidy if the wife was not earning an
independent income, or earned a very low one. But if the wife’s
earnings were greater, she, and the couple, faced a substantial tax
penalty. A similar system operated in the UK, also built around the
"male breadwinner" model. Until the 1970s, the systems were
broadly similar in structure. But the UK introduced the option of
separate taxation for wives on earned income, removing a major
source of unfairness from the system, and a step towards a system
of independent treatment of husbands and wives.
In Ireland, the Supreme Court ruled in 1979 that the "marriage
penalty" implicit in the tax code was unconstitutional. Since then,
fiscal policies implying a less favourable treatment for a married
couple than for an unmarried couple would be regarded as
contrary to the constitution. The response to the decision in the
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Murphy case32 was to move to what is known as an "income-
splitting" system. This involved aggregating family income, and
splitting it equally between the partners for income tax purposes.
Alternatively, this can be characterised as involving "doubled bands
and personal allowances", or full transferability not only of income
tax allowances, but of rate bands as well. (See Box 5.1) Married
couples are permitted to minimise their tax liabilities by assigning
allowances and rate bands freely to either partner. In the UK,
reform of the tax treatment of couples involved a move towards
independent treatment of each partner’s income. The last vestige of
the old system is the "married couples allowance", which is now
seen as an ill-targeted subsidy, and was restricted in value (by
permitting it only at the lowest rate of tax, 10 per cent) in UK
Budget 2000.
The net effect of these different policy responses is that Ireland
has ended up at one extreme with respect to the tax treatment of
couples, while the UK is close to the other extreme. Other
countries can be found with intermediate positions. One
implication of income-splitting is that widening of the standard rate
band has been much more expensive in revenue terms in Ireland
than in the UK. Until recently, in order to widen the band by
£1,000 for single persons, the band had to be raised by £2,000 for
married couples, including the large number of one-earner married
couples. In the UK, the band can be widened by £1,000 for each
earner, without extending the benefit to £2,000 for one-earner
married couples. This has restricted the ability of Irish policy
makers to attain the desired end of reducing substantially the
number and proportion of taxpayers paying the top rate of tax. The
results of this are illustrated in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
Despite cuts in tax rates and the application of significant
resources to tax-cutting packages in recent years, the threshold
income at which single persons pay the top rate of tax remains
relatively low in Ireland. This has been a persistent feature of the
income tax system over many years. A comparison with the
situation in the UK, in Figure 5.1, shows stark differences in the
marginal tax rates facing single persons at incomes between about
IR£15,000 and IR£35,000. The difference is much less marked for
one-earner couples, as shown in Figure 5.2. One-earner couples in
Ireland face similar (and sometimes lower) marginal income tax
rates to those in the UK on incomes up to about IR£28,000 per
year. It is only on incomes between this level and about IR£38,000
that a substantial gap in marginal tax rates emerges.
32
It has been argued that dlis was not a necessary response, and that other
structures - including those with greater independence of taxation between
spouses - could equally have addressed the issues arising from the judgement.
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Figure 5.1: Marginal Income Tax Rates for Single Persons, Ireland and UK, 1999
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European Economy, December 1998: this exchange rate was IR~l=UK~0.92.
Figure 5.2: Marginal Income Tax Rates for One-Earner Married Couples, Ireland and UK,
1999
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Greater independence in the tax treatment of husbands and
wives means restricting the transferability of bands and/or
allowances. Some options along these lines were considered in the
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report of the Working Group Examining the Treatment of Married,
Cohabiting and One-Parent Families Under the Tax and Social
Welfare Codes (1999), which drew on an initial analysis of cost and
distributive effects using SWITCH. One option considered by the
Group was restriction in the transferability of rate bands, coupled
with an increase in child benefit. While the Working Group could
not reach agreement on this option, there were broadly positive
comments indicating the need to explore it further.
The major structural innovation in the Budget announced in
December 1999 for implementation in 2000 was indeed a move
towards individualisation of the standard rate tax band. This
involves restricting the extent to which tax bands are transferable
between spouses. In 2000, the standard tax band for a single
person was increased from £14,000 to £17,000 per annum. The
standard rate band for a married couple with one income remained
at £28,000 per annum, whereas the corresponding band for a
married couple with two incomes rose to £34,000. The stated
objective was to arrive at a position after three years where each
individual, whether single or married, has his/her own standard
rate tax band which can be set off against his/her own income but
cannot be transferred between spouses.
As argued in Callan, Nolan, Walsh and Nestor (1999), this broad
policy direction in itself has many positive features. In terms of
equity, it recognises that a one-earner couple has a greater "ability
to pay" than a two-earner couple at the same level of total family
income. The existing system treats the couples almost identically, as
if they had the same total resources because their cash incomes are
equal. But this ignores the fact that the one-earner couple benefits
from having one partner available to manage the home and care
for children. From a labour supply point of view, the package
proposed aims to increase the financial reward for taking up paid
employment, while protecting the income position of those who
choose not to take up employment.
However, the broader context in which this policy is
implemented is crucial, both to its reception and its success. We
argued in Callan, Nolan, Walsh and Nestor (1999) that independent
taxation and increased child benefit in combination could provide
a framework in which to address the twin issues of the recognition
of the childcare work done by "women in the home" and the need
to assist with childcare costs in an even-handed and neutral way.
We return in Chapter 6 below to the issue of child income support
and how it can best be structured. The point to be emphasised here
is that resources can best be targeted directly on children - whether
in one-earner or double-earner families, or those with no one in
employment - through universal Child Benefit. Linking greater
individualisation in the tax code with very substantial increases in
Child Benefit then represents a balanced strategy giving parents
greater freedom to make decisions about how best to care for their
children.
As a result of the reactions to the budget, the Minister
subsequently announced in addition the introduction of a special
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allowance of £3,000 at the standard tax rate for couples where one
partner stays at home to care for children, the elderly or someone
with a disability. While the overall distributional impact of the
budget is analysed in Chapter 7 below, it is worth bringing out here
the impact of the budget including this special allowance,
compared with an alternative where the standard tax band for all
couples simply reverted to being double the band for a single
person. We see in Table 5.2 that the latter would in fact benefit the
top quintile of the income distribution more than the budget
including the special allowance. Conversely, the second and third
quintiles from the bottom benefit more from the budget including
the special allowance than they would if the band had been
doubled for all couples.
Table 5.2: Average Percentage Change in Disposable Income by
Quintile from Budget 2000 Including New Special
Allowance, Compared With Doubled Tax Bands for All
(Benchmark Budget indexed to earnings)
Poorest 20% ~families2~ ¯ .: : ::::
Developments during 2000 have moved policy closer to the
package of increased child benefit and greater independence in the
taxation of husband and wife. At the beginning of the year,
Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness, the latest partnership
agreement, included the statement that
The social partners support the policy of establishing a
single standard rate income tax band for all individual
taxpayers. They also agree that the standard rate
income tax band should be kept under review in the
light of increases in income levels and the objective of
ensuring that, over time, at least 80 per cent of
taxpayers are not subject to the higher rate of income
tax.
At the end of the year, Budget 2001 widened the single person
standard rate band by £3,000, yielding an increase of £6,000 for
two-earner couple; but the band for a single-eamer couple was
increased by £1,000. The major feature of Budget 2001, so far as
policy towards children was concerned, was an increase in the
main rate of child benefit of £25 per month, or almost 60 per cent;
and an announcement that the target was to almost triple child
benefit from its initial level of £42 per month to £117.50 over a
three year period.
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5.5
Individual
-isation and
the Social
Welfare
System
The report of the Working Group Examining the Treatment of
Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Families under the Tax and
Social Welfare Codes (1999) points out that
For many years one assumption underlying both social
welfare provision and the taxation code was that of a
"breadwinner father" with dependent spouse and
children in a lifelong marriage. This is, however, no
longer necessarily the norm in Irish society. Key social
changes relevant to the deliberations of the Group
include the rise in the labour force participation of
women, the fact that women are staying in
employment after marriage and childbirth, the increase
in the number of women in part-time work, the
decline in the fertility of marriage, the increase in the
level of marital breakdown, the increasing numbers of
those parenting alone, and the fact that cohabitation is
emerging as either an alternative or a precursor to
marriage for a small, if growing, number of people.
(p. 1-2).
In this context, structural changes which could increase the
flexibility of the income support mechanism were considered. One
area of interest is the idea of "individualisation" of the social
welfare system)3 Before we consider what is meant by
individualisation, and the motivation behind such changes, it
should be noted that "individualisation within fiscal systems should
not be seen as the same thing as the cultural phenomenon of
individualism. Indeed many of those arguing for greater
individualisation do so because they believe this enhances social
solidarity, and/or encourages the formation and maintenance of
important social bonds - those between spouses, or those involved
in other long-term intimate adult relationships, and between
parents and children" (McLaughlin, 1997).
The current welfare system includes a mixture of an individual
basis of assessment (e.g., individual entitlements to personal rates
of payment of social insurance benefits) and payments based on
family circumstances (e.g., many social assistance payments, but
also payments of "qualified adult allowance" and child dependant
additions under social insurance schemes))4 This can create a
situation in which there are particularly severe financial
disincentives to employment or increased hours of work for the
partner of a social welfare recipient. Tapering arrangements applied
33
A commitment to investigate this issue was given in the National Anti-Poverty
Strategy, 1997: the Working Group’s report represented the initial investigation of
the issues.
34 There are exceptions to this in the current social welfare system: if each partner
is entitled to a contributory benefit they each get the full rate. In the case of the
Old Age (non-contributory) Pension, if both spouses are over 66 they can claim the
personal rate of pension in their own right.
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to qualified adult payments have reduced the severity of this
problem insofar as it applies to partners of benefit recipients, but
not eliminated it. Means tests which include spouse’s earned
income, such as the Unemployment Assistance means tests, also
involve such disincentives (with some easing provided by a
disregard for spouse’s earned income). An individualised system
may seem an attractive way of dealing with these problems, with
each person’s benefits depending on income earned in his or her
¯ own right.
Similar issues may also arise in terms of the incentives for
household formation and co-parenting, as emphasised by the
Commission on the Family. If each individual’s welfare entitlement
depended on his or her own circumstances, they would be free to
marry or cohabit without any loss of welfare support. Under the
current system, there are however two potential sources of loss of
welfare support. First, there is the "limitation rule" which limits the
joint assistance payments of a married or cohabiting couple to a
rate which is designed to take into account the economies of scale
of living as a couple. If this scale (currently 1.6 times the single
rate, though set to rise to 1.7 times that rate) reflects true
economies of scale it could be argued that the net resources of a
welfare-recipient couple would be similar whether living apart or
living together. In this context it is possible that individualised
welfare payments could tend to tilt the balance towards couples
living together. Second, for couples living apart, total payments
might include not only Unemployment Assistance, but also a One
Parent Family payment. Here, the more favourable treatment of
earnings in the One Parent Family means test is designed to assist
lone parents with their particular difficulties in taking up
employment, but may distort decisions regarding cohabitation and
marriage.
How might individualisation of welfare payments deal with
these issues? First, we must distinguish between different concepts
of individualisation, ranging from quite limited administrative
changes to far-reaching structural changes.
* "Administrative individualisation": In effect, this would not
alter the total amount paid to any family, nor the basis on
which the amount was calculated, but it would ensure that
half of the total payment was paid to each spouse. This
facility "is only currently available in difficult family
situations on request" but could be extended subject to
certain administrative and technical difficulties.
¯ "Payment rate individualisation": This would simply bring
the rate of payment for a qualified adult up to the level of
the personal rate of payment for each scheme. At present,
the qualified adult rate is about 60 per cent of the personal
rate for most schemes, while Budget 2000 has announced
the intention of bringing this rate up to 70 per cent. The
cost of this option was estimated by the Working Group at
about £185m per annum.
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¯ "Full individualisation": This is not a single option, but a
range of options, each with the key feature that the concept
of a "qualified adult" is abolished, with entitlement to a
personal welfare payment being established on the basis of
individual circumstances. These options could vary in terms
of how income support would be provided to individuals
who previously had the indirect benefit of a Qualified Adult
Allowance (QAA). This could involve channelling resources
through some combination of improvements in Child
Benefit and Carers’ Allowances, and/or new benefit or
assistance payments designed to deal with parenting
responsibilities.
The first of these options is a very limited one. The only
additional costs would be administrative, with no net change in the
total resources of any family, and the impact would be limited to
those families in which the division of the payment influenced
control over resources. "Payment rate individualisation" would
represent a more substantial change. But it would not alter the
structure of financial work incentives associated with family-based
means tests; indeed, the increase in payment levels for qualified
adult allowances would be more likely to cause a disimprovement
in the financial incentive to work for the spouse of a welfare
recipient. There would be a shift
advantage towards cohabitation and
couple’s payment rate would rise
individual rate. But the extent of the
difficult to gauge.
in the balance of financial
marriage, because in effect a
to the same as twice the
response to such a change is
An assessment of the impact of full individualisation depends
quite sensitively on how it would be implemented. One option
described by the Working Group is as follows:
Each individual would be able to claim a payment in
his/her own right based on their own insurance record
or income (a spouse’s income would not be included
in the means test). Persons working in the home who
are available for and genuinely seeking employment
would be entitled to claim Unemployment Assistance.
Some allowance would have to be made for those
caring in the home, perhaps in the form of an
increased Child Benefit, Homemakers’ Allowance,
Home Responsibility Allowance or Parental Benefit as
recommended by the Commission on the Family.
The implications for financial work incentives depend critically on
the latter element of this package. A "Homemaker Allowance", lost
on taking up employment, would involve the same sort of
disincentive to paid employment as the loss of the qualified adult
allowance in the current system.
5.6
Conclusions
As with many areas of public policy, social preferences have a
vital role to play in determining the design of a tax/transfer
structure which can best serve social goals. It would be unrealistic,
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on this account, to expect analysis to give rise to an answer that
can command universal support: in this area, as in so many others,
there is no "right answer". The contribution that can be made by
economic analysis is twofold. First, it can help to clarify the
outcomes that will be associated with particular policies. Second, it
can help to distinguish between more and less efficient policies in
achieving certain goals.
Since 1980, the Irish tax system has not been "marriage neutral".
It has instead had provisions which favour marriage - moving from
a situation where many individuals faced a "marriage penalty" to
one in which none faced a penalty, and many benefited from a
subsidy. Consider two couples, each with one earner, but one
couple being married and the other cohabiting. The tax bill of the
married couple is below that of the unmarried couple. This is what
would be recognised in the economics literature as a "marriage
subsidy". The recent moves towards an individualised standard rate
-band have reduced this subsidy, in the case of top rate taxpayers,
but increased it (through the Home Carer’s Allowance) for others.
As noted earlier (Eissa and Hoynes, 2000) a case for a marriage
subsidy can be constructed, depending on two elements. First, that
marriage has an "external benefit" from society’s point of view,
perhaps through positive effects on child well-being. An argument
for government intervention would require (a) that there is a causal
relationship between marriage and child well-being and (b) that
individual decisions about marriage do not take full account of
these social benefits. More commonly, the rationale of the
"marriage subsidy" has been seen as a support for those caring full
time for children or relatives who are elderly or disabled. But here,
economic analysis tells us that there are more efficient ways of
providing such support.
For example, let us consider the target group as families with
children.35 If this is so, then a tax subsidy based on marriage is ill-
targeted. As Fahey (1998) points out, many of the target group
would receive no benefit, and many who receive benefit are not in
the target group. Even if the tax subsidy were restricted to families
with children its targeting would be problematic. If, as was the case
for many years, the tax concession for such families consisted of an
allowance, or a combination of a standardised allowance and extra
band width, this would be of greatest value to top rate taxpayers. A
more equitable mechanism for the support of children is readily
available, in the form of child benefit. Labelling made for easy
connections between "individualisation" and individualism, or a
system which is good for individuals and not for families. But in
fact individualised taxes can, together with specific benefits like
child benefit and carer’s benefit, offer a more efficient and effective
way of achieving social goals. As ever, much depends on the detail
of the rates of taxes and benefits. In this connection, it is worth
35 Similar comments would apply with respect to other target groups such as
elderly or disabled persons needing care.
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noting that the main child benefit rate increased by something
under 25 per cent in 2000 (the year individualisation was
introduced); but the total increase will be 240 per cent by 2003, on
current policy plans.
6. REFORMING CtND
INCOME SUPPORT
6.1
Introduction
6.2
The Context:
Trends in
Child Poverty
In previous chapters we examined a range of issues relating to
reform of the social welfare and tax systems, but left to one side
the whole question of provision of support to families with
children. Since such support can be provided through the tax
system, the social welfare system or both, it is more appropriate to
deal with it en bloc and that is the focus of this chapter. We first set
out (Section 6.2) some evidence on recent trends in child poverty
in Ireland, an important part of the context in which child income
support issues are to be addressed. In Section 6.3 we discuss some
general strategies for provision of support to families with children,
and the advantages and disadvantages of each. In Section 6.4 we
assess the distributional impact of some alternative uses of extra
resources for children, including the announced government policy
of concentrating substantial extra resources on Child Benefit.
Compared with the 1970s, the relative position of households
with children had deteriorated sharply in Ireland by the late 1980s.
Nolan and Farrell’s (1990) study for the Combat Poverty Agency
showed that in the late 1980s children faced a much higher risk
than adults of being in a poor household. The relative position of
children versus adults also worsened in a number of other
industrialised countries around that time, but the extent of child
income poverty in Ireland was exceptionally high. The dramatic
increase in unemployment during the 1980s was the critical factor
driving this wedge between income poverty rates for children
versus adults, though tax and socialwelfare policies also played a
role.
Using the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, Callan et al. (1996)
showed that the gap between relative income poverty rates for
children and adults was fairly stable between 1987 and 1994, as the
rates for each group rose. Child poverty at that point, measured in
terms of relative income poverty lines, was again very high
compared with other European Union member states. Eurostat, the
Statistical Office of the European Community, has recently
produced figures for 1994 from the European Community
Household Panel Survey for most of the EU member states, which
allow such a comparison to be made. These relate to the
percentage below half the average income in the country in
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question, and are shown in Table 6.1. (The income measure used
in these comparisons relates to calendar year 1994, as reported in
Wave 2 of the ECHP carried out in 1995.) We see that at 30 per
cent Ireland in fact has the highest rate of child poverty, measured
in this way, of any of the member states included in the survey.
Only Portugal and the UK have a child poverty rate nearly as high,
and in many of the countries the rate is half Ireland’s or below.
From other sources one can see that other industrialised
countries such as Australia, Canada and particularly the USA also
had high child poverty rates, measured vis-a-vis relative income
lines, in the early-mid-1990s. Applying a common income poverty
line across EU or industrialised countries, rather than country-
specific relative lines, would also give a rather different picture, but
Ireland in the mid-1990s would still have a relatively high poverty
rate on that basis.
Table 6.1: Percentage of Children Below 50 Per Cent Relative
Income Poverty Line in European Union Countries, 1994
More recent information is now available for Ireland, from the
1998 round of the Living in Ireland Survey (LID. Table 6.2 shows
relative income poverty rates for adults and children in 1998
compared with the 1994 LII. (The income measure employed is
now income at the time of the survey, not annual income in the
previous year.) To put these recent trends in context the table also
includes the corresponding results from the 1987 ESRI Household
Survey and the Household Budget Surveys of 1980 and 1973. We
see that from 1994 to 1998 these poverty rates for children declined
at the 50 per cent and 60 per cent relative income poverty lines
while those for adults also fell but not by the same magnitude.
Child poverty rates at the 50 and 60 per cent lines are now
considerably below those experienced in 1994. With the 40 per
cent line, however, the poverty rate for children increased. This
increase in child poverty at the lowest relative poverty line
measured less than one per cent but it was the only poverty rate to
increase as all poverty rates decreased between 1997 and 1998 for
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adults, producing a significant narrowing in the gap between
children and adults. Just as rising unemployment produced
increasing relative income poverty for Irish children in the 1980s,
the fall in unemployment between 1994 and 1998 was central to
the decline in the proportion of children living in households
below half or 60 per cent of average income. In 1994, one child in
five lived in a household where the head was unemployed, but by
1997, this had fallen to 14 per cent. The relative income poverty
risk associated with unemployment rose since 1994, however, as
social welfare support levels lagged behind rapidly increasing
average incomes. This contributed to the divergent pattern with the
lowest relative income line. Prior to 1997, families relying on social
welfare support would have been below the 40 per cent relative
poverty line. By 1997, the 40 per cent line had caught up on the
support for families provided by some social welfare programmes.
Table 6.2: Risks of Relative Income Poverty for Children and Adults, Ireland 1973-1998
! .............i973 ...............1~ "
HB8 " HBS
Per Cent ’Children
i40% line 8.1 10.1 7.6
150% line 16.2 18.5 25.5
60% line 27.5 29.5 37
Per (
}40% line 7.4 7.7         6.5
!50% line 15.1 15.2. 16.i
60%line ¯ 24:4 .........25.4 ..- ~ ~,.26.5.’~,~.‘ .
Note: * Equivalence scale I/0.66/0.33. Child defined as an individual aged under 14 years.
As well as purely relative income lines, it is important to see
how children have fared in terms of the combined income and
basic deprivation measure adopted in the NAPS global poverty
reduction target. Like relative income poverty lines, measures
combining those lines with experience of basic deprivation showed
children at a-substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis adults in 1987 and
1994. Table 6.3 shows that these combined income and deprivation
measures showed substantial falls for both children and adults
between 1994 and 1998, with the gap between child and adult
rates of consistent poverty dosing. By 1998 about 12 per cent of
children were in households below 60 per cent of mean
equivalised income and experiencing basic deprivation, compared
with 8 per cen{ of adults. This is roughly a halving of the consistent
poverty rate over 4 years. Compared with children below the
relative income lines alone, a smaller proportion of the children
meeting the combined income and deprivation poverty criteria
were in households headed by a self-employed person or farmer
and more are in households where the head is unemployed.
Very rapid economic growth has been sustained since 1997,
bringing with it further pronounced falls in unemployment and in
long-term unemployment. This represents very much a continuation
of the underlying trends seen over the 1994-1997 period, and is
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likely to have had a broadly similar impact on child poverty. The
gap between relative income poverty rates for children versus
adults may thus have continued to narrow, and deprivation levels
are likely to have continued to fall. It is more difficult to assess
how much impact this is likely to have had on the ranking of
Ireland versus other European Union countries in terms of relative
income poverty rates for children: further waves of the European
Community Household Panel will allow that picture to be updated.
Table 6.3: Percentage of Children and Adults in Households Below Relative Income Thresholds
and Experiencing Basic Deprivation, 1987, 1994, 1997and 1998
Relative inc0meLine ~> Per cent:in H6~useh0ids b~low Line and Experiencing Enforced BasiC Deprivation* :
1 7 ,,-:: 1987~ 1994 1997 1"998PeP Cent>0fefiildmn :~’ 3’~ ’"> ’:7 "4 .........
4:1 8:6 5.9
17,9 14.9 9.8
23~’5 ~6.9 12.4
3.6 2.9
6.8, 5.3
9.4~ 7.7
Note: * Equivalence scale 1/0.66/0.33.
6.3
Strategies for
Child Income
Support
The State has a variety of objectives in assisting families with the
costs of child rearing. These include avoiding or alleviating child
poverty, helping redistribute resources across the lifecycle, sharing
the costs of children across the community, and promoting
efficiency in the labour market. A number of different tax or
transfer instruments aimed at supporting those with children can be
employed. These include extra payments for those depending on
social welfare, income tax relief, cash transfers to those in work
with children, and universal payments for all children. In the Irish
case, there has been no general tax relief of this sort since child tax
allowances were abolished in 1986. There are, however, child
additions to the tax exemption limits which can affect the level at
which one enters the tax net. Additional payments for each child
dependant of those receiving support from the various regular
weekly transfer schemes form an important element in the social
welfare system. Family Income Supplement also provides cash
transfers to those in work on low incomes and with dependent
children, with the amount varying with the level of (after-tax)
earnings and the number of children. Finally, Child Benefit
provides an untaxed monthly amount for each dependent child,
with a higher amount paid for third and subsequent children.
These instruments have different distributional and incentive
effects, as has been brought out in previous work using the
SWITCH tax-benefit model (see for example, Callan, O’Donoghue
and O’Neill 1995). However, the best mix of instruments and the
balance between them depends on the balance between what may
be to some extent competing objectives - promoting horizontal
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equity, reducing child poverty, reducing disincentives, and ensuring
that resources go to improving the lot of the children themselves.
All per-child payments help the degree of lifetime redistribution by
enhancing family incomes during a period of additional need
(Lundberg et al., 1997). As we have discussed in previous studies,
channelling resources through income tax relief is regressive
(though less so now that a tax credit system is in operation), failing
to benefit those with incomes too low to be in the tax net. Child
dependant additions to regular weekly social welfare payments do
reach many of those on low incomes, but can contribute to serious
unemployment traps. Trying to offset these effects through targeted
payments to those in work on low pay runs the risk of pushing
these disincentive effects a little further up the income distribution,
exacerbating poverty traps. The work disincentive effects associated
with high marginal effective tax rates are exaggerated by any child
payment that is withdrawn as parental earnings increase (Lundberg
et al., 1997). However, a benefit that is not means tested does not
prioritise the short-term income maintenance goal and in this
regard loses efficiency at targeting poverty alleviation. At the same
time, there are inequities associated with the stigma of means
testing (which can lead to less than full take-up by those eligible
for the support). Child tax exemptions assist only those on the
margins of the tax net, and can seriously worsen poverty traps.
Universal Child Benefit assists all those with children in meeting
the costs involved, assists those on low incomes more relative to
their incomes, and does not distort parental choices about labour
force participation. It also directly helps mothers of dependent
children, whether working outside the home or not, since the
payment is generally made to the mother. It is not particularly well
targeted in terms of concentrating resources on the poor. However,
Brown (1988) noted that universal child benefits have many
functions besides reducing the rate of child poverty. It performs a
similar role to child tax allowances by contributing to horizontal
equity on the net taxation of families of different types.
We look at the income distribution effects of child benefit in
Table 6.4. Column (1) shows what share of total child benefit
expenditure accrues to each income decile, from poorest to richest.
Columns (2) and (3) show what proportion of income is made up
by child benefit for each income group, for families with children
and for all families respectively.
The distribution of child benefit expenditure reflects the location
of children across the income distribution.36 Thus, the low share of
child benefit going to. thebottom~.decile-reflects.the low number of
children in that decile. Column (2) makes clear, however, that child
36Larger families are somewhat more likely to be found in the lower reaches of the
distribution. Higher child benefit payments for 3’e and higher order children,
therefore, mean that average child benefit payments per child will be somewhat
higher at lower income levels.
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benefit payments form a much higher proportion of income for
those in the bottom half of the distribution than for those in the top
half. This reflects the fiat rate nature of the benefit. Families with
children in the second decile are shown to derive almost one-fifth
of their disposable income from their monthly child benefit
payment. For families in the top decile, child benefit contributes
just one-fiftieth to the disposable income of families with children.
Table6.4: Current distribution of Child Benefit by decile of
equivalised disposable income
A rise in child benefit would give rise to a distributive impact
which would have a similar patternf7 Looking at families with
children, the greatest proportionate gains would be at the lower
end of the income scale, with a decline to much smaller
proportionate gains at the top. Looking at all family units, the
results for each income decile would depend also on what
proportion of families had children.
For the reason that a substantial increase in universal child
benefits is very costly, we have argued for a strategy which
substantially increases Child Benefit, but covers some of the cost by
making it subject to income tax. In recent budgets Child Benefit has
been the primary route through which extra resources for child
support have been channelled, but there has been no change in the
tax status of the payment.
One difficulty that has arisen in discussion of the idea of an
increased, taxable child benefit is that there are some uncertainties
regarding the legal and constitutional position. For example, at the
time such matters were under consideration by the Tax and Welfare
Group (TWG), a High Court decision had ruled that a widow, in
receipt of child dependant additions to her Widow’s Contributory
Pension, should not pay tax on the child dependant additions. But
more recently, the Supreme Court, overturning earlier decisions by
37
A doubling of Child Benefit would give rise to the same proportionate changes
as outlined in the table. A smaller rise would see the same distributive pattern, but
the impact would be "scaled back".
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the Appeal Commissioner and the High Court, held that the full
Widow’s Social Welfare Contributory Pension, including the
increase in respect of "qualifying children" was the beneficial
entitlement of the widow and correctly assessable on her. At
present, there remains some uncertainty regarding how the taxation
of child benefit would be viewed by the courts, depending not
only on new legislation, but also on existing legislation concerning
child benefit and constitutional provisions. For prior removal of
uncertainties regarding constitutionality, it would be necessary to
allow for money bills to be referred by the President to the
Supreme Court, which is not currently permitted by the
Constitution.
More fundamentally, however, it seems unlikely that a taxable
child benefit could be introduced without very substantial increases
in child benefit payment rates. The fact that substantial increases
were initiated last year, and that further increases were announced
for the next two years, makes the introduction of a taxable
paYment in the future much less likely. One specific calculation
may help to illustrate the point. At the current top rate of tax, an
increase in child benefit of about 70 per cent would be required to
compensate top rate taxpayers for incipient losses. This is
approximately the rate of increase envisaged over the next two
budgets, following an increase of 58 per cent last year. Future
increases will now be from a much higher base.
The other major element of child income support is through
Child Dependant Additions (CDA) to the payments received by
social welfare beneficiaries. Table 6.5 shows that about three-
quarters of this expenditure goes to the 30 per cent of families with
the lowest incomes. CDAs amount to 7 per cent of income in the
second decile, and 4 per cent in the first. For all deciles above the
third, CDAs amount to less than 1 per cent of income.
Table 6.5: Current distribution of Child Dependant Additions by
decile of equivalised disposable income
t :
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6.4
Distributional
Impacts of
Alternative
Policy
Instruments
Budget 2001 pre-announced the government’s intention to raise
Child Benefit rates to £117.50 per month and £146 per month over
the three-year period 2001-2003. Given this plan, we examine the
impact of this (and other options) in the context of a projected
2003 scenario. This involves uprating wages, salaries and other self-
employment incomes by expected growth in the years 2002 and
2003; and a benchmark policy that indexes the 2001 policy to
expected wage growth over the period.38 We then consider the
impact of an increase in Child Benefit to the target level of £117.50
per month for first and second children, and £146 per month for
higher order children.
Table 6.6 shows how the policy of substantially increasing Child
Benefit, with a continued freeze on the nominal amount of child
dependant additions, compares with a simple wage indexation rule
on current policy. The net cost of the policy change is of the order
of £500m per annum. About 20 per cent of this goes to the poorest
30 per cent of family units; but this is enough to raise their incomes
by 11/2 to 31½ per cent. By contrast, the top 30 per cent of family
units receive almost 30 per cent of the total expenditure, but their
incomes rise by less than 1 per cent.
Another scenario would be to move to a Child Benefit system
similar to that of the Netherlands where payment rates are universal
to all children but are graduated on the basis of the child’s age (and
by extension, material needs) rather than the number of children
per claimant. However, Immervoll et al. (2000) conclude that a
child benefit system which depends on the number of children as
well as the age of the child, is more effective at reducing poverty
than a system which depends on age alone. In a scenario run on
the EUROMOD model, they found that even when controlling for
the amount spent on benefit, a system that pays more to larger
families appears to be the most efficient in reducing poverty rates.
A similar conclusion was reached in the Irish context by the report
of a special group on Child Benefit prior to the 1995 Budget.
Table 6.6: Distributional Impact of Announced Increases in Child
Benefit, 2003
38 The reasons for this latter choice are examined in depth in the next chapter.
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CHILD INCOME SUPPORT THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM
The current policy approach is that child income support should, so
far as is possible, be delivered through a universal child benefit.
However, suggestions have been made from time to time
concerning the introduction of child income supports through the
income tax system. In Table 6.7 we consider three such
approaches.
The first, is to (re-)introduce a tax-free allowance in respect of
dependent children allowable in full at the taxpayer’s marginal rate,
in respect of children. An allowance of £1,000 per child would be
worth £3.84 per week to a standard rate taxpayer and over £8 per
week to a top rate taxpayer in 2001. The aggregate cost would be
£390m. The second is to introduce a standard-rated allowance (or
tax credit) with the same aggregate cost. This would allow a
standard-rated allowance of £1,600, worth £6.14 per week per child
to almost all taxpayersf9 The third is to make the tax credit
,refundable"
, 
i.e., those who did not have (enough) tax liabilities to
make use of the tax credit would see their tax liability become
negative, and receive a payment from the authorities. In principle,
this could achieve precisely the same results as a universal child
benefit payment, and this is how its distributional effects are
model!ed here. (Possible differences between the "refundable child
tax credit" and child benefit are discussed later.)
Under the child tax free allowance there would be little or no
gain in the bottom 3 deciles, and gains of about llA per cent for
most middle and upper middle deciles. The top decile, and the
fourth would see gains of just under 1 per cent. The standardised
allowance would see slight reductions in the percentage gains for
the top 4 deciles, and gains in middle deciles would be up by
about 0.3 percentage points; those at the bottom would be
unaffected. The distributional impact of a refundable child tax
credit/child benefit are quite different. Gains of between 11½ and 4
per cent are found in the bottom four deciles; 11½ per cent in the
middle two deciles; and 1 per cent or less in the top four deciles.
Thus far we have treated refundable child tax credits (RCTC)
and child benefit (CB) as identical. Now we examine possible
differences between them, before considering why it is that one
might be preferred over the other. Payment of child benefit
depends on completion of some relatively simple forms. Would this
remain the case for RCTC, or would payment of RCTC depend on
being fully up-to-date with tax returns? If so, then a shift from child
benefit to RCTC could affect twO" classes of "non-compliant"
taxpayer. First, those who are .not paying the tax due. Second,
those who have paid the tax due (or in some cases, more than the
tax due) but who have not, as required by law, kept their tax
39
Taxpayers who did not have enough tax to fully utilise this credit would have a
smaller gain: their tax liability could only be reduced to zero.
REFORMING CHILD INCOME SUPPORT 77
returns up to date. Alternatively RCTC could take a form very
similar to child benefit, and this would be allowed on taxpayer’s
tax liability without having to prove that other tax affairs were up-
to-date.
Table 6.7: Distributional Impact of Alternative Tax-Based Child
Income Supports 2001
’Note: By construction, the aggregate costs of all three options are identical at
£390m. This would permit a tax free allowance in respect of children of
£1,000, a child tax credit of £320 (equivalent to an allowance of £1,600 at the
standard rate), or a refundable child tax credit, modelled here as identical to
a child benefit, with a value of £30.40 per month (£38.70 for 3’J and higher
order children).
Under the child benefit system, payments continue (by voucher
at the post office, or direct to a bank account) irrespective of the
labour force status of the claimant. An RCTC may have particular
advantages for those in steady employment, and may be very
similar to child benefit for those out of employment, but dealing
with those who move into and out of employment would pose
challenges. Could administrative mechanisms be put in place to
ensure timely payment is kept up (and avoiding dual payment). US
evidence suggests that employment participation may be
encouraged by paying advances on refundable tax credits
(Vleminckx and Smeeding, 2001).
A feature of the child benefit scheme is that, in most cases, it is
paid direct to the mother. Under the RCTC, by contrast, the value
of the payment would be included in someone’s pay cheque or pay
packet. Thus, the payees under CB and RCTC could be different in
a number of cases. While the real implications for the use of
resources may be limited in many cases, there are some where the
altered balance of resources will affect outcomes and the welfare of
children.
From an administrative point of view, the fact that child benefit
counts as an expenditure, while RCTC is a "tax reduction" may be
of particular importance. If administrators are faced with "cash
limits" on expenditure (e.g., a ceiling on expenditure growth from
year to year) this would rule out certain policy options - even if
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they are desirable on other grounds. Such rules may come from
national government or from EU level. If the rules are amenable to
change (e.g., because national government can be persuaded to
remove an expenditure cap) then this may be the "first best" way
to deal with an unwanted distortion. But ff the rules are externally
imposed and cannot be changed, then alterations in the balance of
policy instruments of this type can provide a "second best"
solution.
The use of an RCTC could result in some altered perceptions. At
present, child benefit may be seen as a welfare payment and little
to do with the person who sees himself or herself as a taxpayer.
Likewise, welfare recipients may see tax credits as little to do with
them. But a refundable child tax credit (RCTC) could be seen as
something which would be of benefit to all children and their
parents, irrespective of their labour market status. It could be
argued, on the other hand, that one of the virtues of Child Benefit
is the widespread recognition and support which it enjoys.
INCREASED~ TAXABLE CHILD BENEFIT
The trend of recent policy has been to focus extra resources for
child income support on child benefit. The fact that equal amounts
of extra income form a greater, percentage of a low income than of
a high income means that this element of policy tends to give
greater proportionate gains to those on low incomes. But, as noted
already (Table 6.4), the aggregate amounts of (extra) child benefit
going to high and top income earners are substantial. For example,
more than £~5m of the announced increase in child benefit up to
2003 will go to the top one-fifth of income earners. One method of
restricting these gains, and focusing resources first at those in
poverty, then at middle income earner is to allow child benefit to
be treated as assessable income for tax purposes. The rationale for
this approach has been discussed on many occasions: here we
update the budgetary arithmetic which is involved.
Columns 1 and 2 show the distributive effects of simply
increasing child benefit, and of increasing it by a greater amount,
financed by making all of child benefit taxable. Column 3 shows
the first-round impact of an "integrated child benefit", replacing
child dependant additions. This would fully compensate for the
eliminated CDAs. By construction, the total cost, and the average
gain across the population (1.1 per cen0 is the same across all
options. The increased, taxable child benefit shows gains of
between 21½ and 61/2 per cent for the bottom four deciles with gains
for the top four deciles being under 1 per cent; the middle income
group has gains of about llA per cent. Thus, it involves greater
gains at the bottom of the distribution than the increased child
benefit.
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Table6.8: Distributional Impact of Alternative Child Income
Support 2001
Note.. By construction, the aggregate costs of all options are identical at £390m. This
would permit a child benefit increase, with a value of £30.40 per month
(£38.70 for 3’d and higher order children) or an increased, taxable child
benefit with a total value of £121.50 (£154.80) i.e., an increase of £54 (£69). If
CDAs were to be withdrawn as CBs increased, this would allow an increase
to reach levels of £140 (£177 for higher order children), an increase of £72.50
(£91).
What if child benefit were increased still further, but child
dependant additions were withdrawn? Would this reduce, or
completely reverse the gains at the bottom of the income
distribution. It would reduce them, but gains in the bottom three
deciles would still be above those in the top 3 deciles. The highest
proportionate gains would be towards the lower middle part of the
distribution.
6.5
Conclusions
This chapter reviewed the evidence on the evolution of child
poverty in Ireland. It is clear that child poverty is less severe at
present than in recent years. Unprecedented economic growth,
which led to rising employment, has ensured that the prevalence of
unemployed heads of household has fallen substantially. This fall in
unemployment is closely related to the decline in the proportion of
children living in households below half or 60 per cent of average
income. Average income levels for households engaged in farming
or with a head of household who is self-employed have also
grown. This phenomenon has also contributed to a substantial
reduction in the number of households with children experiencing
combined income poverty and basic deprivation.
How can further falls in child poverty be achieved? Given that
unemployment rates are at rates which are historically very low,
both from a national and international perspective, there may be
limits on the extent to which further growth in employment rates
and unemployment reductions could be expected. Other routes to
the reduction of child poverty include the use of child-related
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transfers, through existing policy instruments (Child Benefit, Family
Income Supplement, Child Dependant Additions) or new
instruments (taxable child benefit, refundable child tax credits, in-
work benefits paid through the tax system).
The trend of recent policy has been to focus extra resources for
child income support on child benefit. This policy results in greater
proport!onate gains for those on low incomes. But the aggregate
amounts of extra child benefit going to high and top income
earners are substantial. For example, more than £85m of the
announced increase in child benefit up to 2003 will go to the top
one-fifth of income earners. One method of restricting these gains,
and focusing resources first at those in poverty, then at middle
income earners, is to allow child benefit to be treated as assessable
income for tax purposes.
7. ASSESSING BUDGETARY
IMPACT: DISIRIBI_mONAL
EFFECTS AND "POVERTY
PROOFING"
7.1
Introduction
There has been considerable debate over the years about the
"fairness" of Budget day changes in income tax and social welfare
policy. During the 1990s much of the debate focused on the
structuring of tax cuts - the contrasting implications of delivering
tax cuts through rate and band adjustments as against increases in
allowances or personal tax credits. In more recent years, the
adoption of a National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS), requiring an
assessment of the impact of budgets on poverty, has raised broader
questions about the combined impact of tax and welfare policies.
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy requires that policy proposals
should be "poverty proofed" i.e., "it is now a requirement in the
updated Cabinet Handbook...that memoranda for government
’indicate clearly the impact of the proposal on groups in poverty or
at risk of falling into poverty in the case of significant policy
proposals’" (National Anti-Poverty Strategy Unit, 1999).
In this chapter we first discuss how best to assess the
distributional impact of a budget, pointing out some serious flaws
with the framework most commonly employed. The rationale for
an alternative approach (first implemented in an Irish context by
Callan et al., 1998) is elaborated. We use this approach to look at
the distributional impact of budgetary policy over three sub-periods
since 1987, and at the separate impact of the three most recent
budgets. We find that "poverty proofing" budgetary packages in
advance, as required by NAPS, and "poverty auditing" of the impact
of an actual budget retrospectively, raise similar issues regarding
the appropriate framework for the analysis, with important
substantive implications.
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7.2
Approaches to
Assessing
Budgetary
Impact
One problematic aspect of much of the commentary on budget
tax and welfare changes is that it looks at effects on a small
number of supposedly "typical" families. While this approach has a
place in helping to understand the nature of a policy change, it can
also be. highly misleading. The most commonly analysed "typical"
family at budget time is a one-earner couple, with 2 children, taxed
under PAYE. Less than ! family in 20 actually fails into this
category, and those who do differ widely in terms of income,
housing tenure and other characteristics relevant to their social
welfare entitlements and income tax liabilities. Concentration on
the effects of a policy change on a small number of hypothetical
households cannot provide an overall picture of the gains and
losses associated with reform packages. Further, by concentrating
on a small number of supposedly "typical" families it may lead to
the neglect of effects which are important for significant groups.
Microsimulation models such as SWITCH, based on large-scale
surveys of actual households, have been developed and used to
overcome these shortcomings. Being based on a large-scale
representative sample of the population, they automatically take
account of the wide diversity of circumstances in the population,
and can show the overall pattern of gains and losses (in terms of
first-round effects, before any behavioural responses).
In assessing the impact on the income distribution of the tax
and welfare measures introduced in a particular budget, one needs
a benchmark against which to assess the policies the Minister
actually announces. What is the best way to construct this
benchmark? Here we outline three different approaches, before
going on to compare their usefulness in assessing the impact of
budgetary changes on measures of income poverty and the
distribution of income.
CONVENTIONAL OPENING BUDGET
The usual approach adopted - for example, in documents
accompanying the budget - is to analyse the impact as if the
alternative to budget day changes was to leave tax and social
welfare policy essentially unchanged in nominal terms. This simple
approach has obvious attractions, but has serious, though less
obvious, disadvantages. The approach grows out of the
longstanding conventions governing the construction of the
opening budget. For many years, estimates of expenditure during
the budgetary year have been prepared on the basis of constant
rates of tax and constant social welfare payment rates.
A somewhat different convention is used in preparing the multi-
annual projections which have accompanied the budget
documentation since 1998. While there is no automatic mechanism
in the projections for changes in tax and welfare parameters,
"prudent provision" (Department of Finance, 1998) is made for
additional expenditure and tax reductions. Thus the "no policy
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change" scenario in this case could allow for indexation of welfare
parameters in line with expected price inflation. No policy change
could then mean constant real levels of expenditure on social
welfare, as well as on other areas of government spending.
The procedures now involved in arriving at the annual
expenditure estimates and the three year macroeconomic projection
are described in Department of Finance (2000a). Initially,
departments are asked to submit expenditure projections for the
next three years based on a no policy change (NPC) scenario. This
quantifies the cost "of the existing levels of programmes and
services, adjusted where Government decisions exist authorising
specific improvements or curtailments". Later, following
Government decisions on broad budgetary targets, departments
submit draft expenditure plans which are the basis for detailed
discussions with the Department of Finance. Government decisions
then approve detailed spending allocations for the next financial
year, and financial envelopes for the following two years.
We have described this process in some detail in order to tease
out the differences between the treatment of welfare policies
compared to the vast bulk of public expenditure. The baseline for
most public expenditure is a "no policy change" situation, defined
with respect to "existing levels of programmes and services". Thus,
for example, the estimates for health and education expenditure are
adjusted to take into account agreed pay increases for relevant staff,
or other costs of providing the same level of service.4° By contrast,
for social welfare expenditures, payment rates are frozen in
nominal terms under the opening budget convention. This cannot
be regarded as a continuation of the "existing level of services" for
social welfare clients. A constant real value for social welfare
payments would imply price indexation, while a constant value of
social welfare payments relative to other incomes would involve
indexation to a broader earnings or income measure.
Similarly, on the income tax side, estimates of receipts which
underpin the budget day calculations are made on the basis of no
change in rates, allowances or bands. Under a progressive income
tax system, this would involve a rise in the tax take as a proportion
of income or "fiscal drag". The amount of fiscal drag would depend
on the level of inflation and the growth in real incomes.
PRICE INDEXATION
The experience of substantial fiscal drag during certain periods of
high inflation was one of the factors motivating the idea of "price
indexation" for key tax parameters. In the UK the Rooker-Wise
amendment to the 1977 Finance Bill provided for price indexation
of the main income tax personal allowances. These allowances are
40
Where pay increases are yet to be negotiated, no increase is assumed but a
contingency provision may be included elsewhere.
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increased automatically each year in line with the inflation rate as
measured by the retail price index, unless Parliament decides
otherwise.41 This indexation provision was refined and extended in
1980, and some key welfare payments have also been price
indexed since 1981/2. The US income tax system has also used
price indexation since the mid-1980s.
One advantage of a price-indexed benchmark for policy is that
changes in the level of inflation do not affect the assessment of
policy impact. For example, if actual budgets were simply to price
index all relevant parameters, assessment against a conventional
opening budget benchmark would suggest that the size of policy
impacts varied directly with the level of inflation; but assessment
relative to a price-indexed benchmark would show policy
providing constant real levels of service in each year, with no
change from year to year. Budgetary impacts calculated relative to
conventional opening budget (in macro terms) would, on the other
hand, simply "track inflation".
INDEXATION TO WAGE GROWTH
When examining the impact of budgetary policy on income
¯ distribution and relative income poverty, it is useful to have a
benchmark which can be regarded as "distributionally neutral". This
can be thought of in a number of ways: under a "distributionally
neutral" benchmark, major population groups would share equally
in the benefits of economic growth. Growth in disposable income
would be the same for all major population groups, and shares of
income for different groups in the population would remain the
same after the budget as in the year before. While some would
argue that the government should undertake more redistribution,
and Others that it should do less, the "distributionally neutral"
benchmark at least provides a yardstick against which changes can
reasonably be measured.42
A number of choices arise in implementing such a benchmark.
The approach implemented here involves indexing tax and social
welfare to the growth in gross wage income, the predominant
element in national income.43 In effect, then, the benchmark
represents, a-budget which, is neutral.in terms of the share of wages
41
"Indexation applies to the main income tax personal allowances, the threshold
for the higher rate of tax, the capital gains tax exempt amounts for individuals and
trusts, and to the threshold for inheritance tax. It is given effect by "indexation
orders" - pieces of secondary legislation - but it can be overridden to increase
allowances and thresholds by more (or indeed less) than indexation by the Finance
Bill." (HM Treasury, 2001).
42 A similar benchmark is among those used by Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson
(1998).
43
Incomes from self-employment are more variable from year to year than wages,
so indexing taxes and social welfare to wage growth provides a more stable
benchmark.
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going in tax, and in terms of the relationship between wages and
the incomes of social welfare recipients. For wage earners, this is
achieved by increasing tax-free allowances and tax bands in line
with the growth in gross wages. For those depending on social
welfare payments for their income, an increase in welfare rates
equal to the rate of increase in pre-tax wages would, in general,
ensure that they shared equally in the growth in income.44 It is
worth noting that this "wage indexation benchmark" can also be
viewed as a "neutral" option in macroeconomic perspective:
indexing policy to wage growth would keep government revenue
and expenditure roughly constant as a proportion of national
income.
Another perspective on this benchmark is that even if tax
allowances, credits and bands are adjusted in line with price
inflation, real income growth would still push taxpayers into higher
tax brackets. As a result, there will be a tendency for the tax take to
rise as a proportion of income. Some countries have had annual
discretionary adjustments of income taxes to counteract this
tendency;45 others offset it in a more systematic fashion by an
automatic adjustment of brackets and thresholds in line with
nominal income growth (e.g., Denmark from 1974 to 1983).46 The
indexation to wages procedure considered here is one systematic
way of adjusting tax parameters to hold the share of income taken
in tax at a constant level over time.
WHICH BENCHMARK?
What are the implications of using one of these benchmarks rather
than another? In the real world, identifying budgetary impacts can
be hampered by concurrent changes in economic and social
structures and by difficulties in identifying behavioural responses to
tax and welfare policy changes. Here we construct a much simpler
illustrative scenario in which the direct impact of budgetary
changes on the income distribution and on relative income poverty
can be measured. This scenario helps to identify the differences
between the alternative benchmarks in assessing budgetary
impacts.
Under the scenario, the economy can be regarded as in a
"steady state", with prices and wages growing at fixed rates, and
economic and social structures perfectly stable e.g., employment
and unemployment rates, the age distribution of the population and
so on. M1 earnings (by employees and by the self employed) are
assumed to grow at the same rate: there are no shifts in the
44
If tax cuts over and above indexation were implemented, then welfare payments
would have to rise faster to keep pace with growth in net wage incomes.
45
Immervoll (2000) cites the experience of Japan.
46
The term "super indexation" is sometimes used to describe such procedures
(hnmervoll, 2000).
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earnings distribution tOwards greater or lesser inequality, or shifts in
relativities. Occupational pensions are also set to rise by the same
proportion. Essentially, the oflly changes are to incomes and prices,
and not to employment, unemployment or household composition.
The baseline year used is 1999, but this illustrative scenario is not
meant to be a representation of the year 2000, but a counterfactual
construct which helps to clarify differences in the nature of the
alternative benchmarks.
We first, examine t~ow real disposable income growth varies
across the income distribution under the conventional benchmark
policy (simply freezing policy in nominal terms) and under the
wage indexation alternative. Family units are ranked from poorest
to richest, based on income per adult equivalent (where the first
adult counts as 1, other adults as 0.66, and children as 0.33).
Families are then divided into ten equal sized groups or "deciles",
and the growth in income for each decile is shown.
Figure 7.1 shows that under the wage indexation benchmark
real disposable income growth is the same for all ten income
groups. Furthermore that rate of growth is equal to the growth in
real earnings before tax.
If, on the other hand, the conventional opening budget were
actually implemented, this would be far from neutral in its effects
across the income distribution. With tax and welfare parameters
frozen in nominal terms, there would be real income losses for
those dependent on welfare. Higher up the income distribution, the
average tax rate would rise because of the progressivity of the
income tax system i.e., there would be "fiscal drag" due to both
inflation and real growth in incomes. As a result, growth in real
disposable incomes would be somewhat below real earnings
growth in the upper income groups.
47
Third-level students, aged over 18, are treated as separate tax and benefit units
by the tax and social welfare systems. In earlier analysis (e.g., Callan et al., 1998
and Callan and Nolan, 1999) distributive analysis has treated these students as
separate "tax units". In this chapter, where third level students are living with their
parents, and the students have no independent income, they are grouped with
their parents in what is termed an "income-sharing unit" for the purposes of the
distributive analysis.
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Figure 7.1: Real Income Growth under Alternative
Benchmarks, Illustrative Scenario
% growth in disposable income
6%
Budgetary
4%
2%
n m m m m n m m mm m
m m mm m m m m m m m
Poorest    2 3 4
o%1111,
- o ommm-
¯
m m _ m mm
mmmmmm
6 7 8 9 Richest
mConventional opening budget
"l’Wage-indexed budget
-6%
DecUes of disposable income per adult equivalent
Suppose that the actual budget simply indexed tax and welfare
parameters in line with prices. What would be the distributive
impact of this policy? The answer depends critically on the
benchmark used for assessing the impact, as shown in Figure 7.2.
Measured against the conventional opening budget, the price-
indexed budget is shown as producing gains for all income groups,
with the greatest gains for the poorest income group, and the size
of the gain declining as income rises. Measured against the wage-
indexed budget, the picture of the distributive impact is reversed.
All income groups lose, with the greatest losses for those at the
bottom of the distribution, and losses declining as income rises.
These differences in the measurement of policy impact go back to
the very different impacts of the benchmarks themselves: the
conventional opening budget would see real disposable incomes
rise for the top half of the income distribution, while falling for
those in the bottom half. A wage-indexed budget would see equal
proportionate gains for both top and bottom.
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Figure 7.2: Change in Disposable Income under a Price-Indexed
Budget, Measured Against Alternative Budgetary
Benchmarks, Illustrative Scenario
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Similar considerations apply to the measurement of budgetary
impact on poverty. We illustrate this in terms of one of the most
commonly used indicators of poverty, the proportion of households
below half average income. We use the same illustrative scenario,
involving steady growth. Table 7.1 shows that just under 20 per
¯ cent of households fell below half of mean disposable income per
adult equivalent in the base year (year zero). Under the
conventional benchmark, this proportion would rise by 2.3
percentage points. There would be a smaller rise (0.7 percentage
points) under a price-indexed budget. Under a wage-indexed
budget the relative income poverty rates remain constant.
Table 7.1: Relative Income Poverty Rate at Half Average Income
Under Alternative Policy Scenarios
! ,benchmark~
! :Price indexation :
i:,Waoe!~X-t~: ::: ::
Source: Calculations. using SWITCH.
Thus, if actual policy followed the route of price indexation, this
would be seen as a budget with a favourable impact on the poverty
rate under the conventional benchmark (a fall of 1.6 percentage
points), but would be seen as increasing poverty under the wage-
indexed benchmark. If actual policy simply froze tax and welfare
parameters in nominal terms, this would be seen as a "neutral"
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budget in terms of its impact on poverty, relative to the
conventional opening budget. But relative income poverty would
rise between the base year and year 1, despite the fact that there
was no economic shock or downturn reducing employment or
increasing unemployment, which would cause an incipient rise in
the relative income poverty rate.
It seems to us more accurate to characterise such a rise in the
relative income poverty rate as due to the tax welfare policy
package chosen. This is what happens when a "distributionally
neutral" budgetary policy is used as the starting point. The
application of price indexation to welfare payments could be
interpreted as delivering a constant real standard of living to
welfare recipients; this could be seen as parallel to the assumption
underlying the "no policy change" estimates of most public
expenditure of a constant real level of public services. Wage
indexation of tax and welfare policies can be seen as providing a
distinctive, distributionally neutral benchmark, which under steady
state conditions would imply no change in the proportion of
persons falling below relative income poverty lines. In what
follows, we compare actual budgetary outturns with the benchmark
constructed by indexing tax and welfare policies to growth in
wages.
7.3
Distributional
Impact of
Budgets from
1987 to 2001
In this section we obtain a broad overview of the distributive
impact of tax and welfare policy over the past 15 years. We divide
this into three sub-periods: the 1987 to 1994 period (analysed in
detail by Callan and Nolan, 1999), 1994 to 1998, and 1999 to 2001.
In the next section we examine the three most recent budgets -
which have involved the largest ever tax and welfare packages - in
more detail.
In order to get an idea of the size of the budgetary packages in
each of these periods/years, Table 7.2 sets out the cost of price
indexation, and the additional cost of wage indexation and the
actual budgetary package.4s
Over the 1987 to 1994 period, budgets had an annual full year
cost of just over £50m, over and above the cost of wage indexation.
Over 80 per cent of the total cost of the budgets would have been
required simply to index policies in line with wage growth. During
48 The decomposition, and the estimate of the total cost of the budgetary package
are derived from SWITCH-based analyses. SWITCH and official estimates of the total
cost of the last three budgets are quite similar - a detailed comparison of SWITCH
and official costings for 2001 is given in Appendix 7.1.
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¯ Table 7.2: Breakdown of Cost of BudgetarY Changes in Tax and Welfare, 1987-2001
P,dod     prk~     c.~t of
indexmkm wage
Inclexatlon
1987-1994
1994-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
£m £m £m
1,060 927 379
585 658 ¯ ¯ : 917
138 314
506 197
the four years to 1998, much greater resources were available: over
£200m per annum in budgetary costs over and above the cost of
wage indexation. This is dwarfed by the size of the budgetary
packages in the past three years, with an average cost of over
£700m per annum, again over and above what would be required
by wage indexation. This was sufficient to raise average disposable
income by over 7 per cent over the level implied by wage
indexation, as against a rise of about 4 per cent in the four years to
1998 and something over 2 per cent over the seven years to 1994.
Figure 7.3 examines the gains, relative to the "distributionally
neutral" benchmark, for each decile of income per adult equivalent
during each sub-period. The 1987 to 1994 sub-period was one in
which income tax rates were cut, and social welfare payment rates
were streamlined. There were special increases, as recommended
by the Commission on Social Welfare, for those on the lowest rates.
This is the main factor behind the high percentage increase in
income in the lowest income decile. Low to middle income groups
fared less well than under a wage-indexed policy: indexation of tax
allowances would have been of greater value to this group than the
tax rate cuts actually implemented. The size and structure of the tax
cutting packages gave gains to upper middle and high income
groups, with the proportionate gain rising with income.
Over the 1994 to 1998 period, welfare rates rose by a little more
than prices, but not as fast as other incomes. There were, however,
some special increases for pensioners towards the end of the
period. The standard and top tax rates were cut, along with
widening of the standard rate band and increases in personal
allowances. There was also a restructuring of the PRSI system, with
an allowance structure being put in place. Low income families
fared less well under actual budgets than under a "distributionally
neutral" wage indexed benchmark, while those in the upper half of
the income distribution gained 4 to 5 per cent more. The richest 10
per cent of families gained about 4 per cent from Budget day
changes, over and above what they would have gained from the
simple indexation rule. But the poorest fifth of the population
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gained 2 per cent less from Budget day changes actually introduced
than from indexation.
The 1998 to 2001 period saw the greatest average gains, but
again the distribution of the gains was uneven. Those in the bottom
decile would have fared better under simple wage indexation, the
distributionally neutral benchmark policy. Others in the bottom 30
per cent of the income distribution saw gains of 2 to 4 per cent, but
much higher gains of 7 to 9 per cent were recorded by the lower
middle, middle and upper reaches of the income distribution.
The analysis set out in Figure 7.3 does not take account of any
distributional impact arising from the introduction of the National
Minimum Wage from April 2000. It would be misleading to view
this as a tool of redistributional policy, in the same way as income
tax or social welfare policy. A key difference between the
minimum wage and tax/welfare policy is that the immediate costs
of the former are borne by employers, with the immediate benefits
flowing to households, whereas the immediate costs and benefits of
tax and welfare policy can be attributed to government and to
households.
Figure 7.3: Distributive Impact of Budgetary Changes, 1987-2001
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Of course, the ultimate incidence of taxes may be quite different
from the initial "impact" effects. Similarly, in the context of the
national minimum wage a key concern is the size and nature of the
effects on employment associated with the introduction of the wage
or a change in its level. But there is likely to remain a substantial
contrast between the immediate impacts of these different policy
instruments.
In attempting to examine the distributional impact of gains from
the national minimum wage, we hold tax and welfare policy
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constant at the actual 2000 levels, and contrast a situation in which
the National Minimum Wage of £4.40 is introduced, with a scenario
in which no minimum wage is specified. Table 7.3 shows the
distribution of "cash gains" on impact, before any adjustments in
employment levels.
Table 7.31 Projected Distributional Impact of National Minimum
Wage, 2000
Decilesin the lower half of the income distribution gained by 3
to 4 per cent, typically. The proportionate and absolute gains for
those who do benefit from the minimum wage are, of course,
much more sizeable. There were some gains in the top half of the
income distribution as well, but the average gain falls to about 0.1
per cent for the top three deciles. In money terms, the aggregate
gain is concentrated on deciles 4 and 5, which together share about
half the total gain. A further one-third of the gain goes to the
bottom three deciles. These findings are in line with earlier
SWITCH-based estimates produced for the Interdepartmental Group
on the.Implementation of a National Minimum Wage (1999).
There are a number of features underlying these figures, which
caution against too precise an interpretation of the results. First, the
uprating of wage and salary incomes applies the same estimate of
average wage growth to earnings at all levels of the income
distribution. As a result the distribution of earnings is tied very
closely .to the underlying 1994 wage distribution. In particular, the
increase in.relative earnings for those towards the bottom of.the
earnings distribution, which appears to have occurred over this
period, is not caught by this projection. This means that the picture
shown here will tend to overstate the impact of the national
minimum wage. Second, even .with perfectly accurate data for 1999
and 2000, there would still be uncertainty over the extent to which
the rise in wages for the low paid reflected the strength of demand
for low-skilled labour, as against the introduction of the minimum
wage: Under the approach adopted here, the rise is attributed
wholly to the introduction of the minimum wage. Finally, even
with perfectly accurate data and analysis, there is the further issue
of how gains arising from (a change in) the minimum wage should
be interpreted in analysing the distributive effects of government
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policy. For this reason, we concentrate, when not analysing
(changes in) the minimum wage in its own right, on analysis of the
distributional impacts of tax and welfare policy, taking the
minimum wage for each year as a given.
"/.4
Recent
Budgets, 1999
to 2001:
Distributional
Impact
We now turn to a closer analysis of the last three budgets,
beginning with Budget 1999 (i.e., the budget announced in
December 1998 and implemented in 1999). Once again the
benchmark employed is indexation of tax allowances and bands,
and of social welfare rates, in line with earnings growth. Budget
1999 aimed at concentrating tax relief on low and middle income
earners, and restricting gains to those at the top of the income
distribution. This was to be achieved by restricting the value of
personal allowances to the standard rate of tax, and focusing tax
relief on increasing this standardised personal allowance.
Figure 7.4 shows that Budget 1999 gave the greatest gains in
proportionate terms to those in the middle of the income
distribution, with substantial gains for low earners and lesser gains
for high earners. It also shows that the bottom 20 to 30 per cent of
the income distribution did not share to the same extent in the
gains, relative to the wage indexation benchmark. Indeed, the
bottom 20 per cent of the population fared less well than under
simple wage indexation of tax and welfare parameters, while the
next decile fared only marginally better. Gains of about 2 to 3 per
cent were typical for the middle of the income distribution, while
the upper three deciles saw gains tapering off towards 1 per cent at
the very top. This was the year in which tax policy moved towards
tax credits, via a standard-rated personal allowance, and more
importantly, in which resources were concentrated on increasing
the standard-rated personal allowance. It is this latter feature which
helped to focus gains on the middle of the distribution rather than
its upper reaches.
A similar analysis for Budget 2000 (including post-Budget day
adjustments such as the Home Carer’s Allowance and the changes
to PRSI exemption limits) is shown in Figure 7.5.49 The average
gain in disposable income across all families was just under 3 per
cent, measured against the wage indexation benchmark. The
poorest one-fifth of family units did not share in this gain, with
losses for the poorest one-tenth. Middle and upper income family
units gained about this average, or slightly above. The relatively
low gains for the poorest income groups reflect the balance that
49 The major structural innovation in Budget 2000, and the element which received
most attention in the immediate aftermath, was the proposal to move towards
individualisation of the standard rate tax band by restricting transferability of
allowances across spouses. This has already been discussed in some detail in
Chapter 5, whereas here we are interested in the distributional impact of the
Budget as a whole.
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¯ was struck between increased welfare expenditure and tax cuts.
The upper reaches of the income distribution gained more from tax
rate cuts and the widening of bands (which, together with
individualisation of bands, was a major feature of Budget 2000). On
the other hand, post-budget adjustments such as the PRSI
exemption limits and the Home Carer’s Allowance were of greatest
proportionate benefit to the lower and middle reaches of the
earnings distribution.
Budget 2001 gave rise to an average gain of close to 3 per cent
above the indexation benchmark. Low income groups fared 1 or 2
per cent better than wage indexation on average, but middle and
higher income groups saw still greater gains.. Most other income
groups saw a gain of close to 3 per cent, with gains close to 4 per
cent in the fifth and ninth deciles. ¯These estimates take account of
the main changes in income tax rates, tax credits and the standard
rate band (including the further individualisation of the band). They
also include the main changes in social welfare payment rates.
Among the items not included is the distributive impact of the
Special Savings Incentive Scheme, whereby individuals can set up
special savings accounts, and the Government supplements every
£4 of savings with an additional £1.
Figure 7.4: Distributive Impact of 1999 Budget Against 1998 Policy
Indexed to Earnings
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7.5
Poverty
Prool~mg and
Poverty
Auditing
Figure 7.5: Distributive Impact of 2000 Budget Against 1999 Policy
Indexed to Earnings
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Figure 7.6: Distributive Impact of 2001 Budget Against 2000 Policy
Indexed to Earnings
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Guidelines for the implementation of poverty proofing
procedures were drawn up by the NAPS unit, and partial
assessments of the 2001 Budget were undertaken by the
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2001) and by
the Department of Finance (2001).
There are a number of limitations to these poverty proofing
exercises, as pointed out by Combat Poverty Agency (2001).
Neither provides a full assessment of the impact of tax and welfare
changes on poverty. The Budget documentation (Department of
Finance, 2001: Annex C, pp. C47-C50) provides an analysis of the
combined impact of income tax changes and child benefit, while
the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2001)
analysis looks at the impact of changes in social welfare (including
child benefit). The two analyses cannot be combined to provide an
overview.
The Department of Finance assessment states that the budgetary
income tax package will help to prevent people falling into
poverty, by raising disposable incomes and underpinning economic
development and employment growth. Furthermore, by reducing
tax at lower incomes and taking more of the lower paid out of the
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tax net, it is stated that the Budget addresses inequalities that might
lead tO poverty. The documentation for Budget 2001 goes on to
state that
...it is not intended that poverty proofing would require that all
policies be fundamentally transformed so that they are explicitly
targeted at the disadvantaged. It should also be pointed out that
the impact on poverty is one criterion for assessing the Budget.
There are many other legitimate goals and targets such as
increasing economic efficiency, rewarding effort and enterprise
and risk taking, removing market distortions, controlling
inflation and encouraging capital accumulation, all of which
improve economic welfare generally. (Department of Finance,
2001).
The Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2001)
considers the anti-poverty impact of changes in rates of payment,
changes in child benefit, and changes in FIS, against the standard
set of questions set out in the guidelines for poverty proofing. The
Department notes that higher payment rates will help to ameliorate
poverty by providing increased incomes to at-risk groups, and will
help to address inequalities that might lead to poverty. Similarly,
Child Benefit increases will, it is stated, act to reduce the level of
poverty, particularly as the highest increases go to larger families,
facing the greatest risk of poverty. Lastly, FIS increases will also
improve income support to an at risk group, and make it less likely
that they will fall into unemployment.
A key feature of both departments’ analysis is that the implicit
assumption is that policy impact can be measured against the
conventional benchmark of no change in the nominal values of tax
bands and welfare payments. We have seen in Section 7.2 that this
benchmark is a very uneven one: if implemented it would involve
income losses for welfare recipients, and income gains for those in
employment. A wage indexed benchmark was found more suitable
for distributional and poverty issues, as it involved equi-
proportionate growth across all income levels.
We now set out the impact of Budget 2001 on one of the key
poverty measures, the proportion of persons falling below half
average income. This is of interest in itself, as a broad measure of
poverty over time; and is an essential stepping stone in assessing
the impact of the Budget on the more immediate NAPS poverty
target of reducing consistent povelty. (On the relationship between
these measures of poverty, and their links to possible poverty
targets, including the NAPS targets, see Layte et al., 2001.)50
50 In order to move to an assessment of the impact on consistent poverty, one must
estimate or judge on the basis of available evidence, the likely impact of the budget
on the proportion of those below the income poverty line who are also
experiencing basic deprivation - which in principle involves not just a fixed set of
items regarded as necessities, but a socially-defined set of items which may change
over time.
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The SWITCH-based estimate of poverty for 2000 is a little under
20 per cent.51 Under a conventional opening budget this figure
would rise to just over 21 per cent. The actual policy implemented
for 2001 is estimated as giving rise to a poverty rate of just over 20
per cent. Thus, against the conventional benchmark, Budget 2001
would be assessed as reducing poverty by about one percentage
point. But a wage-indexed budget would see poverty remain at its
2000 level of just under 20 per cent. Measured against this
distributionally neutral standard, Budget 2001 is found to have
increased relative income poverty by about half a percentage point.
In our view, analysis of this type is needed to assess poverty
impacts in a systematic way.
We noted earlier (Chapter 3) that when consideration is being
given to strategies for the indexation of welfare payments, the lags
in relevant information must be explicitly taken into account.
Similar considerations apply to the analysis of the distributive and
poverty impacts of Budgets. We illustrate this point using Budget
2000. At the time of the introduction of the Budget (December
1999), the ESRI’s Quarterly Economic Commentary forecast price
inflation of 3 per cent, and wage growth of approximately 6 per
cent during 2000. A year later, price inflation was estimated to have
been 5.6 per cent, and wage growth was estimated at almost 8 per
cent. Thus, if budgetary policy had aimed at price indexation, an
adjustment of a further 2~A per cent to welfare payment rates would
have been needed; if the aim had been wage indexation, an
adjustment of something under 2 per cent would have been
required. If such adjustments were not to be made,5~ the ex ante
forecasts of the distributional and poverty impact of the budget
could be quite different from an ex post analysis of actual outturns.
This, in turn, suggests the need for systematic "poverty auditing" of
outcomes, which would become an input to the design of policy.
7.6
Conclusions
We have examined alternative benchmarks for the assessment of
the distributive and poverty impact of budgetary policy. While the
opening budget convention, as developed over the years, may
have particular attractions as a baseline for the construction of a
budget, it is not sufficient in itself as a benchmark for the
assessment or evaluation of budgets. Implementation of the
conventional opening budget would see relative income poverty
51
SWITCH-based estimates use the 1994 database projected forward, and use
simulated tax liabilities and welfare entitlements in order to be able to compare the
results of alternative policies. Thus the levels of poverty simulated by SWITCH
may not coincide with those produced from current data, but the impact of policy
changes may nonetheless be quite closely modelled.
52
Tax Strategy Group (2001b) does state that compensating "for higher-than-
expected inflation in 2000" was one of the primary objectives of the increase in
payment rates in Budget 2001.
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rise; as welfare recipients real incomes were reduced by inflation,
while those with earnings would usually see their real incomes rise.
Nevertheless, such a policy would be measured as having no
impact on poverty or income distribution. Provisions for price-
indexation of tax bands and allowances are sometimes seen as
protection against fiscal drag which’ may tend to distort decisions
on taxation and expenditure. But if policy followed this path,
average tax rates would still rise, and the incomes of welfare
recipients would fall behind in relative terms, as a result of real
income growth. If a price-indexed benchmark were used, the
measured impact on poverty would be zero - but relative income
poverty would rise from one year to the next.
These findings point towards the need for the measurement of
budgetary policy against a distributionally-neutral wage-indexed
benchmark. Using this benchmark we find that low income families
gained most during the i987 to 1994 period, while middle income
families Would have fared better under indexation. Higher income
families also gained, with the greatest gains at the top. During the
1994 to 2001 period, low income families fared less well than
others, with losses at the very bottom compared to the wage
indexation standard. The middle and upper reaches of the income
distribution saw gains of 14 to 15 per cent, with a rise of about 10
per cent for the top decile.
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy requires that significant
policy proposals, including the budget’s income tax and welfare
package, must be "poverty-proofed". Assessments of the anti-
poverty impact of these policies by relevant departments have not,
as yet, taken full advantage of the possibilities now offered by
SWITCH. The direct assessment of first-round impacts on relative
income poverty and the income distribution can provide results of
direct interest, and provide a framework for the discussion of
broader issues. The key issues concerning the choice of benchmark
policy (frozen in nominal terms or indexed with respect to
expected wage growth) also need to be addressed. Both
departmental assessments continue to use only the conventional
benchmark of "freezing" current year tax and welfare policy in
money terms, which is found to be highly unsatisfactory when
analysing issues of poverty and income distribution.
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APPENDIX 7.1: COMPARISON
OF OFHCIAL AND SWITCH-
BASED ESTIMATES OF COST
OF BUDGET 2001 INCOME
TAX AND WELFARE
CHANGES
Official estimates from the Budget 2001 documentation are
compared below with SWITCH-based estimates prepared on a
similar basis. The SWITCH estimate of the overall cost is within 2
per cent of the official estimate. The SWITCH estimate of the cost
of the tax and PRSI package is within 6 per cent of the official
estimate. The breakdown as between the major elements of the
package is also captured well. For example, the cost of changes to
allowances and credits forms 44 per cent of the total income tax
package for both the official and the SWITCH based estimates.
There are somewhat greater divergences in the estimated costs
of social welfare increases, with the SWITCH estimate 13 per cent
below the official estimate. A part of this is due to increases in
expenditure which are not modelled - such as respite care, and the
duration of the fuel allowance. While more recent data will help to
improve the quality of the estimates, a specially designed large
scale survey (like the Family Resources Survey in the UK) may be
needed to obtain a high degree of precision on low income groups.
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Table A.7.1: Estimated Full Year Costs of Income Tax and Social Welfare Changes
in Budget 2001
!
2 per cent cut inMandard rote of tax ,
2 per cent cut In IDp rateof tax
i Widening ~emdard ra~ bend -
~-,"~e ~ ,,We ,~
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i Rent a room’ : ....
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i PRSI and Levies    " ....
~. PRSI self4cr~oloyed (rate cut 2 percent,
I Sub-total PRSI ~ ..., ~ ,.
Notes:
Sources:
n.m.=not modelled by SWITCH.
*Respite care not modelled,
The table excludes the cost of increasing non-cash social welfare benefits, which are not
modelled in SWITCH.
Dept of Finance (2001) and authors’ calculations using SWITCH.
8. KEY POLICY CHOICES
8.1
Introduction
In earlier chapters we have considered possible changes to
particular elements of the tax and transfer system. Chapter 7,
however, considered the overall impact of budgetary packages in
the recent past, and over a longer time span. In this chapter we
look at alternative budgetary packages in the future.
Section 8.2 considers recent policy trends, and stated
government or partnership targets, in an attempt to construct
realistic projections of 2003 policy structures. As well as a "central"
case, we consider a rebalancing of fiscal priorities in favour of
social welfare increases rather than tax cuts; and conversely, a
scenario in which priority is given to tax cuts, with welfare
increases attenuated. In Section 8.3 the policy scenarios thus
constructed are compared with the wage-indexed benchmark,
which, as outlined in the previous chapter, represents a
distributionally and fiscally neutral benchmark. This allows the
impact on the income distribution, and the first-round impact on
relative income poverty, to be identified. Section 8.3 also looks at a
possible variation from the continuation of past policy trends,
focusing tax cutting effort on personal tax allowances/credits.
Section 8.4 goes on to examine the impact of the alternative
packages on marginal tax rates (a measure of incentives facing
those in work) and replacement rates (a measure particularly
relevant to those out of work, though also potentially relevant to
some employees). Section 8.5 brings together the main findings.
Box 8.1: Welfare Economics and
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While an exact prediction of future policy cannot be expected, it
is possibleto specify and analyse a scenario in which recent and
current policy trends are continued. We can expect that this
scenario will capture the main features of a continuation of present
policy trends.
First, it is necessary to specify the resource envelope within
which tax/transfer policy must operate. The size of overall tax
welfare package depends iriter alia on broader economic trends,
and on priorities as between other spending (e.g., health,
education, roads) and Welfare spending. While these factors are
subject to change, some indication of the overall size of the
tax/welfare package can be obtained from the projections relating
to the stability programme, attached to the budget. Notes to tables
projecting the situation in 2002 and 2003, supplied in Department
Of Finance (2001); state that they include "technical provisions
under the expenditure and tax headings for possible future
budgets, With full year costs of £1.3 billion in 2002 and £1.2 billion
in 2003". The costs of changes announced in Budget 2001 for
implementation in Budget 2002 and 2003 are included within these
technical provisions. In recent years these technical provisions have
tended to underpredict the size of the actual budget package, but
slower growth in recent months, and the possibility of a more
sustained downturn, make it prudent to use these figures as the
basis for determining a "resource envelope" for medium-term
analysis. Not all of the budgetary package goes to personal tax or
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Table 8.1:
social welfare spending; some goes also to other areas of
expenditure and costs of other tax reductions: we use a figure of
four-fifths the total provision, or £2,000m, as the total size of the
tax/welfare package envisaged by 2003. A counterbalancing factor
is that wage growth appears, according to the latest Quarterly
Economic Commentary, to be proceeding at a faster pace than was
assumed in the Department of Finance forecasts underlying
budgetary . .    53projections. Allowing for this, the nominal amount
available for tax cuts and/or welfare increases is of the order of
£2,500m.
Second, we consider the allocation of these resources as
between cuts in income tax and PRSI contributions and welfare
increases. Table 8.1 analyses how resources have been allocated
over the seven year periods ending in 1994 and 2001, and also for
the last three individual budgets. For the various periods of interest,
the basic procedure is the same. The cost of the base period policy,
indexed in line with nominal wage growth, is calculated. The total
cost of policy changes since the base period can then be
decomposed into the cost needed to index the tax and welfare
system in line with gross wages, and the resources over and above
that cost actually allocated to the tax and/or welfare systems.
(While the discussion of indexation in Chapter 3 refers to the
alternative possibilities of indexing welfare to growth in gross
wages or net wages, in the present context it is indexation of both
the tax and the welfare systems which is used to provide a neutral
benchmark for the decomposition.)
Costs of Indexation to Wages, and Total Costs of Tax and Welfare Budgetary
Packages
Source: Estimated using SWITCH.
Over the 1987 to 1994 sub-period, welfare expenditure
increased by less than would have been required for indexation to
gross wages: by contrast, the tax system was allocated more than
53The report of the Tax Forecasting Methodology Group (Department of Finance,
1999) stresses that "...under forecast of growth in the economy has been the
principal cause of the under forecast of tax revenue during the 1990s".
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was required by indexation. During the 1994 to 2001 sub-period,
both the tax and welfare systems were allocated more resources
than were required for wage indexation; but the welfare system
received under 10 per cent of the total resources over and above
indexation, while the tax system was allocated about 90 per cent.
During 1998 and 1999, this broad trend was still in place, with
social welfare expenditure being increased by about the same rate
as wage indexation, and the tax system being allocated resources
over and above what wage indexation required. But the size of the
child benefit increase in-Budget 2001 was such that the welfare
system received about 22 per cent of the total resources over and
above indexation, with the share of the tax system falling just
below 80 per cent. It should be noted that the fact that sufficient
resources were allocated to the welfare system to allow for
indexation in line with nominal wage growth is no guarantee that
all payment rates will have risen in line with wages: the
concentration of resources on particular aims, such as the increase
in child benefit, may mean that other rates were increased by less
than wage growth. Also, as seen earlier, when a large share of
resources, over and above indexation, is devoted to tax reductions,
then the rate, of growth in welfare payment will fall below growth
in net earnings.
Turning back to the division of resources as between the tax
and welfare systems, past experience indicates that the welfare
system could not expect much more than 20 per cent of the total
resources (over and above wage indexation) available to the tax
transfer system. Indeed, the proportion could be a good deal less,
and an average proportion over the period would lie between zero
and 10 per cent. However, before constructing a scenario based on
such an assumption regarding the resource allocation, it is useful to
examine the specific commitments on welfare policy included in
the Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness (Ireland, 2000).
A paper on social welfare strategy for the Tax Strategy Group
(2000b) sets out the main social welfare commitments in the
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness. Those outstanding after
Budget 2001 include the following:
¯ All rates of social welfare will be increased in real terms in
the period up to 2003.
¯ The Government’s £100 target for all old age pensions will
be achieved by 2002.
¯ Over the period up to 2002, all old age pensions will
increase in line with average industrial earnings.
.................... "-’-.~. ......Substantial-,-progress~, will,’, bed,’made, over ~::the: period "up to
2003 towards a target rate of £100 per week for the lowest
social welfare rates.
In addition, Budget 2001 announced not only increases in Child
Benefit for 2001, but also the rates that would be reached by 2003:
¯ £117.50 per month for the first and second child and
¯ £146 per month for third and higher order children.
KEY POLICY CHOICES 105
These commitments can be used to specify a likely future
welfare policy scenario, which can be costed to determine the
implied split of resources between the welfare and tax systems.
The commitments regarding payment rates for pensions and for
non-elderly social welfare recipients can be approximated by wage
indexation over the years 2002 and 2003. This would see personal
rates of Old Age Contributory Pension exceed £120, while the non-
contributory rate would reach £110 in 2003. Most rates would be at
least £98 with the lowest rates within £3.50 of the £100 target.
Wage indexation of social welfare rates to 2003, along with
indexation of tax parameters, would leave about £950m from the
total resource envelope. The net cost of the substantial increases in
child benefit (allowing for savings from "freezing" the rates of
payment for child dependant additions) is about £470m. Even with
no further welfare increases, this leaves the share of welfare in the
resources over and above indexation at about 50 per cent. If the
share were to be below this, it would imply a failure to attain some
of the specific targets laid out above e.g., failure to raise child
benefit rates to the levels announced, or rates for the elderly not
being raised in line with wage growth, or other rates not being
raised close to £100 by 2003.
Similarly, we may look at outstanding tax commitments in the
government’s Action Programme for the Millennium (APM), and in
the Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) for indications of
likely future action:
¯ The standard rate tax band will be broadened "to ensure
that 80 per cent of taxpayers do not pay the higher rate on
any part of their income" (APM) and "The social partners
support the policy of establishing a single standard rate tax
band for all individual taxpayers. They also agree that the
standard rate income tax band should be kept under review
in the light of increases in income levels and the objective
of ensuring that, over time, at least 80 per cent of taxpayers
are not subject to the higher rate of income tax" (PPF).
¯
"If economic circumstances permit, the objective will be to
reduce the higher rate to 40 per cent during the lifetime of
the Government" (APM).
¯ "The Government and the social partners regard increases
in tax credits and the development of the tax credit system
as priority areas for resources" (PPF).
¯ "It is an agreed policy objective of the government and the
social partners that, over time, all those earning the
minimum wage will be removed from the tax net" (PPF).
The quantitative implications of these objectives are not quite so
clear-cut. For example, what judgement will be made as to whether
"economic circumstances permit" reduction in the top rate of tax to
40 per cent? And as regards increases in tax credits, the time scale
envisaged for the removal of those on minimum incomes from the
tax net will determine the rate at which personal tax credits will
rise. Budget 2001 states that as a result of the band widening "the
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proportion of income earners on the higher rate will fall to 23 per
cent". The implication seems to be that reaching the declared
target (no more than 20 per cent on the higher rate) would require
fairly modest increases in the width of the standard rate band, over
and above indexation in line with earnings.
We construct three distinct scenarios, taking into account the
information (and the uncertainties), set out above: each operates
within the resource envelope described. The central scenario is one
in which the specific welfare commitments are met, and remaining
resources are applied to tax reductions. An alternative scenario
gives higher priority to tax cuts, which, with a fixed resource
envelope, implies that welfare increases are curtailed. Third, we
examine a scenario in which welfare payments receive higher
priority, and tax changes are limited to those offsetting the effects
of wage growth.
Key tax and welfare parameters associated with each of the
scenarios are set out in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Specification of Policy Scenarios
~ ............... ’ ’" " ~ to TaX
i Income Tax
I Penional tax free alowan~ £7,900
i Standard rate band (~g~) £25,000
i ~ rate band (2-earner coup) £50,000t Standard rate band (1-earner couple) £31,t
Standard tax rate
i .Top tax rate
Soc/a! We/fare
i r Old Age (Con~buV~) Pension
!OkJ Age (~) Pe.sk~
Unemployment Benefit £90.4O
Chi~ ~ O=j2~ ch,d)
CN~ Ben~ (3" chik~ up)
i Costs in excess of indexa#onSodal welfam
i Tax
Memo item: Costs of indexation are £928m for tax, £750m for social welfare.
Note: FIS income limits adjusted to maintain cash gap between income in-work (with FIS) and income out of
work (with UB).
In the central scenario, all the major welfare targets are met: the
lowest pension rates reach £100 in 2002 and rise in line with wages
in 2003, and other personal rates are close to the £100 level in
2003. Child benefit reaches the levels announced in Budget 2001.
The remaining resources are sufficient to permit wage indexation of
other elements of the tax and welfare systems, and to allow for a
package of tax cuts including 2 percentage points off the top rate,
substantial increases in personal allowances and widening of the
standard rate band. Under the scenario entitled "priority to tax" all
welfare rates (including child benefit) are scaled back - implying
that welfare targets are not met - so that resources over and above
indexation go purely to income tax cuts. This allows further
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8.3
Implications
for Income
Distribution
and Poverty
increases in basic personal allowances and some further widening
of the standard rate band, as well as a one percentage point cut in
the standard rate of tax. Conversely, a budgetary package with all
resources above indexation devoted to welfare expenditure could
see rates of payment rise by about £10 to £11 per week above the
central scenario.
In the next sections we explore some of the implications of
these and other packages for the distribution of income, relative
income poverty, marginal tax rates and replacement rates.
The first-round distributional impact of the alternative policy
packages are illustrated in Figures 8.1 to 8.3. (The same scale is
used on the vertical axis for all three figures, in order to facilitate
comparisons.) The central option, with half of the resources above
indexation going to tax and half to welfare, yields a fairly even
spread of gains across the income distribution. The largest gains are
in the second decile (about 3:A per cent) and the smallest (I:A to 2
per cent) are in deciles 3, 7 and 8; all the rest have gains between
2 and 3 per cent. Compared to the spread of gains shown by many
actual budgets, this is quite narrow.
Figure 8.2 shows quite a different picture for the outcome when
all resources over and above those needed for indexation to wages
are allocated to tax reductions. There are substantial losses - from
3:A to over 5 per cent - at the bottom of the income distribution,
relative to a wage indexation benchmark. This contrasts with gains
of about 3 per cent for deciles in the upper half of the income
distribution.
An alternative use of resources is to reverse the trend of recent
years and aim at welfare increases which exceed the wage
indexation benchmark. Under this scenario, the income tax system
would simply be indexed in line with wages, and all other
budgetary resources would be applied to increases in personal and
qualified adult rates (with increased child income support coming
wholly through the specified increases in child benefit). Gains are
highest in the bottom two deciles, and decline steadily to very low
levels of gain for the top income deciles. For the bottom 30 per
cent of family units, average gains are of the order of 10 per cent.
In the remainder of the bottom half there are gains of 3 to 5 per
cent. In the upper half of the distribution gains fall from 2 per cent
to less than half of 1 per cent.
What about the implications of the alternative policy packages
for relative income poverty? Table 8.3 sets out the impact of the
packages on some of the key indicators of relative income poverty.
Mean disposable income is, of course, nearly identical across the
three options. But differences in the distribution of income brought
about by the relative scales of the tax cuts and welfare spending
have significant implications for the incidence of relative income
poverty.
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Figure 8.1: Distributive Impact of Central Policy Scenario 2003,
against 2001 Policy Indexed to Earnings Growth
°.4 change in disposable income
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Figure 8.2: Distributive Impact of "Priority to Tax" Policy Scenario
2003, against 2001 Policy Indexed to Earnings Growth
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Figure 8.3: Distributive Impact of "Priority to Welfare" Policy
Scenario 2003, against 2001 Policy Indexed to Earnings
Growth
% change in disposable income
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Table 8.3: Impact of Alternative Policy Options on Relative Income Poverty
Memo item: Relative income poverty rate at 50 per cent of mean income is 21.1 per cent under wage indexed policy.
About 21 per cent of households fall below half average income
under the central option. This is very close to the number falling
below half average income under the simple wage indexation
benchmark. Reallocating resources towards tax cuts raises the
proportions below 50 and 60 per cent of average income by about
one percentage point. Reallocation towards welfare expenditure, on
the other hand, reduces the proportion below half average income
by about 21A percentage points, and the proportion below 60 per
cent of average income by something under one percentage point.
Analysis using more comprehensive measures of poverty (taking
into account the depth, or the depth and distribution of poverty)
confirms that the results stated are not simply dependent on the
location of the poverty line or on the properties of the head count
measure. But these more sophisticated measures also show a
greater "symmetry" about the central option e.g., the poverty gap at
half average income rises and falls by about the same amount
under the priority to tax and priority to welfare options
respectively. The fact that moving from "priority to tax" to the
central option lowers the head count at half average income
reflects the fact that many individuals are pushed from just below
to just above the poverty line.
Finally, we consider the impact of changing the structure of tax
cuts, within a given size of tax-cutting package. We start from the
central option, and consider what might happen if all the resources
available to the tax system (over and above the costs of wage
indexation) were applied to increasing the basic personal
allowance or tax credit; versus a situation in which tax credits were
simply indexed and all additional resources were applied to
reducing rates and band widening. Table 8.4 sets out the main
results in terms of head count measures of relative income poverty.
I I0 REFORMING TAX AND WELFARE
Table 8.4: Impact of Alternative Tax Cuts on Relative Income
Poverty
%of~sl
~’ 40%
1 50%0f mean income ~/~
The incidence of persons falling below 40 per cent of average
income is unaffected by the structure of the tax cuts: few if any
taxpayers are included in this group. Even at half average income,
the variation in the structure of the tax cut makes a difference of
only one-tenth of 1 per cent to the head count of those in poverty.
At the higher, 60 per cent relative poverty line, the difference is
marginally greater.
Figure 8.4: Distributive Impact of Alternative Forms of Tax Cuts
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o~ 1.0%
0.5%
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Deciles of income per adult equivalent
Do more significant differences appear further up the income
distribution? Figure 8.4 shows that there are more significant
differences in the middle and upper reaches of the income
distribution. Thus, from an overall distributional perspective both
the size and the structure of tax cuts matters; but from a relative
poverty perspective, the key factor is the allocation of resources as
between tax cuts and welfare increases.
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8.4
Implications
for Financial
Incentives to
Work
We consider two major aspects of the financial incentive to
work. For those who are in employment, we consider the effective
marginal tax rate. This is made up of the marginal rates of income
tax and employee social insurance contributions/levies, together
with the benefit withdrawal rate arising for recipients of Family
Income Supplement. This concept is of most relevance to decisions
about an extra hour or an extra day’s work. For those who are
unemployed or classify themselves as engaged in home duties, a
more relevant measure of the financial incentive to work is
provided by the replacement rate - the ratio of the family’s
disposable income out-of-work to disposable income in work.
Table 8.5 shows how marginal tax rates for employees are
affected by variations from the central policy scenario (wage
indexation of tax and welfare, plus extra resources to meet the
child benefit target, with remaining resources applied to tax cuts).
Table 8.5: Impact of Alternative Policies on Marginal Tax Rates
Memo item: Number of individuals: 1.15m.
Under the "priority to tax" option, there is a fall in the standard
rate of tax from 20 per cent to 19 per cent, affecting about two-
thirds of employees. Most of the remainder see no change, but just
under 3 per cent are affected by either additional widening of the
standard rate band (bringing some individuals from the top rate to
the standard rate of tax) or increased allowances (removing others
from the tax net). Under the "priority to welfare" scenario, marginal
tax rates are unaffected for close to two-thirds of employees. About
one third - those on the top rate of tax - would have a tax rate two
percentage points higher than in the central policy option. This is
because the "priority to welfare" option foregos the two percentage
point cut in the top rate of tax, in order to concentrate resources on
welfare increases. A further 3 per cent would have tax rates at least
twenty percentage points higher than in the base case. About half
of this is due to differences in the width of the standard rate band
and the personal allowance; the other half is due to higher income
limits for FIS, which make more persons eligible. While net
incomes are boosted, the withdrawal rate for FIS also boosts the
marginal tax-cum-benefit withdrawal rate.
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Table 8.6: Impact of Alternative Policies on Replacement Rates for the Unemployed (on UA or
UB)
i 40
~ Over 80% .........................
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show the distribution of replacement rates -
the ratio of out-of-work family income to in-work family income -
under the alternative policy scenarios. Table 8.6 shows that 13 per
cent of unemployed persons would have a replacement rate above
70 per cent (a commonly used cut-off) under the central policy
scenario. This proportion would rise to almost 16 per cent under
the priority to welfare scenario, but would fall to 11 per cent under
the priority to tax option.
Table 8.7: Impact of Alternative Policies on Replacement Rates for those Engaged in Home
Duties (Self-reported)
Less than 20%
20 to 40%
40 to 60%
60 to. 70%
70 to80%
Over 80%
Total.    , ............
8.5
Conclusions
Table 8.7 examines replacement rates facing those who classify
themselves as engaged in home duties. Under the central policy
option, about one-third would face replacement rates above 70 per
cent. This would rise by about two percentage points under the
priority to welfare option, or fall by about two percentage points
under the priority to tax option.
Similar analysis for employees shows that the policy alternatives
above have very little impact on the incidence of high replacement
rates among employees: it remains low under each option (at about
11 to 12 per cent).
q-i
’l-he trade-offs’ between levels0f income support and the tax rates
required to finance them are faced in the construction of the annual
budget. The current positioning of the tax/transfer system along
that trade-off reflects the accumulation of past choices in the
allocation of resources. Over the past 14 years, we found that on
average, the welfare system obtained no more than 10 per cent of
the incremental resources available to the tax/transfer system (over
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and above what would be required by wage indexation). Looking
to the future however, specific commitments on welfare, and the
indicative level of resources for tax and transfer changes, would
imply something more like a 50-50 split of additional resources as
between the tax and welfare systems. If the more usual relationship
(10:90) is to hold, and the specific welfare commitments are to be
met, then the size of the resource envelope would have to
increase.
Working within the resource envelope indicated by Budget
2001, we constructed a central policy scenario around specific tax
and welfare commitments (mainly in Budget 2001 and the
Partnership for Prosperity and Fairness). Variations from this
scenario, giving priority to tax or to welfare, in the allocation of
resources, were also considered. These showed that key poverty
indicators, such as the proportion of individuals below half average
income, could be significantly influenced by the allocation of
resources as between welfare and tax. The structure of tax cuts had
little impact on poverty rates, but did affect the distribution of
resources among the top 70 per cent of the population: a focus on
basic personal allowances favoured low and middle income
earners, while rate cuts and band widening favoured those towards
the top.
Turning to financial work incentives, we can identify the other
aspect of the trade-off between levels of income support and tax
rates. We found that 13 per cent of unemployed persons would
have a replacement rate above 70 per cent (a commonly used cut-
off) under the central policy scenario. This proportion would rise to
almost 16 per cent under the priority to welfare scenario, but
would fall to 11 per cent under the priority to tax option. For those
in employment, a majority would face a marginal tax rate no more
than two percentage points different as between the priority to tax
and priority to welfare scenarios. But about 6 per cent would see
tax rates differ by around twenty percentage points, mostly as a
result of differences in levels of personal allowances or the width
of the standard rate band.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Government’s concern about the impact of policy on poverty has
led to procedures for "poverty proQfing" which are now required
for all major policy initiatives - including the annual budget. The
latest social partnership agreement - as might be expected from its
title, the Programme for .Prosperity and Fairness - also shows
particular concern, about distributional issues. The taxation section
includes mention of increasing take-home pay "especially for those
below average earnings" and developing "the structure of the tax
system to deliver benefits and focus resources in an equitable
manner". Much of the work reported here is highly relevant to
these concerns. In this chapter we summarise the main findings
and conclusions, organised around four main themes: poverty-
proofing, the balance between welfare increases and tax cuts, the
tax and welfare treatment of individuals and families, and child
income support.
9.1
Poverty-
Proof’rag
under NAPS
The benchmark usually used at budget time is that the impact of
the budget can be measured by projecting the current system, with
tax rates and welfare rates unchanged in nominal terms, into the
future. Estimates of the impact of the budget on poverty are based
on this "conventional opening budget". But over a ten year period,
this official estimate could show that the impact of each year’s
budget has been to reduce poverty, while the actual poverty rate
was unchanged throughout the period. The key to this apparent
paradox is that the "conventional opening budget" is not neutral: if
implemented, it would lead to a fall in the real incomes of welfare
recipients, and rises in real income further up the distribution.
A neutral benchmark is needed, under which the incomes of all
families grow at the same rate, and tax revenue remains a steady
proportion of income. One such benchmark is provided by
indexation of tax and welfare parameters with respect to nominal
wage growth. If this policy were implemented, the income
distribution would be unchanged, and relative income poverty rates
would be constant. Measured against this benchmark, we find that
low income families gained most during the 1987 to 1994 period,
while middle income families would have fared better under
indexation. Higher income families also gained, with the greatest
gains at the top. During the 1994 to 2001 period, low income
families fared less well than others, with losses at the very bottom
compared to the wage indexation standard. The middle and upper
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9.2
Tax Cuts and
Welfare
Increases
reaches of the income distribution saw gains of 14 to 15 per cent,
with a rise of about 10 per cent for the top decile.
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy requires that significant
policy proposals, including the budget’s income tax and welfare
package, must be "poverty-proofed". Assessments of the anti-
poverty impact of these policies by relevant departments have not,
as yet, taken full advantage of the possibilities now offered by
SWITCH. The direct assessment of first-round impacts on relative
income poverty and the income distribution can provide results of
direct interest, and provide a framework for the discussion of
broader issues. The key issues concerning the choice of benchmark
policy (frozen in nominal terms or indexed with respect to
expected wage growth) also need to be addressed. Both
departmental assessments continue to use only the conventional
benchmark of "freezing" current year tax and welfare policy in
money terms, which is found to be highly unsatisfactory when
analysing issues of poverty and income distribution. In the year
2000, for example, measurement against the conventional
benchmark suggests that the budget led to a slight fall in relative
income poverty, whereas measurement against the neutral, wage
indexation benchmark suggests that the impact of the budget was a
rise of half a percentage point (at the 50 per cent relative income
poverty line). Official statements, at the same time, point to a fall in
poverty. It may be that part of this difference relates to a difference
of focus - on the relative income poverty line, as against the
measure of consistent poverty in the NAPS target. But even if the
central focus is on consistent poverty, poverty-proofing guidelines
indicate that attention should be given to the impact on inequalities
that give rise to poverty.
Broad options for tax and welfare policy between now and the
end of 2003 - the end of the current Partnership agreement - were
examined. Commitments under the PPF and the Government’s
Action Programme for the Millennium, as well as the future
changes to Child Benefit announced in Budget 2001, were used to
build up a central case scenario. This involved an approximately
equal split of resources over and above those required by wage
indexation as between the tax and welfare systems. Over the past
14 years, however, welfare’s share has been no more than 10 per
cent on average. Two variations from the central case were
examined: one in which priority was given to welfare (implying a
100 per cent share in available resources above indexation, with
none for tax reductions) and the other giving priority to income tax
reductions (implying no extra resources for welfare, as all would go
to tax reductions).
Key poverty indicators, such as the proportion of the population
below half average income, could be significantly affected by the
allocation of resources as between welfare and tax. For example,
the proportion of persons below half average income is some 31A
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percentage points higher under the "priority to tax cuts" scenario as
against the "priority to welfare" scenario.
This is, of course, a static estimate which does not take account
of behavioural responses in the labour market. But the implications
of the alternative policy choices for financial work incentives were
also identified. The proportion of unemployed persons with a
replacement rate (ratio of out-of-work to in-work income) above 70
per cent varied from 11 per cent, for the option giving priority to
tax cuts, to 16 per cent, for the option giving priority to welfare
increases. In the central case, about 13 per cent of unemployed
individuals had high replacement rates.
9.3
Tax and
Welfare
Treatment of
Individuals
and Couples
Tax systems varied quite substantially across countries, but the
1970s and early 1980s saw seven European countries move from
systems based on joint taxation towards independent or individual
taxation of husband and wife. In Ireland, Budget 2000 took an
initial step in this direction, continued in Budget 2001.
As with many areas of public policy, social preferences have a
vital role to play in determining the design of a tax/transfer
structure which can best serve social goals. It would be unrealistic,
on this account, to expect analysis to give rise to an answer that
can command universal support: in this area, as in so many others,
there is no "right answer". The contribution that can be made by
economic analysis is twofold. First, it can help to clarify the
outcomes that will be associated with particular policies. Second, it
can help to distinguish between more and less efficient policies in
achieving certain goals.
Neither the pre- nor post-1980 Irish income tax system was
"marriage neutral". Instead, the system moved from one in which
many individuals faced a "marriage penalty" to one in which none
faced a penalty, and many benefited from a subsidy. Consider two
couples, each with one earner, but one couple being married and
the other cohabiting. The tax bill of the married couple is below
that of the unmarried couple. This is what would be recognised in
the economics literature as a "marriage subsidy". The recent moves
towards an individualised standard rate band have reduced this
subsidy, in the case of top rate taxpayers, but increased it (through
the Home Carer’s Allowance) for others.
The economic case for a marriage subsidy depends on two
elements. First, that marriage has an "external benefit" from
society’s point of view, perhaps through positive effects on child
well-being. An argument for government intervention would
require (a) that there is a causal relationship between marriage and
child well-being and (b) that individual decisions about marriage
do not take full account of these social benefits. The rationale of
the "marriage subsidy" has been seen as a support for those caring
full time for children or relatives who are elderly or disabled. But
here, economic analysis tells us that there are more efficient ways
of providing such support.
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For example, let us consider the target group as families with
children.54 If this is so, then a tax subsidy based on marriage is ill-
targeted. Many of the target group would receive no benefit, and
many who receive benefit are not in the target group. (Fahey,
1998.) Even if the tax subsidy were restricted to families with
children its targeting would be problematic. If, as was the case for
many years, the tax concession for such families consisted of an
allowance, or a combination of a standardised allowance and extra
band width, this would be of greatest value to top rate taxpayers. A
more equitable mechanism for the support of children is readily
available, in the form of child benefit. Individualised taxes can,
together with specific benefits like child benefit and carer’s benefit,
offer a more efficient and effective way of achieving social goals.
As ever, much depends on the detail of the rates of taxes and
benefits. In this connection, it is worth noting that the main child
benefit rate increased by something under 25 per cent in 2000 (the
year individualisation was introduced); but the total increase will be
240 per cent by 2003, on current policy plans.
54
Similar comments would apply with respect to other target groups such as
elderly or disabled persons needing care.
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